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Abstract 
Anthropologists have long recognized the central role of social systems in 
enhancing environmental sustainability, but few have attempted to accurately 
assess the conditions under which traditional social institutions can equitably and 
effectively manage access to natural resources for the purposes of their use and 
conservation. By failing to look closely at how resource management practices are 
shaped both by local-Ievel cultural institutions and the political and economic 
forces of government policies and markets, anthropologists have compounded the 
confusion surrounding the functions and capacities of traditional resource 
management institutions. 
This dissertation examines the connections between institutional and 
economic incentives and resource use and management decisions among the Naso 
indigenous people in Bocas dei Toro, Panama. The study incorporates insights 
from development anthropology, common property systems and political ecology 
to develop a multi-sited approach that uses multiple research methods. A detailed 
household survey (n=54 or 18% of Naso households located within the eight 
villages surveyed in 2004) was used to obtain socio-demographic data and to 
establish patterns of land tenure and resource use. Preliminary and follow-up 
interviews were also conducted with community leaders, government officials and 
representatives of various national and international organizations with a stake in 
the conservation and/or development of the N aso region. 
As a group, the Naso were found to use both indigenous and imported 
technologies to manage a wide range of natural resources towards ensuring the 
economic, cultural and ecological viability of their communities. However, recent 
legislation intended to recognize Naso land rights and a hydroelectric project 
nearing construction on Naso lands have sought to modify the formal rules and 
organizations that have traditionally served to order local resource tenure and 
management practices. This thesis analyses the guidelines and criteria invoked by 
the various stakeholders involved with these projects in order to assess the equity 
of the distribution of their social and environmental impacts. It highlights the need 
to become more sceptical and sophisticated when assessing the objectives and 
justifications provided by the academics, government agencies, local authorities 
and private companies involved in the conservation and development of 
indigenous peoples' territorial resources. 
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Résumé 
Depuis longtemps, les anthropologues reconnaissent l'importance des facteurs 
sociaux pour assurer la durabilité environnementale. Pourtant, peu ont essayé 
d'évaluer de façon systématique les conditions favorables à une gestion efficace et 
équitable des ressources naturelles par les institutions sociales traditionnelles. Par 
défaut d'analyse adéquate de ces institutions locales, ou bien des dynamiques 
politiques et économiques régionales et internationales qui les affectent, les 
anthropologues ont souvent contribués à accroître la confusion quand à leurs 
capacités de fonctionnement dans la gestion des ressources naturelles. 
Cette thèse examine les liens entre les incitatifs économiques et 
institutionnelles et la gestion des ressources naturelles du territoire du peuple 
autochtone Naso au Panama. La recherche est fondée sur une réflexion provenant 
des domaines de l'anthropologie du développement, l'étude des régimes fonciers 
communautaires et l'écologie politique. La méthodologie est qualitative, même si 
un sondage domestique (n=54 ou 18% des résidences comprises parmi les huit 
villages Naso sondés en 2004) a permis de quantifier plusieurs des tendances 
socio-économiques et foncières observées. Des entrevus ont aussi été réalisés 
auprès de diverses autorités locales, fonctionnaires et représentants 
d'organisations non gouvernementales, du secteur privé, et des institutions 
internationales engagés dans le développement et la conservation des ressources 
naturelles et culturelles de la région Naso. 
Ceci a permis de constater que les Naso emploient une gamme de technologies 
autochtones et adoptés pour s'assurer de la viabilité socio-économique et 
environnementale de leurs familles et communautés. Cependant, une nouvelle loi 
destinée à reconnaître leurs droits ancestraux, plusieurs initiatives de conservation 
de la biodiversité, et un projet de barrage hydroélectrique prévu sur leur territoire 
proposent de modifier les règles de fonctionnement des organisations 
traditionnelles Naso présentement impliqués dans la gestion social et 
environnementale. Cette thèse analyse également les normes et les critères 
invoqués par les parties prenantes associés à ces initiatives pour évaluer l'équité 
de la distribution de leurs impacts sociaux et environnementaux. Elle souligne la 
nécessité d'entreprendre des études plus rigoureuses et critiques des objectifs et 
des impacts des projets de développement et de conservation des ressources 
territoriaux des peuples autochtones. 
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Resumen 
Por largo tiempo, los antrop6logos han reconocido el papel central que han 
jugado los sistemas sociales en el manejo sostenible de los recursos naturales, 
pero pocos han procurado precisar las condiciones - por ejemplo: caractensticas 
deI recurso y deI grupo, incentivos econ6micos e institucionales, etc. - bajo las 
cuales comunidades locales pueden efectivamente implementar medidas de 
conservaci6n. Esta negligencia disciplinaria es responsable por la laguna 
substancial con que nos encontramos hoy sobre el funcionamiento y las 
capacidades de las instituciones tradicionales involucradas en el manejo de los 
recursos naturales. Dicha falta de una adecuada comprensi6n sigue permitiendo 
que una concepci6n err6nea sea la mas influyente en el diseno de las innovaciones 
institucionales y organizativas en proyectos de desarrollo y conservaci6n tales 
coma los contemplados para el territorio Naso de Bocas deI Toro, Panama. 
La regi6n N aso de Bocas deI Toro en Panama resulta muy interesante para 
estudiar la dinâmica institucional correspondiente al acceso y manejo de los 
recursos naturales porque en eI ano 2005 existieron tres grandes proyectos de 
desarrollo y conservaci6n que plantearon medidas para reordenar el territorio. De 
hecho, aunque los tres proyectos contemplados para el ârea Naso difieren bastante 
entre si en cuanto a sus objetivos fundamentales: 1) producir y vender energia 
hidroeléctrica, 2) reconocer y delimitar una nueva jurisdicci6n territorial, y 3) 
respaldar el desarrollo sostenible en las comunidades indigenas de la zona, los 
promotores de cada iniciativa sostienen querer facilitar la recuperaci6n de los 
valores culturales de las poblaciones indigenas y propiciar sus practicas 
tradicionales de uso sostenible de la tierra. 
Esta tesis presenta un analisis de los conflictos relacionados con las divers as 
representaciones sociales, culturales y ambientales desarrolladas en toma a estas 
tres propuestas para evaluar la equidad de la distribuci6n de sus impactos. 
Enfatizo la necesidad de realizar anâlisis mas sofisticados y de ser mas escépticos 
con respecto a las justificaciones brindadas por las autoridades tradicionales, 
agencias gubemamentales y empresas privadas involucradas en proyectos de 
desarrollo y conservaci6n de los recursos naturales en âreas indigenas. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Anthrapologists - no longer the bearded and greatcoated explorers 
plying remote waters in search of radical difference - may, pravided they 
are as flexible as the identities they theorize about, attain a pivotai societal 
raIe as political analysts. 
(Eriksen 2001: 145) 
1.1 Indigenous rights and resource management 
The 'tiger' identified in the title of this thesis is actually a jaguar (panthera 
onca) that can easily weigh in excess of 150 kilos. This large cat - know locally 
as 'el tigre' in Spanish - continues to play an important role in the mythology and 
cultural imagery of the N aso and other indigenous peoples throughout 
Mesoamerica. This image of the revered and endemic figure of 'the tiger' , 
juxtaposed with that of a high-tech and capital-intensive 'turbine' - representing 
the Bonyic hydroelectric project - neatly summarizes the nature of the conflicts 
currently affecting the Naso region of Bocas deI Toro, Panama. This thesis shows 
how such representations can become "mate rial and symbolic resources for use in 
the on-going renegotiation of social relations" (Mosse 1997:500) in (Mearns, 
Leach, and Scoones 2000: 16). It does so by exploring the interplay between ideas 
about economic development and cultural diversity and the alliances and 
relationships generated through the complex social and conceptual processes 
mobilized around ongoing resource development and conservation projects in the 
Naso region. 
The issues addressed in this thesis are closely related to what proponents of 
the new "sustainability science" have called the incentives - i.e. markets, rules, 
norms, and information - that can improve the sustainability of interactions 
between society and nature (Kates et al. 2001, in McCabe 2003). Anthropologists 
have long recognized the central role of social systems in enhancing 
sustainability,l and anthropological studies of resource management institutions 
have been particularly helpful in understanding the issues of cultural complexity, 
1 See for example: (Despres 1975, Gross et al. 1979, Lee 1988, Painter and Durham 1995). 
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persistence and change that are the hallmarks of anthropological approaches to 
sustainability.2 But anthropologists have often failed to look at how resource 
management practices are shaped by both local cultural institutions and the wider 
political and economic contexts. As a result they have frequently assumed that 
traditional systems of authority or common property institutions must be good and 
in harmony with nature.3 As my research will show, this failing continues to breed 
confusion about the actual functions and capacities of traditional resource 
management institutions. 
In contrast, 1 believe that it is important to accurately assess the conditions 
(i.e. resource and group attributes, economic and institution al incentives, etc.) 
under which local communities can efficiently manage access to land and 
associated resources for equitable use and effective conservation (Alcom 1995, in 
Lu 2001). This thesis does so by examining the connections between institutional 
and economic incentives and resource use and management decisions among the 
Naso indigenous people in Bocas deI Toro, Panama.4 It investigates a series of 
conflicts associated with the various social, cultural and environmental 
representations inc1uded in three resource conservation and development 
interventions currently targeting the Naso region. 1 analyse the guidelines and 
criteria invoked by the various actors seeking to modify Naso resource tenure and 
management practices in order to assess the equity of their social and 
environmental impacts. 
2 See especially: (AgrawaI2001, Brandon 1996, Spaeder 2005b, Stone 2003). 
3 See for example: (Bodley 1999, Chase 2002, Esteva 2000, Howe 1998). 
4 What exactly defines a population or person as "Indigenous" is a highly contentious and divisive 
subject. The definition accepted in this thesis corresponds to that adopted by the United Nations 
(Martinez-Cobo 1994) as those communities, peoples and nations with the following broad 
characteristics: 
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1. Historie continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
terri tories. 
2. Self-identified as distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in those 
terrÏtories. 
3. Non-dominant relative to other sectors of society. 
4. Determined ta preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
terrÏtories and ethnie identity as basis of continued existence as people s, in accordance 
with own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. 
The point of this analysis is not simply to evaluate the success or failure of 
specific development interventions in the Naso region according to their own pre-
established assumptions and indieators. My goal is also to assess how particularly 
significant interpretations of project successes and failures are established, 
promoted and defended through the social and professionallives of known actors 
in specific organizations.5 This approach to the N aso case material will therefore 
help to illustrate important connections and discrepancies between economic 
development, nature conservation, legislative reforms and issues like social 
justice, indigenous territorial rights, and representations of identity, community 
and culture at a specific time and location. My implicit objective in generating 
such context -specific insights will be to test and refine two influential 
generalizations about the interactions between culture, the environment and 
development. 
These insights from the Naso case make particularly significant contributions 
to at least two prominent research problems within the areas addressed by 
theoretically informed and engaged anthropologists. Firstly, my research shows 
how the deceptive nature of popular notions about indigenous societies held in 
ecologieal equilibrium by virtue of their traditional cultures can be used to 
sanction otherwise illegitimate decision-making processes. In the Bonyic case, 1 
show how dam proponents and their allies used traditional indigenous institutions 
to ostensibly align their development projects with the politically more palatable 
goals of cultural diversity and ecological conservation. But the facts of this case 
suggest that such strategie partnerships between states, companies and indigenous 
peoples based sol el y on the apparent recognition cultural rights are likely to falter. 
Secondly, my research underscores the urgency of the need to improve our 
capacity to identify and promote more equitable solutions to problems with the 
distribution of the costs and benefits associated with large-scale infrastructure 
projects. The information assessed here points towards several recommendations 
that could enable a more equitable reconciliation of the rights and priorities of the 
5 1 am particularly indebted here to Mosse (2005a) for bis insightful analysis of the many 
distinctions between aid policy and practice. 
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different groups of people interested in economic development and the 
conservation of biological and cultural diversity. 
The pm-pose of this thesis is thus to understand how natural resource 
management regimes are forged through the interactions and disjunctions between 
cornmunity-Ievel politics and cultural practices and the global forces of state 
poli tic al and economic structures. 1 believe that such a two-pronged approach is 
necessary because local concerns and characteristics invariably affect how 
development policies and programs are interpreted, implemented and 
transformed; and secondly, because the empirical specificities of the social 
processes involved in a particular series of actions and events are difficult to grasp 
through a singular methodological focus on local cornmunities. 1 argue that this 
ethnographic approach to the political con tests over legitimacy and control of 
resources initiated through the various development initiatives operating in the 
Naso region provides a necessary corrective to the frequent over-emphasis 
accorded to formaI resource management institutions. This excessive 
preoccupation with so-called "tradition al" organizational models and rules for 
regulating resource access and use has too often served to prec1ude the emergence 
of more innovative and equitable arrangements between the different groups of 
people interested in the development and conservation of natural and cultural 
resources. 1 conc1ude that even though the legal and institutional arrangements 
that shape the incentives and constraints facing resource users are generally 
complex and often controversial, the prospects of modifying these links presents a 
crucial sphere for policy and project innovation. 
1.2 Thesis outline 
The structure of this thesis reflects this same multiple-scaled ethnographic 
approach to the study of natural resource management institutions. The two 
empirically grounded chapters that constitute the core of my analysis consist of a 
deliberately local emphasis on the socio-economic and cultural practices affecting 
Naso resource use and decision-making in Chapter III. This is followed in Chapter 
IV by a wider focus on how the latest set of national and international actors are 
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combining forces in a further attempt to reconfigure N aso resource management 
regimes and practices 'from above'. Chapter IV thus considers the 
Naso household and community dynamics presented in Chapter III within the 
broader context of the socially, politically and ecologically motivated 
representations currently being contested through the various resource 
management changes proposed for the Naso region. 
In Chapter II, 1 use secondary sources of relevant historical information about 
the Naso people and their territory to outline the major ecological, technologie al 
and socio-cultural features of life in the Naso region. This roughly chronologie al 
review of the regionalliterature provides a context for situating the research 
findings presented in subsequent chapters by emphasizing themes particularly 
relevant to Naso resource access and use. The following section of this 
Introduction will highlight several specificities that make the Naso case an ideal 
context within which to assess the social impacts of contemporary natural 
resource management policies and projects. Section 1.4 then provides an account 
of the importance of these issues by situating the Naso case within current debates 
in the anthropologie al and related literatures. This is followed by a brief 
discussion my methodological approach and the research methods that 1 used to 
obtain the data analysed in this report. Finally, a collection of supplementary 
material (permits, questionnaires, letters, newspaper clippings, etc.) is appended at 
the end of tbis report. These documents generally serve to substantiate key 
conclusions drawn from the evidence presented, and will also be of use to those 
who might wish to investigate additional issues regarding the people and events 
featured in this account. 
1.3 The tiger and the turbine 
The Naso people have traditionally occupied the mountainous jungle regions 
of eastem Bocas deI Toro where they continue to identify with the lands along the 
river that became known in the Spanish speaking world as the Teribe (see Map 1 
below). Teribe is a Spanish misnomer for "Tjër Di" - the Naso name for the river 
that is the source of most of their mythology, traditional beliefs, and history. In 
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the Naso language, 'Di' means 'water' and Tjër is their mythical "Grand-Mother" 
who was endowed by God with the secrets of botanical medicine (Instituto de 
Estudios de las Tradiciones Sagradas de Abia Yala 2001:68). Tjër shared her 
teachings with the benevolent spirits known to the Naso as 'kjus'. These in tum, 
would visit the Naso 'Sukias' or shamans who sang to them at night to reveal 
Tjër's protective blessings and give guidance about relations with enemy tribes 
(Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala 2002:35). Until fairly recently the Naso indigenous 
people - 'na' meaning 'here' and 'so' meaning 'owner' (Oakes 2001) - were 
more commonly known to outsiders as the "Teribe". While the term Teribe carries 
no negative connotations, 1 have chosen to use their 'insider' term for themselves 
(i.e. Naso). Naso is also the name they chose to designate their proposed territorial 
jurisdiction, Comarca Naso Tjër Di. 
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Map 1: Arial view of western Panama (looking south and east towards Colombia). 
The Naso region of Bocas deI Toro is visible in foreground. The white rectangular 
overlay situates the area of influence of the proposed Bonyic hydroelectric dam. The 
nearby towns of Changuinola and Guabito, on the border with Costa Rica, can also be 
seen. Source: Adapted from Google Barth Pro 2006. 
As recently as three or four generations ago, the Naso people continued to lead 
a remarkably autonomous existence. Dispersed among their clans and 
homesteads, and geographically isolated from most of the world, the Naso 
developed and nurtured their cultural self-sufficiency through the idiom and the 
institution of the family. Today, the Naso are proud to be among the last peoples 
in the Americas stillled by a King. Their contemporary poli tic al regime combines 
tradition al elements of a hereditary monarchy (i.e. a king and appointed 
councilors), and locally-elected community representatives responsible for the 
administration of justice and the maintenance of public order. Naso villages are 
small clusters comprised of between lOto 100 households that share a public 
school or health clinic and sorne religious, productive or political organizations. 
There are no roads in the Naso region, so people travel by foot, horse, and raft 
or dugout canoe. The Teribe River is the lifeline of the Naso people. Not enough 
water and they have to get out and push their canoes, too much water and the 
CUITent can smash them against the rocks. A network of jungle trails and foot 
paths connect these villages on either bank of the Teribe River with the N aso' s 
farms, hunting and collecting grounds and neighboring communities. These trails 
are full of ups and downs, punctuated by many streams to wade through, and the 
mud is everywhere as it rains almost every day - sometimes for hours (2000 -
3000mmlyr). Add to this the often oppressive heat (between 22 and 32 Celsius), 
limited availability of nutritious food and untreated drinking water. Wildlife is 
fairlyabundant. Birds and snakes, many ofthem venomous (ex: bothrops asper) 
are common, as are scorpions, and poisonous frogs (ex: dendrobates auratus). 
Tapir, monkey, agouti and peccary are among the most frequently sighted 
mammals. 
The 3000 or so Naso living in this region today are, for the most part, very 
poor subsistence farmers who supplement their livelihoods with earnings from the 
sale of agricultural products (coco a, oranges, plantains, etc.), animaIs (pigs, 
chickens, fish, etc.), lumber (cordia alliodora, cedrela odorata, etc.) and sorne 
handicrafts which they sell in the relatively nearby towns of Changuinola and 
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Guabito.6 While the Naso people have remained largely isolated in geographic 
terms and receive few visitors to their communities, they are today, for the most 
part, bilingual (Naso and Spanish), their children go to public primary schools, 
and many among them have converted to evangelical protestant religions (Von 
Chong Sand Ortiz 1982). Still, despite their limited access to markets, 
infrastructure and public services, the enormous scientific, hydroelectric and eco-
tourism potential of the Naso people's ancestral territory has attracted 
considerable international and national interest. 
Beginning in the 
1980s, the Government 
of Panama transferred 
large sections of the 
Naso region to its own 
system of protected 
areas (Palo Seco 
Protected Forest 
(BBPS) and La Amistad 
International Park 
(PILA). By the year 
2004 three major 
conservation and 
development projects 
were again proposing to 
significantly reorganize 
local land use activities. 
These inc1uded: 1) a 
law to recognize Naso 
land rights and 
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Map 2: Physical map showing the location of the 
Naso Territory in the Province of Bocas Del Toro, 
Panama. Adapted from (Bricefio 2004:242). 
6 A survey conducted in 2001 by the Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala found that average annual per capita 
incorne arnong the Naso varied between U$397.00 and $32.00 (Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala 2002). 
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jurisdiction in the Panamanian National Assembly as an indigenous Comarca; 2) 
a World Bank-funded biological corridor project promoting sustainable 
development in indigenous communities and protected areas (CBMAP); and 3) 
the Bonyic hydroelectric project sponsored by a Panamanian subsidiary of the 
Colombian utility company Empresas Pûblicas de Medellfn. Although the 
principle objectives of each of the se interventions were quite distinct 1) to 
recognize and demarcate a new indigenous jurisdiction; 2) to achieve effective 
biodiversity conservation; and 3) to pro duce and sell hydroelectric energy; the 
promoters of all three projects have each dec1ared their respective commitments to 
encouraging the recovery of traditional Naso cultural values and sustainable land 
use practices. 
All three conservation and development interventions planned for the region 
acknowledge the vital role that the Naso people have played in the management 
and conservation of the natural resources of their region. The Environmental 
Impact Assessment (ElA) for the Bonyic hydroelectric project attributes this 
success to the existence of a tradition al indigenous culture that acts as "the 
fundamentallink that provides harmony between society and nature" (my 
translation) (Planeta Panama Consultores 2005:VI-2). This instrumental view of 
culture also pervades the public discourse presented in the report of the Permanent 
Commission on Indigenous Affairs ofPanama's National Assembly with regards 
to Law No.19 of 2005 "which creates the Comarca Naso Tjër Di"(Comisi6n 
Permanente de Asuntos Indfgenas 2005). And the same functional vision of 
cultural intermediation achieving a harmonious balance between society and the 
environment figures prominently in the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor 
initiative (CBMAP) (Moreno 2005). As a result of such shared understandings of 
culture all three projects propose to improve local environmental conditions by 
investing in what are described as traditional indigenous cultures and institutions. 
The impacts of these natural resource management policy re-orientations and 
associated adjustments to the political rules and incentive structures goveming 
resource tenure will have profound effects upon the social and environmental 
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future of the Naso region and potentially weIl beyond. These characteristics of the 
Naso context - i.e. smaIl, fairly homogeneous population, well-defined resource 
boundary, representative local institutions, and a relatively supportive extemal 
policy environment - make their experience crucial for understanding the social 
impacts of institutional reforms on community access to and use of natural 
resources. Documenting and analyzing their implications can therefore make a 
significant contribution towards understanding the enabling conditions of 
sustainable development in sensitive tropical forest environments. Before doing 
so, 1 want to briefly review sorne of the key strengths and weaknesses of various 
anthropological approaches to understanding human - environment relationships 
in this region. 
1.4 Anthropology in action: culture, environment and development 
The interactions of culture, environment, and development form a 
strategic focus within the areas that must be addressed by a theoretically 
informed, engaged anthropology. 
(Rappaport 1995: 1) 
It should probably come as no surprise to find the above mentioned degree of 
unanimity present in the theoretical frameworks and operational assumptions of 
aIl three development and conservation projects active in the Naso region. After 
all, the indigenous peoples of the Americas have commonly been cast as the 
romantic protectors of a cultural and ecological wisdom that Europeans and other 
peoples obsessed with consumption and materialism have long since forgotten 
(Strang 2003:94). Anthropologists in particular have been responsible for creating 
and fostering the popularity of this myth of societies tied to the environment by 
virtue of a cultural system that ensures the harmony and stability of the combined 
macro system. They have frequently done so by disregarding the activities of 
indigenous peoples that have negative impacts on the natural environment or by 
attributing the blame for such behaviours to conditions beyond the control of 
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indigenous peoples - for example colonialism, assimilation, or corruption. lO This 
strategic blind spot has occasionally helped sorne of the most marginal and 
exploited groups to obtain certain political advantages. ll 
And yet other anthropologists have taken it upon themselves to challenge the 
romanticism that pervades much of this 'ethno-environmentalism' .12 These critics 
have emphasized the numerous pitfalls and dangers that such discourses, 
strategies and le gal frameworks - imbued with idealized versions of "tradition al" 
indigenous cultures - can present. Sieder and Witchell (2001) even suggest that to 
reify traditional culture runs the risk of further marginalizing indigenous peoples 
from national processes - potentially even denying access to justice for the most 
disadvantaged sectors of the population such as women. It is also important to 
recognize that there are many examples in the literature of tribal groups ignoring 
ritual taboos and spirituallimits as they have proceeded to dean out local forests 
of the game animals or forest products which fetch the highest prices on local 
markets. 13 As younger people in particular move away from tradition and embrace 
the values of the market economy, this can cause confusion among community 
members over access to resources, usufruct and property rights. Among the 
Miskito, for instance, sorne kinship obligations (ex: gifts of turtles) are not being 
met in order to produce a surplus to sell to turtle companies. This change is 
reportedly creating significant social and cultural tensions in what are generally 
quite dose-knit communities (Richards 1997: 100-10 1). 
Alvard's daim (2002) that the erroneous perspective which holds that the 
degree of naturalness assigned to a phenomenon (e.g. an ecosystem) is inversely 
proportional to the involvement of human agency, goes a long way towards 
explaining the pervasive belief that people in small-scale societies are natural 
10 See for example Bodley (1999) , Chase (2002), Esteva (2000), Howe (1998). See also Guzman et al. 
(2003) who critique Herlihy (1997) and Ventocilla et al. (1995) for their overly generous portrayal of 
the Kuna indigenous people of Panama' s environmental management practices. 
11 See for ex ample Assies (2000) , Brysk (2000), Deere (2002), Hvalkof (2002). 
12 See for instance Jackson (1995), Mato (2000), and Sieder (2001) for more discussion of both 
pragmatic and moral or philosophical problems related to the authenticity of essentialized political 
identities. 
13 See for example: Alvard (2002), Conklin and Graham (1995), Richards (1997) and Wickstrom 
(2003). 
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conservers and have little or no impact on their environments (p.29). Alvard's 
main point is " ... that the impact a subsistence-oriented society makes on its 
environment is largely a function of its population density and by extension its 
access to markets." Conservation, if and where it has ensued, is thus an 
"epiphenomenal product of such low population densities, not a mythical 
harmonious nature." (Alvard 2002:31) Kay and Simmons have added that the fact 
that the indigenous peoples of the past were generally not what we would today 
calI 'conservationists' actually strengthens their land claims. For by modifying the 
land, they clearly established ownership - even by the perverse Euro-American 
standards of 'social use' commonly applied by Central American govemments 
(Kay and Simmons 2002). For instance agrarian legislation frequently classified 
forested lands as idle, thereby making property rights to such areas subject to 
prescription through "proof' of occupancy (i.e. forest clearing defined as 
"mejoras" or improvements). Joly (1989) has aptly described how in Panama such 
visions of the "social use of the land" embedded in legislation and common 
practice have fueled the conversion of rain forests to pastures for extensive cattle 
raising (Joly 1989). 
Richards agrees with Alvard that the various communal resource management 
institutions found throughout Mexico and Central America are often vulnerable to 
demographic and commercial pressures as they make the transition from 
subsistence-oriented cultivation to greater market integration (Richards 1997).14 
Commodity markets are frequently blamed for undermining indigenous 
cosmological visions of the world and human's place within it, which tends to 
further erode the power of traditional institutions to regulate extractive practices 
and maintain the individual incentives for group members to cooperate. 
Furthermore, these groups are frequently faced with the management and 
logistical difficulties of excIuding non-members from what are generally quite 
remote and extensive areas. However, Richards argues that it is over-simplistic to 
14 For discussions of such communal tenure systems in Mexico see: Aguirre Beltnin (1979), Van 
der Haar (2000); and for Central America see especially: Anaya and MacDonald (1995), Holloman 
(1975), Stocks (1996), Utting (1993), Ventocilla (1996). 
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ascribe the erosion of traditional resource management institutions to commercial 
and/or demographic pressures per se, especially as he suggests, where these 
institutions have generally faced highly discriminatory policy environments 
(Richards 1997). 
Government development policies have generall y subsidized the consolidation 
of tropical land into large estates and discriminated against the emergence of 
viable small-holder farming systems (Jones 1989). Typical examples of such 
policies have included tacit or even open encouragement of colonization by 
recognizing tenure rights gained by clearing forested lands defined as idle and 
therefore subject to appropriation. Credit or tax incentives have also been 
provided to loggers and miners or other vested interests, and these situations are 
often compounded by the common failure to uphold basic law and order in remote 
regions (Richards 1997: 111). Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua have also 
created large areas of open-access forest (i.e. national parks) in areas previously 
subject to extensive management by indigenous groups. These measures have 
compounded the jurisdictional conflicts and ambiguities between centralized 
legislation and customary institutional arrangements (Ascher 1995 in Richards 
1997: 98). 
Still, it is never easy to separate cause from effects in such circumstances, as 
the social and ecological outcomes being witnessed are inevitably the result of a 
complex interactions between external and internal forces that depend, as noted 
above, on a variety of factors. The magnitude of the potential outcomes of these 
important debates can be seen from the experience of Colombia where 28 million 
hectares of lowland tropical rainforest (an area slightly larger than the United 
Kingdom and comprising roughly a quarter of Colombia's total land are a) were 
recently granted to indigenous peoples on the basis of the assumption that they 
live in harmony with nature, and that their stewardship will ensure that the forests 
will be protected (Alvard 2002). 15 Von Hildebrand, an anthropologist who helped 
design the plan, believes that commitment to conservation (for international and 
15 Indigenous peoples make up less than 3% of the total population of Colombia (Van Cott 2002). 
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national beneficiaries) in exchange for territorial rights, effective defense against 
encroachment, and social and (sorne) financial assistance, is more in keeping with 
indigenous reciprocallogic. These types of arrangement have the added advantage 
of causing minimum interference with established indigenous fore st management 
systems (Richards 1997). 
But explicit in such agreements where indigenous peoples are granted rights to 
areas who se govemment designated status as conservation areas is assumed to be 
fundamentally compatible with indigenous ownership is the unjust restriction that 
the owners will not develop the land (Kay 2002). And whereas the primary goal 
of environmentalists in such agreements has been to promote the sustainable 
management of natural resources, it is quite c1ear from the foregoing that such 
priorities are not universally compatible with indigenous peoples' fundamental 
concems over resource control and self-deterrnination. The precarious nature of 
the agreements founded on stereotypes of indigenous peoples as conservationists 
is readily perceptible from the patemalism and intolerance that has been quiek to 
surface whenever the apparently sympathetic and good intentions of 
environmentalists have been 'betrayed' by indigenous peoples who chose short-
term profits over long-term conservation (Conklin and Graham 1995). 
Serious doubts have also been raised about the economic viability of such 
arrangements given the often ridieulously low priees paid for most tradition al 
products (e.g. corn, beans, plantains, coffee, etc.) and the associated dependence 
of their producers on financial subsidies from govemments or NGOs - hence the 
perhaps exaggeratedly high hopes being placed on organic and fair trade niche 
markets. Meanwhile, the lack of short-term income earning opportunities is 
persuading many poor farmers and fore st dwellers to adopt less benign forms of 
land use including selling out to pastoralists who prefer more labor-extensive 
ranching, or increasing the size of their slash and bum plots (Richards 1997). But 
should the value of rurallivelihoods based on small sc ale farrning and diversified 
subsistence activities be judged mainly on the basis of their economic 
sustainability? Clearly there are many who would disagree, particularly as these 
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livelihoods can represent important components of broader approaches with 
significant implications for addressing the many devastating social and perhaps 
even environmental problems which today are being felt most acutely in the rural 
and mainly indigenous areas of Central America. 
The Caribbean coastal region of Central America is a particularly diverse area 
where countless and dramatic ecological, socio-cultural, and technological 
transformations, syncretic adaptations and millennial continuities have shaped a 
great variety of distinctive life forms and cultural expressions. Data available for 
the wider Mesoamerican Biological Corridor region 16 as a whole indicate that the 
area is home to roughly 9% of the world' s total biodiversity - much of which is 
endemic and threatened by alarming rates of deforestation (Guzman, Raine, and 
Rodrfguez 2003). In 1950, about three quarters of Central America was covered 
by forests. Fifty years later only a third remained - most of this being increasingly 
fragmented and concentrated in protected areas and indigenous terri tories on the 
Atlantic side of the Isthmus (Heckadon Moreno 1997). 
But plant and animal species diversity is not the only casualty of rapid forest 
conversion - soil erosion, loss of fertility and soil compaction have also 
negatively affected the agricultural economies, transportation infrastructures and 
water supplies in several areas within the region (Utting 1993). In addition to such 
high levels of ecological diversity, at least 60 indigenous peoples or linguistic 
groups account for sorne Il million people or 23% of the total Mesoamerican 
regional population (Grosvenor et al. 1992). More than half of this total 
population is considered poor, and in rural areas - where about a third of the 
population and most indigenous peoples live - the percentage living in poverty is 
doser to 70% (Annis 1992). Only about 10% of this regional population lives on 
the Caribbean side of the isthmus though, which also accounts for roughly 90% of 
the total protected surface area in the region. These land use restrictions intended 
to promote resource conservation are increasingly in conflict with the needs of 
16 An area that includes the seven modem countries that comprise geographic Central America 
(Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and Belize) as weIl as the five 
southemmost states of Mexico (Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatan). 
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poor farmers and indigenous peoples whose access to critical subsistence 
resources has been substantially curtailed (Heckadon Moreno 1997). 
A highly skewed distribution of access to resources and a related set of 
problems deriving from tenure insecurity (e.g. inadequately defined, delimited 
and/or enforced property rights) are commonly considered the main catalysts 
behind the many and severe social and environmental problems affecting different 
regions of Latin America. 17 To my view, sorne of the most successful attempts to 
address these problems have analyzed the historical circumstances behind local 
patterns of resource use and 
control (i.e. resource tenure) 
using multidisciplinary 
frameworks inspired by the 
efforts to integrate human and 
cultural ecology with poli tic al 
economy that began in the 
1970's. During the 1990's, 
researchers continued to be 
interested in the" ... ways in 
which power and politics affect 
and are affected by ecology and 
the biophysical environment." 
(Stonich 2001:4053), to the 
point where "political ecology" 
has bec orne a diverse and 
expanding set of perspectives 
on: a) the contextual sources of 
environmental change, b) 
conflicts over access to 
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Figure 1: The poli tic al ecology model of 
deforestation in Latin America: a simplified sketch 
highlighting the structural causes of environmental 
destruction. 'A' refers to low input costs, 'B' to 
production subsidies. Dashed lines indicate 
suspected relationships. Source: (Durham 1995). 
17 Versions ofthis thesis have been put forward by: Brockett (1998), Howard (1998), Huber and Safford 
(1995), Kay (2002), Nygren (2004), Painter and Durham (1995), and Partridge (1989). 
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resources, and c) the political ramifications of environmental change (Nygren 
2000). 
Notwithstanding the importance of the se theoretical and methodological 
contributions, political ecology is no panacea for explaining all environmental 
changes. For all too often, what political ecologists actually study is more about 
political contests over natural resources - for example changes in access rights 
(i.e. tenure reforms) - and not, to any significant extent, how the resources 
themselves are explicitly affected by these changes (Vayda 1999: 168-169). 
Political ecology, especially its poststructuralist variant that attracted so many 
anthropologists during the 1980's and 90's, 18 has similarly been criticized for 
overestimating the significance of structural factors (i.e. the political economy) to 
the detriment of a more adequate recognition of the cultural diversity and 
livelihood strategies that inevitably coexist within the same human communities. 19 
In other words, the 'ecology' in political ecology is too often conceived in terms 
that simply " ... support preordained philosophical values or political agendas." 
(Kay and Simmons 2002:xiv-xv). 
Much of the inspiration for this upsurge of social science contributions to 
environmental studies has been attributed to Michel Foucault and the 
poststructuralists' problematizing of power. Judging by the amount of criticism 
provoked, Arturo Escobar (1991, 1995) is probably the most familiar proponent of 
this influential approach. Variously know as the anthropology of development 
'discourse', the 'post-structural' critique, or 'post-development', the aIl too 
frequently partial, overheated and sterile accusations that characterized much of 
these dependency theory and post-modemist inspired critiques have in tum been 
taken to task by a series of researchers concemed about how anthropological 
theory and methods can more adequately be mobilized to deal with pivotal aspects 
of planned interventions and social transformations. Despite the often passionate 
18 The most notable proponents of this poststructuralist variant - for example Escobar (1995), Esteva 
(2000), Ferguson (1990), Hobart (1993), Sachs (1992) - adopted an almost Manichean view of 
development as monolithic, technocratie, and irredeemably flawed. 
19 For a more in-depth demonstration of this critique see especially: Edelman (1999), Everett (1997), 
and Stonich (1993). 
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and sometimes even personal tone of these rebukes and counter debates - see for 
example Edelman (1999), Grillo and Stirrat (1997) and Little and Painter (1995)-
it is for the most part generally acknowledged that the poststructuralist critique 
constitutes a valuable corrective to mainstream social theory in several important 
respects. The most notable contribution has come from the way poststructuralists 
have consistently highlighted the role of language and meaning in the constitution 
of social reality. 
But because of their near exclusive focus on how power is achieved through 
language and discourse, poststructuralists have also tended to overlook both the 
achievements of development projects (however modest these may be in many 
cases), and the ways that projects are often appropriated and reshaped by local 
actors (Van AusdaI2001:601). Edelman has criticized the largely poststructuralist 
inspired literature on social movements in Latin America for its lack of attention 
to the historical context of local political struggles and a tendency to ignore the 
more material aspects of the physical and social reproduction of wealth and 
poverty (e.g. geographic isolation, lack of infrastructure, as set distribution, etc.) 
(Edelman 1999). On the politics of globalization which are frequently represented 
as a "free-market onslaught", Edelman suggests that it " ... might better be 
understood as a profoundly cultural process of contention between dominant and 
popular sectors (and their respective allies, at home and abroad)." (ibid:207) By 
implication, poststructuralists have found it difficult to offer specifie and viable 
alternatives to the frequently deplorable situations they decry. This shortcoming is 
attested to by the poststructuralists' often uncritical celebration of imagined 
differences, traditions and autonomy, the implication being that somehow by 
simply talking critically about development discourse, anthropologists can 
demonstrate political solidarity with the oppressed (Little and Painter 1995). This 
penchant has earned the poststructuralists a weIl deserved reputation for preaching 
a rather weak and politically correct version of anthropology (Grillo and Stirrat 
1997). 
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Whereas poststructuralists have generally portrayed development programs as 
little more than elegant log frames and techniques of control, other 
anthropologists have preferred to recognize them as embodiments of, at times, 
highly idiosyncratic interests and desires (Arce and Long 2000b). Among this 
latter group of anthropologists who take a more measured approach to the study of 
development projects and the policy process, development discourse is more 
accurately conceived of as a fairly mutable blend of rhetoric, official practices and 
political theory (Rew 1997:81).20 Rather than simply studying local actors' 
reactions to the discourses that accompany external interventions, anthropologists 
should also analyse local interpretations, negotiating strategies and dynamic 
engagements with the people and ideas that seek to enrol their support for 
particular development objectives (Arce and Long 2000a). My research with the 
Naso does this by considering the complex cultural and environment forces 
behind the social and political processes of increasing market integration and land 
tenure changes operating in the Naso region within a historie and ethnographie 
perspective. 
Another important anthropological variant of these debates with considerable 
implications for the Naso region is that which opposes 'constructivists' (or 
'constructionists' as they are sometimes called) and 'cultural survivalists'. Put 
broadly, survivalists draw upon the more stable and homogeneous versions of 
culture developed by anthropologists during the first decades of the 20th century 
in order to de fend the metaphor of a mosaic of bounded and discrete systems of 
practices, beliefs and values. In this model, each culture is seen as susceptible -
perhaps by analogy to actual culture-bearing individuals - to survive or to die out 
depending on the measure of autonomous decision making power its 
representatives retain over their internal affairs.22 Such views no doubt prompted 
20 See also: Grillo and Rew (1985), Pottier (1997) and Stanford (2000). 
22 See for example Cultural Survival founder David Maybury-Lewis (1988) on the aims of the 
advocacy and projects of his organization. For other examples of the cultural survival approach to 
culture in the Central American context see also Chapin (1992) and Sanchez and Balma (1992). 
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Nietschmann to argue that, with respect to the self-determÏnation struggles of 
indigenous peoples in Central America, "Rights have to be tied to land, which 
guarantees what no central non-Indian government can: the survival of indigenous 
peoples." (1988:280) 
Constructivists, on the other hand, see culture as a socially constructed 
narrative that is continuously being created and transformed through actions and 
struggles over meanings (Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson 2001). In this light, 
culture is not fixed in space or time or with respect to any particular institutions 
and practices, but rather is best understood as a dynarnic repertoire of categories 
and practices created to adapt to changing social and ecological conditions. 
Constructivists are also wary of arguments tying cultural survival and identity 
persistence too closely to specific forms of collective ownership over particular 
resources. Albert (2001), for instance, points out that the logic implicit in such 
arguments derives from a model of social change based on a simple opposition al 
dichotomy between forest Indians and urban Indians and the idea of a one-way 
neo-evolutionary passage from one socio-geographic state (rural-tradition al) to 
another (urban-assimilated). Constructivists are concerned about the limiting 
consequences of such arguments for the development of alternative indigenous 
identities and cultural continuities appropriate to more urban and multiethnic 
settings. Instead of the either/or logic of survival or assimilation, they suggest that 
a better way to interpret what is occurring is as a conscious (if not necessarily 
deliberate) rearranging of indigenous social networks across multiple 
communities that articulate, on a regional scale, kinship relations and the 
circulation of people and goods between places situated at various locations 
between the forest and the city (Albert 2001). 
This constructivist critique of the link between place and identity has been 
faulted for downplaying the practical importance of resources (i.e. access to and 
control over land and water) to identity construction, especially in cases where 
few other alternatives for discriminated minorities exist. Without access to land 
for instance, Gordon et al. suggest that the Miskito, Mayangna and Creole peoples 
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of eastern Nicaragua would lose " ... the power to affirm connections with their 
chosen narrative of the past." (2003:379) Without this daim of cultural continuity, 
these groups would lose an invaluable asset for collective action to improve their 
socio-economic circumstances. Conscious of the dangers associated with both the 
essentialism inherent in the cultural survival position and the potential to de-
legitimize daims to cultural rights inherent in the constructivist paradigm, Gordon 
et al. are convinced of the relevance of a third distinct position that emphasizes 
shared understandings of history - drawing on notions of extended kinship, 
cooperative economic practices, religious activities and legal/political precedents 
- as the basis for establishing cultural continuity in rights to land and resources. 
These broad memories of previous and ongoing efforts to defend and secure their 
territorial rights - as opposed to length of occupancy or persistence of cultural 
traits - have enabled local residents to constitute a series of coherent and widely 
resonant narratives of the past. Thus in the eyes of the Creole and indigenous 
peoples of Nicaragua' s Caribbean coast it is these cumulative social memories 
that they share in common that justify their community-specific demands and 
broader territorial daims (Gordon 2003). 
These conceptual and procedural refinements are helping to improve the ways 
in which we understand the roles of social and cultural variables in natural 
resource use and environmental change. They suggest that appropriate solutions to 
the challenges of economic development and cultural and biological conservation 
must seek to indude the most marginalized groups in society, and also be based 
on carefullocation- and culture-specific analysis of the physical environments and 
political economies in which these communities are constituted. These debates 
also underscore the need for more imagination and experimentation to find 
effective ways of supporting indigenous natural resource management (Richards 
1997:113). 
As mentioned briefly above, the approach 1 adopted in my research 
exemplifies the relevance of these insights to two particularl y prominent policy 
challenges that emerged during the latter part of the 20th century. The first 
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concerns the apparent correlation between biodiversity and cultural diversity. 
"Since biological and cultural systems are closely linked, the ecological health of 
[Central America] depends overwhelmingly on the preservation of diversity in all 
its forms" was how Grosvenor et al. formulated this challenge (1992: 198).23 The 
fact that indigenous peoples occupy most of the remaining forested areas in 
Central America has encouraged a significant number of international 
organizations, governments, private enterprises and civil society organizations to 
enter into strategic alliances with indigenous peoples dedicated to safeguarding 
the survival of both categories of diversity. One of the key initiatives favoured by 
such alliances has been to attempt to strengthen or modify the social institutions 
that regulate human behaviour related to access and the use of natural resources. 
There is now significant empirical evidence which demonstrates that 
prevailing institutional arrangements play an important raIe in determining the 
effectiveness of any particular policy or technological interventions.24 Nobel 
laureate Douglass North defines institutions as "the mIes of the game in a society 
or, more formally, ... the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction." (North 1990: 3, in Barrett, Lee and McPeak (2005):194). Institutions 
can also refer to the recognized patterns of social conduct that are maintained by 
these mIes. They can be formaI, as in the mIe of law, or informaI, as in the case of 
kinship - where the mIes and conventions are maintained through the consent of 
the actors involved and the power relations between them (Mearns, Leach, and 
Scoones 2000: 10). Organizations, on the other hand, for instance community 
groups, NGOs, companies, and government agencies, are best thought of as 
specific entities with dedicated personnel, budgets, offices, etc. explicitly 
established by sets of actors with common objectives (Young 1982: 18). 
According to Young, such organizations may serve to facilitate the operation of 
an institution (for example, slavery or dmg prohibition), but sorne of the most 
23 Other authors who have studied or advocated on behalf of this issue include: Gray (1998), Herlihy 
(1997), Place (1993), and Redford and Mansour (1996). 
24 On the roles and capabilities of resource management institutions see especially: Agrawal (2001), 
Baland and Platteau (1996), Garilao (1987), Klooster (2000), Ostrom (2002), and Poteete and Ostrom 
(2004). 
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effective institutions in society can function largely without the benefit of any 
explicitly associated formaI organizations (for example, language and exchange 
systems) (1982: 18-19). 
A similar set of dynamic relationships between multiple institutions and 
organizations serves to order the processes through which people claim and 
defend access to and control over particular natural resources (Mearns, Leach, and 
Scoones 2000: 11-12). Rence the popularity of resource conservation and 
development programs that attempt to "strengthen" or "reform" these 
relationships with judicial or administrative measures that can be quickly devised 
and implemented within short-term project cycles. But patterns of resource access 
and use and the social institutions that sustain them are conditioned by the 
particular human, technological and resource characteristics of the different actors 
and environments involved. Whereas changing the formal organizational 
structures and explicit regulatory regimes of resource management in a given 
setting may prove to be relatively straight forward, the social and cultural 
institutions involved tend to evolve more slowly and to adapt only through 
individual and collective processes of trial and error. 
Because of the fluid and contingent nature of such institutional arrangements, 
the outcomes of institutional reforms can be very difficult to predict. Changes in 
land tenure regulations, for instance, cannot be assumed to have predictable 
effects on indigenous peoples' resource management practices, especially given 
ongoing changes in other institutions affecting resource use - for instance, 
markets and pricing policies, or marri age and migration (Mearns, Leach, and 
Scoones 2000: 15). In most geographically remote and socially marginal tropical 
regions, the impacts of such institutional reforms are also diminished by the 
relatively limited capacities of governments and local communities to consistently 
articulate and enforce applicable rules. So while legal and administrative changes 
targeting resource management organizations can partially affect the nature of the 
processes whereby particular claims are realised, it appears to matter less which 
rules a community adopts than how weIl they monitor and enforce the rules they 
35 
do set (Barrett, Lee, and McPeak 2005). As 1 show in Chapter III, Naso cultural 
institutions and social organizations continue to evolve in complex and dynamic 
ways in conjunction with changes in their social and environmental contexts. 
Figure 2: Infrastructure is pretty basic throughout the Naso region. Clockwise from 
top left are dugout canoes used for transportation; a Naso worker is suspended over 
the Teribe River to fix the broken PVC pipes that carry water to the La Amistad 
International Park (PILA) headquarters at Wekso; children celebrate Panama's 
independence from Colombia by parading the flag around the village of Solon' s 
primary school; a boy returns home with firewood, the main energy source of Naso 
households; the larger Naso villages have public telephones which offer a reasonably 
reliable service. Very few Naso own cell phones as coverage in the area is weak and 
the electricity to charge depleted batteries is non-existent. 
The second polie y challenge derives from the fact that after several decades of 
public sector dominance of infrastructure provision and resource extraction 
activities, many countries are increasingly tuming to the private sector to provide 
the critical knowledge and investments required to build and maintain these 
services.25 This is especially true in Latin America, where even in countries like 
Colombia, Peru and Guatemala that were once considered too politically or 
25 The Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database has data on 3,000 projects in 
150 low- and middle-income countries. http://ppi.worldbank.org/index.aspx: accessed October 10, 
2006. 
36 
economically unstable, resource concessions and associated infrastructure projects 
increased rapidly throughout the 1990s (Bowles and Prickett 2001). Infrastructure 
(for ex ample transportation, energy, communications, water and sanitation, etc.) is 
a determining factor in a country' s economic and social development. Over the 
period from 2000 to 2010, the need for infrastructure investments in developing 
countries alone has been estimated at more than $2 trillion (Santos 2001 :30). The 
scope and magnitude of these investments have meant that their social and 
ecological impacts are showing up in sorne of the most geographically remote and 
socially marginal regions of our planet. This situation is prompting growing 
consensus that continued development should be conditional upon demonstrated 
commitments to good social and environ mental practices. 
In response to such concerns, policy-makers and resource developers have 
begun to pay more attention to accurately identifying and assessing an expanding 
universe of project-related social and environmental issues. Much of this 
evolution has coalesced around large dams and the hydroelectric energy industry .. 
As a case in point, the World Commission on Dams (WCD), the International 
Hydropower Association (IHA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) have 
each sought to provide strategies and best practices for ensuring a more equitable 
distribution of project benefits and improving the living conditions of 
communities affected by dams and related infrastructure projects.26 However, 
despite broad-based acceptance of the five core values articulated in the World 
Commission on Dam's new framework for decision-making (i.e. Equity, 
Efficiency, Participatory decision-making, Sustainability, and Accountability), 
major disagreements still remain as to how these principles are best put into 
practice in the context of specific investment projects (see Figure 3 below). 
26 See especially: International Hydropower Association (2004), Taasen (2000), World 
Commission on Dams (2000). 
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Figure 3: Analytical decision-making framework: World Commission on Dams 
five core values and seven strategie priorities. Source: ((UNEP) 2(06) 
This lack of agreement over how best to apply the WCD's principles and 
guidelines stems in part from the fact that attempts to evaluate the social impacts 
of hydroelectric projects have been hindered by insufficient monitoring and 
follow-up data on existing dams (Roquet 2000).27 This problem is itself related to 
a much larger set of problems that derive from the way project promoters attempt 
to grasp the nature, scope and magnitude of their social impacts, and consequently 
the extent to which they contemplate, design and implement appropriate 
monitoring systems, mitigating measures and levels of compensation. As 1 show 
in Chapter IV, we must seek to identify and promote more creative and equitable 
solutions to these problems if we hope to reconcile the rights and priorities of the 
different groups of people interested in the sustainable production of energy and 
the living conditions of those most affected by its production. 
27 Sorne of the better exarnples of this literature inc1ude: Cemea and McDowell (2000), Homig (1999), 
Khagrarn (2004), Leslie (2005), Scudder (2005), Trussart et al. (2002) and Wali (1989). 
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1.5 Testing the waters: methodology and analysis 
Unfortunately, there is still a strong but erroneous opinion in some circles that 
practical anthropology is fundamentally different from theoretical or 
academic anthropology. The truth is that science begins with application ... 
What is application in science and when does "theory" become practical? 
When it first allows us a definite grip on empirical reality. 
(Malinowski 1961, quoted in Cemea 1995: 1) 
Anthropologists aligned with or sympathetic towards indigenous movements 
have generally been limited to two tasks: affirm the struggle and critique the 
forces that stand in its way (Hale 2004). My research engaged in these tasks, but 
also went beyond them in order to analyze the contradictions, risks and 
unintended consequences of Naso political discourse and engagements with the 
development and conservation initiatives operating in their region. 1 was 
particularly concemed to document and understand the social impacts of these 
projects' legislative and policy changes on local land use practices and Naso 
political institutions. This involved leaming to recognize how particularly 
significant interpretations of project-related activities were established, promoted 
and defended through the social and professionallives of known actors in specific 
organizations. The "truth" in these matters is not something that simply exists 'out 
there' waiting to be objectively discovered through the technically proficient 
application of expert research methods. There are sorne methodological guidelines 
that 1 discuss below which are useful towards ensuring broadly acceptable 
interpretations; for example combining qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, sampling procedures, seeking feedback, etc. But 1 do not believe that 
neutrality (as in standing above the fray or suppressing subjectivity) is a legitimate 
measure of any particular ethnographic or interpretive account. 
31 For a summary discussion of the range and diversity of these methods see also Baker (2000) and 
Chambers (1991). 
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In order to begin to adequately assess the impacts of the changes currently 
affecting the Naso region, 1 had to consider a wide range of social, economic and 
environmental issues simultaneously and at multiple scales. 1 therefore sought 
evidence about: 
1. Naso conceptions of property and ownership; perceptions of resource 
scarcity; and aesthetic and moral values ascribed to place. 
11. Changes in resource tenure, obligations, and sanctions; equity of resource 
access. 
111. Participation in decision making; viability, integrity and accountability of 
institutional arrangements. 
IV. Tensions and conflicts within and between communities and institutions; 
nature and frequency of collective activities. 
v. Resource extractions for commercial or subsistence purposes; damage to 
historical or natural resources. 
vi. Numbers of tourists visiting the area; craft sales and related income 
opportunities. 
To obtain this information, 1 adopted a methodology inspired by a series of 
principles similar to those employed during Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) 
exercises: a) triangulation of research methods and information sources; b) 
deliberate actions to offset biases; c) optimizing tradeoffs between the quantity, 
relevance, timeliness, truth, and actual beneficial use of information. More 
traditional methods of social investigation based on longer and more detailed field 
studies or large-scale quantitative survey techniques may provide more complete 
and sensitive understandings of local socio-cultural dynamics. But both of these 
options have proven to be notoriously inefficient from the stand point of the 
quality of the data produced and/or the amount of time required to analyze and 
publish the results (Chambers 1991:520-522). 
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RRA methodologies are typically portrayed as comprising a menu of options 
from which to select and combine depending on the research project' s information 
needs, local characteristics and resource / time constraints. These choices include 
secondary data reviews, direct observation, semi-structured interviews, group 
interviews, mapping exercises, etc. 31 RRA practitioners frequently draw on 
anthropological procedures for participant observation, informal surveys, and in-
depth case studies to gather and interpret reliable field data for understanding a 
range of issues and variables - for instance, the relationship between landowning 
and social structure, the social organization of family labor resources, the causes 
and consequences of cognitive and behavioral changes, and so on (Cernea and 
Guggenheim 1985). The RRA approach is thus based on common sense and 
experience, both of which show convincingly that to ignore the methods and 
concepts of anthropology in development studies and projects wastes scarce funds 
on the production of inaccurate data, dilutes research efforts and lowers standards, 
entrenches the impunity of technocrats and ivory tower academics, and breeds 
discontent among the objects of such research at the locallevel who desperately 
seek a better life. 
But Rapid Rural Appraisal methodologies are no ready-made panacea for 
social scientists in either short or long-term research situations. Two especially 
significant pitfalls that the advocates of RRA have frequently paid insufficient 
attention are the tendency to gloss over the complexities and efficacies of the 
participant observation techniques used by social scientists, and secondly the risk 
of promoting complacency when making judgments from limited data (Molnar 
1991). Short time frames also enhance the risk that intense research schedules will 
lead to sloppy interviewing. Carelessly applied, RRA can thus be 
indistinguishable from "information strip-mining", producing a strong sense of 
intrusion and correspondingly low levels of acquired social knowledge (Finan 
1991:6-7). 
33 ODESEN obtained a grant of U$20,OOO from the USA based NGO Conservation International 
to renovate and equip their hospitality installations at the old rnilitary base in Wekso. For 
additional information see: http://www.odesen.org/ 
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1 was able to overcome the se common research limitations by using a 
judicious sequence of qualitative and quantitative research methods over a period 
of six months between August 2004 and June 2005. 1 initially used archival 
investigations, participant observation and informal interviews to obtain the 
background information necessary to improve the design and cultural sensitivity 
of a subsequent survey and structured interviews. The fact that 1 spent almost two 
years preparing for this research project - and slightly less time interpreting the 
post fieldwork results - also helped to reduce the total amount of time that 1 
needed to derive the most communication and knowledge benefit from my field 
research. Vpon arrival in Panama, my first step was to interviewa wide range of 
local residents, professionals, government officiaIs, and various NGO, union and 
media representatives that have lived or worked in the Naso region. Subjects were 
identified and contacted with the assistance of the non-governmental 
organizations Alianza para la Conservacion y Desarrollo (ACD) and ODES EN 
(Naso Organization for Sustainable Ecotourism Development). 33 
These contacts proved essential in gaining access to the Naso region, for as 1 
mentioned earlier, there are currently no roads and no public transportation 
leading to any of the Naso communities. After explaining the goals of my research 
to the members of ODESEN, they agreed to provide me with occasional 
transportation and logistical support. Different members of the organization also 
agreed to introduce me to various community contacts where 1 could hang my 
hammock at night and eat while staying in the region.34 Vntil 1 knew at least a few 
people in any of the villages, 1 was always accompanied by a Naso guide / 
interpreter. And because the period between February 2004 and July 2005 
corresponded with a time of intense political prote st and mobilization throughout 
the Naso region, 1 generally managed to find someone who had reason to visit a 
34 Things can get pretty expensive in Bocas dei Toro. At about U$3.00 per gallon, it costs roughly 
U$20.00 in gas alone just to get from Changuinola to Sieyic and back. The going rate for lodging in the 
Naso communities was around U$5.00 per person per night and anywhere from U$2.00 to $5.00 per 
meal. 
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particular community and then offered to pay for their travel and food costs if they 
let me accompany them. 
On one such occasion in August of 
20041 accompanied three Naso 
community activists on a four day 
walking tour that brought us to five 
Naso communities in the Northwestem 
sector of the proposed Comarca. The 
way they decided that it should work 
was to have one ofthe Naso members of 
our visiting delegation introduce the 
group and then invite our hosts to a 
series of upcoming events that they were 
planning. These events were largely 
related to the question of the Bonyic 
hydroelectric project and the Naso 
leadership crisis that 1 de scribe in detail 
Figure 4: Traveling with the keeper 
of the archives of the Naso nation. 
San San Tigra, Panama. 
in Chapter IV. The person responsible for coordinating much of these events was 
an ex-member of the Naso Council of Leaders, Adolfo Villagra Sanchez from 
Siekin. Mr. Villagra can often be found lugging around with him a personal 
library that contains much of the official archives of the Naso people! (See Figure 
4 on right) Among the documents contained in his tom canvas briefcase were 
sorne yellowed and barely legible pages dating as far back as 1979 - the year 
when the long since deceased Naso king Simeon Santana signed an agreement 
granting Panama's national hydroelectric company (IRHE) permission to carry 
out preliminary feasibility studies for a dam on an area of the Teribe River located 
upstream from Sieyic. 
After considerable discussion between my guides and our hosts, it became my 
tum to explain who 1 was and why 1 had come so far to visit them in their homes. 
These initial interviews were guided by a series of open-ended questions designed 
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to explore the complexity of respondents' experiences, perceptions, and feelings 
about local land use practices and related institutions. For example: What do 
residents know about the legislation that proposes to recognize Naso land rights 
and administrative jurisdiction (i.e. the Comarca)? Who are these changes 
expected to benefit? Have they participated in actions intended to improve 
resource management practices? How accountable are institution al arrangements 
for devising, monitoring and enforcing resource access and management rules? 
Are natural and cultural resources currently threatened, and if so, how? These 
questions were refined through interaction with peers and research supervisors, 
and were further tested and revised with initial respondents. Occasionally when 
visiting with elderly Naso people, my guides helped to translate. For the most part 
the people 1 met were friendly and quite delighted that someone, and a foreigner 
at that, had taken the time and made the effort to come to their modest homes 
to ask them about their opinions. Several Naso also asked about my personal 
interpretations and experiences with other similar cases that could be relevant to 
their situation. 
Back in Canada for three weeks in October 2004, 1 used the qualitative 
findings obtained from these interviews to identify patterns of variation in 
attitudes and factors influencing respondents' opinions about my research topics. 
For example, 1 became aware of significant differences in ethnie origins and 
length of residency, as weIl as landholdings and economic occupations. 1 then 
used this initial evidence to design a detailed household survey as a means of 
describing the perceived variations in a more systematic way (n=54 or 18% of 
Naso households located within the eight villages surveyed) (see Appendix 1). My 
survey was designed to obtain relevant and fairly comprehensive information 
about demographic and economic conditions and trends, local organizations, 
cultural traits and other factors that could influence the way the Naso respond to 
the changes affecting their region. 
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Map 3: Arial view looking west towards the Naso villages where 1 conducted 
interviews and household surveys. The junction of the Teribe and Changuinola 
Rivers is visible in the foreground, as are the banana plantations on the southem 
edge of the city of Changuinola (lower right). The icons represent Global 
Positioning System (GPS) coordinates taken from field readings and displayed over 
a satellite image obtained from Google Earth. 
My goal during this second more quantitative phase of fieldwork was to 
pro duce a more accurate assessment of local socio-cultural patterns of resource 
use against which to test my initial hypotheses about the conditions under which 
communities can efficiently manage access to land and associated resources for 
equitable use and effective conservation. For example, how will the legal 
recognition of Naso traditional resource management organizations affect 
household land use decisions? How can these organizations function efficiently 
and accountably in situations of widespread economic vulnerability, dec1ining 
community cohesion and increasing social inequality? 
Because 1 was fundamentally more interested in enhancing the reliability of 
the information produce during my initial and follow-up interviews than with 
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statistical confirmations of these findings across the entire Naso population, my 
sampling strategies for selecting respondents were both purposive and 
opportunistic. Purposive in the sense that 1 deliberately sought out a range of 
households believed to differ among themselves according to the variables 
identified in my first phase of interviews. For example: male, female, youth, eIder, 
farmer, hunter, public / private sector employee, political authority, settler, 
geographic location, etc. My actual sample of 54 Naso households is also 
opportunistic in the sense that 1 frequently took advantage of chance encounters 
and personal invitations and referrals to approach potential respondents about 
their participation in my survey. My decision to use detailed questionnaires with 
only 54 households meant that 1 did not have to rush each respondent and could 
take the time required to adequately explore unexpected themes perceived to be 
relevant by my hosts. This format allowed me to keep the interviews purposely on 
track without denying respondents the opportunity to elaborate on any particular 
aspect of the questions or the ensuing discussions. 
Had 1 insisted on pursuing a more statistically representative sampling 
strategy, for instance by attempting to recruit households identified at random, 1 
would have had to compensate for the lack of accurate census information for the 
Naso region. According to Naso residents, the Govemment ofPanama's official 
2000 census figures consistently underestimate the numbers of households present 
within their region. For anyone familiar with this area, or with any other 
marginalized rural area with no transportation links and limited communications, 
it is not hard to imagine why govemment -hired enumerators may have neglected 
to visit several of the more dispersed Naso hamlets located at considerable 
distances from the village cores. 1 will retum to the implications of these statistical 
problems in Chapter III. For the moment 1 simply wish to add that while the 
nature of my household survey does not permit me to make statistically accurate 
confirmations for the trends that it was designed to measure, these sUrvey findings 
do help to provide a relatively comprehensive socio-cultural, economic, and 
ecological assessment of the Naso population for the purpose of evaluating the 
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risks and benefits of local development projects, and how the Naso understand 
and anticipate the impacts of the measures implied in these changes. This is 
particularly true when these survey data are considered together with the 
interview data presented in Chapter IV and the historical sources reviewed in 
Chapter II. 
Subsequent analysis of these survey results helped me to identify additional 
characteristics, such as occupation al history, land tenure conflicts, the functions 
and capacities of traditional authorities, commitments to resource conservation, 
etc., about which 1 sought further evidence through a final round of semi-
structured interviews. This third and final phase of weeklong stays with different 
families in different N aso villages allowed me to learn more about the history of 
local factions and informal organizations, and the control of as sets and decision-
making across a range of socio-economic groups. As for protecting 
confidentiality, 1 had to learn to refer more generally to the specific statements or 
events reported to me in these interviews. This task sometimes proved difficult as 
the Naso do not generally think about what they do in such anonymous and 
generic terms. They like to personalize things and feel more comfortable talking 
about real people and the supposed incidents that may or may not be directly 
attributable to them. Because 1 made repeated visits to the same communities over 
the space of one year, 1 also obtained a sense of the cyc1ical trends in seasonal 
activities, holidays, and local environmental variability that characterize the Naso 
region. 
1 also made extensive use of spatial information technologies such as global 
positioning systems (GPS). When combined with sorne of the more traditional 
methods of anthropological inquiry described above, techniques such as GPS 
provide new and effective ways of gathering, organizing, analyzing and 
conveying information about land and resource rights and uses (Mohamed and 
Ventura 2(00). One of the most successful examples of this social-spatial 
methodology that 1 used extensively with the Naso is known as "Geo-coded 
Transects". As with convention al transects, an area of particular significance -
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such as individual holdings and commons, reserves, etc. - is systematically 
walked to determine the status and condition of key phenomena and/or features of 
interest. The only difference being that the use of a GPS receiver makes it 
possible to accurately associate these in-situ observations with positional data 
obtained from orbiting satellites.35 These transect walks and the observations 
obtained can therefore be accurately mapped or transposed to a diagram that 
permits further analysis of these spatial differences (see Maps 3 and 4). The Naso 
were particularly interested in mapping the boundaries proposed under the 
national Comarca legislation, but several people also asked me to measure the 
boundaries between family plots. 1 even helped to survey a parcel of land that had 
been donated by a resident to serve as the location for a community elementary 
school. The community authorities used these measurements to draft a written 
agreement with the donor of the land, such that in the future no one could attempt 
to reclaim the donated land from the school. 
Another strategy that is increasingly being promoted in order to counter sorne 
of the problems affecting the quality of RRA research results - especially the fact 
that RRA has not contributed significantly to sustainable local action or 
institutional development - has been to encourage the research subjects (e.g. the 
local community) to become partners in the research process. According to Finan 
and van Willigen, the guiding assumption of such participatory approaches to 
research is that local stakeholders possess valuable knowledge that they will be 
more willing to share with outsiders if they also share in the basic research 
objectives (Finan 1991). Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) methods are 
generally viewed as a sub-set of RRA within which outsiders behave less as 
extractors of information, and more as catalysts and facilitators. To accomplish 
these roles, PRA methods emphasize intensive interrogation and the use of role 
reversals and visual techniques in public places. But the social context (power, 
authority, inequality) of information elicitation can also bias PRA results-
35 The Oarmin ETrex Vista hand-held OPS receiver that 1 used provides accurate readings to 
within three rneters. Although accuracy diminishes with signal strength, for instance while trying 
to obtain satellite readings under dense forest canopy or with sorne otherwise obstructed view of 
the sky. 
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especially as the very poor may be reluctant to potentially compromise their 
economic or social security by publicly stating their needs (Rew 1997). 
The value of PRA is also limited by the fact that an important component of 
cultural knowledge is encoded in technical routines and everyday experiences, 
and therefore cannot easily be elicited verbally. This means that knowledge of 
both private and public events is needed, and that public empowerment exercises 
need to be balanced with extended periods of critical observation. Other dangers 
commonly associated with the use of PRA have included: ritualism and 
insincerity, amateurish over-enthusiasm, and hostility from participating 
disciplinary specialists (Rew 1997). Thus while participatory research approaches 
continue to be widely promoted, they are frequently difficult to implement. 36 On 
the whole, PRA has been most successful in cases where the research objectives 
are quite specific and practical (e.g. where to locate a road) and the populations 
involved are fairlyliterate (Finan 1991). There is also mounting evidence to 
suggest that the choice of research technique is not as important as the need to 
vest planning responsibilities in appropriate groups and to have a good prior 
understanding of the social and cultural conditions governing effective 
participation in research planning (Rew 1997: 101).37 
While my own research with the Naso can not be considered 'participatory' in 
the strictest sense of the term, 1 was frequently able to act as a catalyst and 
facilitator of my hosts' research interests and priorities. 1 describe one particular 
incident in Chapter IV when my suggestion of a petition signing campaign was 
whole-heartedly embraced. 1 also helped the Naso ecotourism group ODES EN to 
prepare a grant proposaI that they submitted to the World Bank. Although this 
proposal was not immediately successful, several of its' components were 
eventually carried out with the financial and logistical support of various national 
and international NGOs. For instance, Asociaci6n ANAl, a Costa Rican nonprofit 
36 For detailed discussions of experience with participatory approaches to research see for example: 
Berardi (2002), Bhatnagar (1992), Mosse (1994), Pottier (1997), and Rietbergen-McCracken (1998). 
37 For examples of critical evaluations of the application of social science methodologies in 
development interventions see Brown (2002), Dani (2002), Hay (2000), Huizer (1997), Krueger (2001) 
and Renshaw (2001), only two of which had been published at the time that Rew was writing. 
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organization, agreed to organize a series of workshops and field training sessions 
on stream biological monitoring for Naso parataxonomists. 1 eventually 
accompanied a group of these fish monitors on an expedition to evaluate the 
potential effects of hydropower dams on the biotic communities, with emphasis 
on diadromous species, in streams draining the La Amistad International Park 
(PILA). 38 
One of the other projects that 1 helped to set up was for a documentation 
center in Sieyic so that the Naso could access the research results of various 
studies previously conducted in their own or similar regions. The Naso 
appreciated gaining access to information about their communities that 1 had 
previously obtained from internationallibraries, specialized agencies and the 
Internet. For example, 1 provided numerous documents, photographs, maps and 
computer files with agronomy and ecology related materials and others on 
ethnography, history and natural resource management. It turns out that several 
Naso have attended the agricultural technology high school in El Silencio, and 
many remain interested in experimenting with appropriate technologies for smalI 
farms. These resources currently constitute the only public1y available source of 
published information about indigenous rights and resource management issues in 
the Naso region. They are currently being stored in the Palace of the Naso people 
in Sieyic. 
In the extremely polarized social and political context of the Naso region 
during the time of my fieldwork this fairly pro active approach to research was not 
equally appreciated by aIl sides of the conflict. For instance, one member of the 
Naso Council of Leaders refused to participate in my survey because of my ties to 
the members of the Naso ecotourism association ODESEN, whom he rightly 
perceived as unsympathetic to the pro-hydro policies being pursued by the Naso 
king Tito Santana and his administration. Throughout these events 1 wrestled not 
so much with my conscience as with what 1 would calI my internal "academic 
watchdog", as when, for example, it came to participating in activities that 1 knew 
38 For additional information on ANAl biological programs see: http://anaicr.org/index.php. 
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could have a direct effect on the Naso leadership struggle or their decision to 
reject or support the hydro project. 1 elaborate further on the accusations of bias 
and support for one politicall y motivated faction of the N aso conflict that were 
made against me in Chapter IV. 
On the basis of the evidence and arguments put forward in this thesis and 
elsewhere, 1 believe that there are considerable opportunities for anthropologists 
to influence the nature and course of development policies and projects in ways 
that can have profound consequences for the quality of life of CUITent and future 
human generations.39 By articulating the kinds of fine-grained definitions of local 
experiences that are the specialty of anthropological accounts with a detailed 
knowledge of the wider world within which project managers negotiate and 
implement their interventions, anthropologists can make significant contributions 
to the design of and experimentation with comprehensive and systematic 
approaches to gaining a qualitative understanding of" ... peoples' values and 
behavior in relation to a planned or ongoing intervention for social and economic 
change." (Salmen 1998: 1). To be effective at this task, anthropologists must go 
beyond the conventional focus on either "top-down" or "bottom-up" development 
and include actions to address both the local and the wider political and 
institution al constraints that prevent people from realizing their full potentials 
(Gow 1995). 
39 For a critical evaluation of the impacts of anthropological theory and methods on development 
programs and studies see especially (Paiement 2007). 
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Chapter II: Social and Ecological History of the Naso Region 
"All historical societies have transformed their relations with the environment; 
this is the very definition of their historicity. " 
(Touraine 1981, quoted in Nygren 2000: 29) 
2.1 Pre-hispanic political ecology 
Archeological and paleo-ecological data signal the arrival of the first humans 
in what is today Panama towards the end of the last ice age (12,000-8000 BC). As 
atmospheric temperatures and sea levels were rising, plant and animal colonies 
were also known to have been on the move. The oldest known archeological site 
in Panama is a rock shelter (i.e. Cueva de los Vampiros) located close to the 
central Pacific coast which was visited repeatedly - from about 9500 BC onwards 
- by peoples who se stone tools closely resembled those of the "Clovis" tradition 
which developed in North America at around the same time (Cooke and Sanchez 
2003:2). Pollen studies have been used to show how dramatic changes in floral 
composition can be directly associated with human subsistence activities. For 
example, the earliest signs of plant domestication in Panama (i.e. microscopie 
particles of pollen and starch preserved in soils, grinding stones and human teeth) 
date back to around 6000 BC, and suggest that widespread deforestation has 
occurred in are as where fire was repeatedly used to clear existing vegetation 
before planting a variety of foods. Several varieties of maize, arrowroot and yams 
known to have been planted between 6000 and 1000 BC are no longer eaten, 
largely because of the availability of more suitable replacements. Primitive 
varieties of maize and manioc are believed to have been acquired from Mexico 
and South America respectively through trade and barter with neighboring 
agricultural groups. Cooke speculates that given the difficult and laborious task of 
clearing forest vegetation before the advent of poli shed stone axes - a technology 
whose first appearance in the region dates to around 500 BC - the se early 
agriculturalists were mostly attracted to plot sites in the mountains and foothills of 
43 For a detailed history of the early Spanish expeditions to the Naso region which date back to 1534 see 
especially Reverte (1967). 
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those regions with marked and lengthy dry seasons (i.e. the Pacific slope) (Cooke 
and Sanchez 2003:3-4). 
By 2000 BC, the constant need to search for fertile lands on which to plant is 
thought to have induced small groups of agriculturalists to begin to fan out over 
the humid and rugged terrain ofPanama's central Caribbean coastal zone (Cooke 
and Sanchez 2003:4). Cooke argues that in-migration to the higher and cOûler 
reaches of the Caribbean side of the Talamanca mountain range was delayed by 
the unsuitability of available food crops to local climatic conditions. The earliest 
evidence of occupancy in this region dates from the arrival of agriculturalists from 
the Pacific side around 800 Be. And while it may not be false to call these 
migrants 'agriculturalists', their livelihoods also depended to a considerable extent 
on hunting, fishing, and collecting shellfish and wild fruits (ibid:4-5). Gordon 
(1982), for example, uses ethnographic data about 20th century Guaymi (Ngobe) 
land use practices in Bocas deI Toro, Panama to de scribe how under traditional 
indigenous land use systems agriculture was but one phase in a long-term cycle 
which also incorporated tree gardens and the nurture of wildlife. Gordon de scribes 
how the Guaymi' s constant culling of plants judged to be "useless" along trails 
and near hamlets creates a subtle reapportioning of species within visited parts of 
the forest. Additional wild species are also transplanted to nearby "tree gardens" 
from the surrounding forests, resulting in a deliberately modified form of 
regrowth vegetation that provides many useful products and a considerable food 
supply. 
Until around the first millennia BC, the material cultures of such peoples 
remained relatively simple. Sorne signs of cultural differentiation are visible from 
the various types of shelters and tools used in different regions of the country, but 
there is no evidence of advancing social stratification until the period between 500 
BC and 500 AD which saw the beginnings of more permanent settlements 
accompanied by increasing technological (e.g. agricultural varieties, tools, 
pottery, gold work, etc.) and social specialization (e.g. shamans, chiefs, 
merchants, etc.) (Cooke and Sanchez 2003). These patterns contrast considerably 
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with the native societies of southern Mexico and northern Central America (i.e. 
Olmec, Maya) where, at around the same time, people were building stone 
temples in largely planned urban settlements and keeping detailed records about 
kinship, warfare and astronomy (Cooke 1997). 
By 1500 AD, most Panamanian societies were small chiefdoms characterized 
by intense status rivalry and competition for wealth and power (ReIms 1979). 
ReIms examined the relationships between chiefly status and power, regional and 
long-distance exchange networks, and the acquisition of esoteric knowledge; 
concerns that drew her attention to sumptuary items of chiefly display - gold 
pieces and ceramics (ibid:3). These chiefs or caciques were generally members of 
high ranking families whose leading members also occupied the lower ranks of 
regional authority, status and wealth. But these situations were also quite flexible, 
as evidence indicates that chiefly power also depended in large measure on 
maintaining agricultural productivity and continued political successes in trade 
and warfare (Cooke and Sânchez 2003). Despite the often bellicose nature of 
inter-group relations, trade and barter reporte dl y flourished. Marine products were 
brought inland to exchange for c10ths made of cotton, gold jewelry and hunting 
dogs. These later goods were also widely traded for agricultural products. 
In western Panama alone, as many as 20 short swift rivers flow north from the 
rugged Talamanca mountain range to the Caribbean Sea, creating a series of 
narrow coastal alluvial valleys connecting the sea to the mountains and providing 
access to the lands beyond (ReIms 1979:6). This topography has reinforced the 
formation of a series of discrete geopolitical sub-regions along the banks of the 
major river systems and their tributaries (ex: the Naso along the Teribe river, the 
Ngobé along the Cricamola river, the Bribri along the Sixaola in Costa Rica, the 
Sumu / Mayangna along the Matagalpa in Nicaragua, and the Miskito along the 
Coco, to name just a few). These territorial configurations provided access to a 
range of different products available from the distinct ecological zones situated at 
different altitudes along the river' s course. And by favoring such human 
settlement patterns, the region's ecological heterogeneity can be understood as an 
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important source of the region's linguistic and cultural diversity (Cooke and 
Sânchez 2003:8-12). 
Genetic, linguistie, and ethno-pharmacologieal data from the lower Central 
America region has largely confirmed the local and regional development 
hypothesis put forward initially on the basis of archeologieal findings. This 
hypothesis suggests that the modem day indigenous peoples (e.g. Bribri, Cebécar, 
Miskito, Rama, Naso, Kuna, Embera, Wounaan, Ngobé and Buglé) are 
descendent from Misumalpan, Paya-Chibchan and Chocoan speaking South 
American ancestors. Most of the available ethnographie data is also consistent 
with this scenario of graduaI fragmentation into separate linguistically and 
culturally related sociopolitical groups that have lived in or else very near to their 
present-day locations for many thousands of years (Cooke and Sanchez 2003). 
Sorne anthropologists have even preferred to consider both the Naso and Bokota 
to be linguistic subgroups of the larger Guaymf (Ngobé) tribe (Spielman 1979), 
even though historical records and N aso informants recognize the existence of 
considerable autonomy and cultural differences between them (Von Chong Sand 
Ortiz 1982). 
2.2 Conquest and colonization 
As recently as the 1940's much of the interior of Panama remained covered 
with tropieal forests, deciduous woodlands and other fore st fragments. But at the 
time when Columbus first explored the coast of present day Bocas dei Toro 
province in 1502,43 vast sections of the low-Iands and mountain slopes had been 
converted to open savannah by centuries of extensive cultivation (ReIms 1979). 
The Spanish conquered most of Central America between 1502 and 1542. The 
first region to be invaded was the central Caribbean coast between what is today 
Veraguas (Panama) eastward to the Gulf of Uraba. These locations (Santa Maria 
and Ac1a) became the staging grounds for a series of coastal raids against 
indigenous settlements, and an eventual expedition in 1513, led by Balboa and 
Pedrarias Davila, across the central mountain range to the dryer and more den sel y 
populated Pacific coastal plains (Cooke 1997). At around the same time, Cortez 
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had defeated the Aztec rulers of central Mexico and in 1524 Pedro de Alvaredo 
attacked and defeated the Maya in Chiapas and Guatemala, and then turned on the 
Nahua-speaking Pipil in El Salvador. The combined effects of European violence 
and diseases ravaged an already internally divided native population in Central 
America which was unable to effectively resist the two-sided invasion (ibid: 172). 
From the beginnings of the Spanish invasion of Panama in the early 16th 
century until nearly four hundred years later colonial settlements were established 
within fairly limited areas in each of the modern countries of Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. These settlements 
were oriented almost exclusively towards the Pacific Ocean. The drier Pacific 
climate facilitated transportation, and the combination of a sedentary indigenous 
population and the existence of commercial crops in that area contributed to a 
general neglect ofthe Caribbean coast. By comparison the Atlantic region's high 
annual rainfall (2000mm-6000mm), frequent tropical storms, rugged mountainous 
interior, swampy coastal areas, low population density and relatively less 
sophisticated material culture offered few attractions to tempt would-be Spanish 
settlers. Thus indigenous landholdings in these are as remained substantially intact 
during the 300 years or so of colonial rule (Martin 1996). 
Other factors that helped to curb Spanish appropriation of indigenous lands 
located on the Caribbean coast were the rudimentary state of agricultural 
technology, the small size of local and regional markets, and the limited 
transportation options. Furthermore, armed resistance and native attacks -
especially during the 16th and 18th centuries - occasionally halted missionary 
activities and allowed several native groups to retain their territories and 
independence until weIl into the 19th century (Cooke 1997) - or ev en the 21 st 
century as can be argued in the case of the Kuna. Thus apart from sorne very 
limited mining and logging activities on the northern shore of Honduras, the 
Caribbean terminal of the Isthmus crossing (i.e. the city of Colôn) was the only 
enduring Caribbean settlement in all of Central America (Jones 1988:45). The 
Caribbean coast was in fact so marginal in the eyes of the Spanish crown that -
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were it not for the obstinate presence of the Dutch, French and English pirates 
who used the region's many coves, islands and sheltered lagoons to launch raids 
against Spanish shipping and inland settlements - the region would likely have 
escaped aIl attempts to control and integrate it into the colonial order (Howe 
1998). 
Contrary to many scholarly and popular accounts of colonial Latin America, 
the history of these events is impossible to understand without considering the 
collaborative relationships and tensions that existed between the colonists, the 
colonized and the actions and goals pursued by various intermediaries including 
local land speculators, govemment officials and indigenous authorities. Besides 
being supported by much of the available archival documentation, such a 
perspective is appealing because it repudiates both the all black (i.e. "genocide" ) 
and all white (i.e. "civilization") accounts of the colonial period that have tended 
to attribute agency almost exclusively to the Europeans (Appelbaum 2003). 
Newson (1992) develops one such ex ample of a more nuanced treatment of 
regional variations in the impacts of Spanish colonialism on the indigenous 
peoples of Nicaragua and Honduras. Her account stresses the complex interplay 
and relative importance of different factors including disease, degree of violence 
and exploitation, different rates of demographic decline and recovery, the 
character of native society, and the nature and quantity of available natural 
resources. Cooke (1997) provides similar evidence about how during the 18th and 
19th centuries, the Miskito (like the Kuna) successfully exploited European 
rivalries to acquire firearms and boats from the English which allowed them to 
extend their sphere of influence up and down the Caribbean coast. 
The creation of the Miskito Protectorate in 1749 was part of a wider British 
plan to increase their geopolitical control of the Caribbean region. The British also 
pursued similar relations with the Kuna in the Darien region of Panama for the 
same strategic purpose of destabilizing the Spanish colonies (Herrera 1982). But 
most significantly for the surrounding indigenous peoples of the lower Caribbean 
coast, the pressure of constant Miskito attacks and demands of tribute in the form 
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of slaves and products forced many, including the Naso, to flee their coastal and 
island settlements in order to seek refuge in the more inaccessible river valleys at 
higher elevations. And yet despite all the suffering caused by frequent 
displacements, hunger, and inter-group warfare that went on at the time, existing 
sources of information about life in the Naso region have suggested that few 
changes took place in the Naso's prevailing social institutions and/or cultural 
traditions during this period (Von Chong Sand Ortiz 1982:47-48). 44 
2.3 Republican modernity 
Throughout Latin America, forging the post-colonial state involved deliberate 
and determined attempts to homogenize the nation and consolidate strong central 
govemments (Sieder 2002). In pursuit of these objectives, the dominant criollo 45 
elites made passionate defenses of progress and national destiny which also 
appealed to the mestizo and mulatto lower classes and thus fostered an inclusive 
national identity. State proponents of liberalism were particularly unwilling to 
tolerate a people who explicitly rejected that identity (Howe 1998). Towards the 
indigenous peoples of the region, the newly independent states pursued policies 
that inevitably dispossessed or disregarded their territories under the assumption 
that they would either assimilate into the dominant culture or be condemned to 
remain 'primitive' (Plant 2001). As during the colonial period, even the most 
'well-meaning' laws and policies intended to protect indigenous rights often 
proved misguided, inadequately enforced, or simply ineffective. Take for instance 
laws intended to protect indigenous lands from encroachment by outsiders - the 
land tenure conflict resolution mechanisms included in such legislation have 
tended to be slow and costly processes disproportionately benefiting the more 
powerful interests in society. Furthermore, the state agencies responsible for 
demarcating and enforcing indigenous land tenure rights have been notoriously 
under-staffed and under-funded (Utting 1993). 
44 An interesting historical footnote from this time involves a Franciscan missionary' s plan to move a 
group of N aso followers across the continental divide to the relative safety of Costa Rica' s pacifie coast. 
These people are known today as the Terraba (Reverte Coma 1967). 
45 Throughout Latin America, the term Criollo applies to descendents of Spanish settlers who were born 
in the Americas. 
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Thus Independence (1822) was in many ways even crue1er to the indigenous 
peoples of Latin America than the suffering and devastation unleashed during the 
previous colonial period. For instance, form Mexico to Chile post-independence 
land-owning elites expropriated church estates and crown lands, and made various 
attempts to privatize the traditional collective holdings that previous colonial 
govemments had permitted indigenous peoples to maintain for their own 
subsistence (Stavenhagen 2002). By the 20th century these economic measures, 
combined with the often equally significant state policies designed to culturally 
assimilate and socially obliterate aIl remnants of indigenous identity, had 
contributed to a situation of widespread landlessness, increasing agrarian unrest, 
multiple revolutions and various experiments with land reforms (e.g. Mexico 
(1910-1920), Bolivia and Guatemala (1952), Peru (1960's and 70's), Chile (1970-
73), Costa Rica and Panama (1970's and 80's), Nicaragua (1980's), etc.) 
(ibid:25). Unfortunate1y, many if not most of these latter state-led approaches to 
land reform and rural development were severe1y compromised by official 
corruption, partisan politics, short-sighted thinking and derelict bureaucratic 
institutions (Bobrow-Strain 2004). 
AIthough geographically Panama appears to be a southward extension of 
Central America, cuIturally, economically and politically its destiny has always 
been doser to Spain (untilI821), Colombia (until 1903), and with the completion 
ofthe transcontinental railroad (1850's) and especially since the Inter-oceanic 
Canal was inaugurated in 1914, to the United States of America than to its 
neighbors (Furlong 2000). Furthermore, unlike in northem Central America (i.e. 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras), the estates of the south (Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica and Panama) rarely had either Indian villages or peasant cultivators as 
hostage labor sources. Colonial demographic disasters, isolation, or the 
prominence of long distance trade created a situation where elites whose political 
power was based on control of trade and govemment rather than landed property 
were un able - or uninterested (as in Panama) - to directly dominate the 
commoner population economically (Gudmundson 1995). Panama's 'geographic 
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vocation' in the transnational commerce and service sectors has continued to 
reduce much of the economic and integrationist pressures directed against the 
country's indigenous minorities (Horton 2006). 
The beginning of the 20th century was a time when outsiders began playing a 
progressively greater role in the internaI affairs of the indigenous peoples of the 
Caribbean region. These newcomers inc1uded turtle hunters, rubber tappers, 
colonists from Colombia, then missionaries and government school teachers 
(Howe 1998). Panama's independence from Colombia in 1903 eventually became 
a significant catalyst in the Kuna's sodo-cultural and political evolution from a 
regional alliance of independent local chiefdoms into an internally self-governing 
constitutional confederation with special status under Panamanian law (Holloman 
1975). After the brief and successful Kuna rebellion in 1925, USA military 
intervention preempted any state retaliation during the following years of 
negotiations between the Kuna and the Panamanian government (Herlihy 1995).46 
These negotiations led to the eventual passage of nationallegislation recognizing 
the Comarca de San BIas as a semi-autonomous territorial jurisdiction, and 
approval of a 'Carta Organica' establishing a framework for an indigenous 
territorial government. In attempting to specify the extent and nature of both 
indigenous and state authority within the territory, the carta organica extended 
formal recognition to the Kuna' s evolving poli tic al system based on a hierarchy of 
regional chiefs. And yet despite such advances and a series of others expanding 
the le gal responsibilities of the national government (e.g. the Constitution of 1946, 
creation of a National indigenous Institute, etc.) indigenous lands throughout the 
country continued to experience colonization by outsiders, and relations with 
governments remained sporadic and characterized by inadequate levels of direct 
support (ibid:82). 
46 The course of these important events has been described in considerable historic detail by Howe 
(1998). Suffice it to say here that an American by the name of Richard Marsh had come to the eastem 
Darien region of Panama in the 1920' s with the goal of establishing a rubber plantation. Marsh became 
a good friend and political advisor of Nele Kantule, a traditionalleader and representative of the 
moderate Kuna faction that organized the 1925 revoIt. 
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One can hardly overestimate the importance of colonization as a primary 
developmental and economic theme of post-colonial Central America. Forested 
lands, and in particular the vast areas of humid tropical regrowth inhabited by 
indigenous peoples and Blacks on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus, were seen as 
virtually unlimited resources but unproductive in their 'natural' state and thus 
requiring incorporation into the national economy (Jones 1989). Peoples of 
African heritage generally make up the major non-Indian population group on the 
Caribbean coast of Central America. Most Afro-Hispanics are the descendents of 
runaway and freed slaves brought to the colonies especially during the 18th 
century. The other major sub-group is comprised of Anglo-African immigrants 
from the Caribbean islands who, by the mid 1820's had established turtle fishing 
camps in the region. These groups were followed by an influx of Island laborers 
as a consequence of rail and canal projects and the development of the banana 
industry (Gordon 1982). The goal of pioneer colonists is normally to increase the 
value of the land (on which they have insecure property rights) as quickly as 
possible. This is usually achieved by sowing it with pasture, after a couple of 
years of raising subsistence crops (Richards 1997: 107). 
The conversion of forests to pasture has also been encouraged by agrarian 
legislation that classified forested lands as idle, thereby making property rights to 
such areas subject to prescription through "proof' of occupancy (i.e. forest 
clearing defined as "mejoras" or improvements). Between 1945 and 1985 60% of 
the Panama's previously forested area was cleared (Heckadon Moreno and 
Espinosa Gonzalez 1985, in Herlihy 1995:90). Throughout Central America, the 
areas of remaining tropical forest are now largely restricted to the Caribbean 
lowlands, where the absence of a dry season has hindered the development of 
overland communications and presents special problems for permanent 
agricultural production (Jones 1989:45). When combined with tax and credit 
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incentives to invest in land speculation and cattle ranching, this process of pasture 
expansion has led to many disastrous social and ecological consequences. 47 
In 1872 a Catholic missionary reported the existence of approximately 180 
Naso people living in two villages along the Teribe and Changuinola Rivers. Over 
the course of the next hundred years the descendents of these people began to 
change in ways that have led observers to consider the contemporary Nasa as 
almost indistinguishable from their mestizo neighbours (Instituto de Estudios de 
las Tradiciones Sagradas de Abia Yala 2001: 11-13). These socio-cultural 
transformations intensified during the early 20th century when several Naso 
families abandoned their homes in the Palenque region along the upper stretches 
of the Teribe River and migrated 10 km or so down river to the present day 
location of Sieyic. The Naso say that their decision to move was in part motivated 
by an epidemic of tuberculosis that ravaged the region in 1920 - 1921. Others say 
that they were persuaded by Adventist missionaries to resettle in the vicinity of 
the missionary school built in Sieyic in 1939. Still others came looking for fertile 
agriculturallands along the river that remains their main transportation route. 
Thus beginning around the 1930s, the Naso have multiplied their contacts with 
the agro industrial and commercial economy developing in the coastallowlands 
and the ethnie aIl y diverse migrants from other parts of the country that were 
similarly drawn to the Changuinola region by these activities. Burton L. Gordon 
made several visits to the Teribe region during the 1950's and again in 1979. 
Gordon characterized the Naso of this period as few and socially fragmented 
along religious and ethnie lines (1982). The Adventist faction apparently mixed 
mostly with other Adventists from around the Province, while an isolationist 
faction under the influence of their traditional king and shaman kept mostly to 
themselves further upriver. Still others were choosing to marry the growing 
numbers of outsiders - mainly Ngobes and Latinos as 1 show in Chapter 111-
47 For example see (Davis 1977) on the disastrous implications for Indigenous people s, poor peasants 
and the Amazon ecosystem of policy incentives and govemment investments in Brazil. For other 
examples from Central America see especially Brockett (1998), Edelman (1995) and Strasma (1992). 
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attracted to the Santa Rosa / Charagre / San San areas by the relative abundance of 
unoccupied lands at the time. 
The Government of Panama has never officially recognized the authority of 
the Naso kings, and as early as the 1950's those Naso dissatisfied with their 
ruler' s judgements could and did sometimes take their cases to an appointed 
Latino official based in the banana zone. The passing of the throne from the 
revered king Lâzaro Santana to his son Simeon Santana in 1973 marked the end of 
a political era for the Naso. Contrary to his son who exercised very little real 
control over his people, Lâzaro is still remembered as a tough but fair ruler who 
enforced respect for Naso tribal custom. As 1 recounted above, this period 
coincided with growing economic interests and political involvement of the 
Panama State in the Naso region. As neither Lâzaro nor his son Simeon spoke 
much Spanish, both relied increasingly on a Latino resident by the name of 
Manuel Aguilar for translation and advice in their relations with the increasingly 
prominent government officiaIs and non-Naso settlers. Upon Simeon Santana's 
death in 1979, Mr. Aguilar even managed to become the maximum authority of 
the Naso people until1982 when he was replaced by Simeon's daughter Rufina 
Santana who became the first Naso Queen. Chapter IV picks up the history of 
Naso leadership succession with Rufina Santana, and shows how these changes 
were becoming increasingly tied to political and economic contests associated 
with the wider regional and even international contexts. 
Gordon (1982:153-155) recounts two events that can serve to bracket this 
decisive half century in the history of the Naso people stretching roughly from the 
1920's to the 1970's. During the 1890s, the United Fruit Company began 
transforming vast expanses of poorly drained in sect- and snake-ridden lowland 
tropical rain forest spanning the Panama - Costa Rica border into one of the most 
productive banana farms in Latin America (Bourgois 1989:3). As mentioned 
earlier, a terrible epidemic oftuberculosis ravaged the Naso region from 1915 or 
so until 1921. Gordon details how at the time hundreds of N aso people descended 
upon and built temporary shelters around the hospital in the town of Bocas where 
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they had brought their stricken king for treatment. Apparently before moving on 
to Bocas, the Naso had sought treatment for their dying ruler from the banana 
Company hospital in Almirante only to be refused. This incident is said to have 
re-enforced Naso resentment towards the Company that was already seen to be 
occupying a large section of their traditionallands. The second illustrative episode 
took place sorne 50 years later in 1969. This time it was another of the 
periodically disastrous floods that occur along the Teribe River that is said to have 
washed away Naso subsistence crops and the fertile alluvial soil from their more 
agriculturally productive river banks. This tragedy would have forced many local 
residents to shift their farming activities onto the steeper, less productive valley 
slopes, further accelerating their dependence upon employment and supplies from 
the banana Company towns. 
The global energy crisis provoked by rising oil prices during the 1970s also 
convinced Panama' s national authorities that - as a net petroleum importer with 
no known oil reserves - the key to the country' s future energy needs was flowing 
through its numerous white-water rivers. Hydroelectricity, as people are still fond 
of saying in Panama, " ... is cheaper, cleaner, renewable and best of all ois ours'" 
(Pinilla 2005). Subsequent feasibility studies conducted by the national 
Hydrological and Electrification Institute (IRHE) confirmed that the Teribe and 
Changuinola river basins alone accounted for 40% of the country' s generating 
potential.48 This period corresponds to the first phase in negotiations between the 
Naso and govemment resource developers over the planned construction of no 
less than six hydroelectric dams on their ancestral territory. These plans called for 
a total direct investment of almost U$700 million in order to generate an average 
3,368 gigawatts per hour (Von Chong Sand Ortiz 1982:215). As an outcome of 
these initial discussions, the govemment of Panama signed a series of agreements 
with the tradition al Naso authorities promising to improve their living conditions. 
Around the same time Panama established the first public schools in the Naso 
48 For a thoroughly fascinating account of the actors and policies that defined the socioeconornic 
and political contexts of energy production and use in Panama during the 1970s and the 1980s see 
especially Wali (1989). 
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region (1969) and the tirst health c1inics (1974) (Instituto de Estudios de las 
Tradiciones Sagradas de Abia Yala 2001: 15). 
Also during the 1970s, Panama's populist military president Omar Torrijos 
was encouraging indigenous leaders to 'struggle' for legal recognition of their 
territories. A series of National Indigenous Congresses were held at which various 
indigenous leaders became aware of the poli tic al effectiveness of the Kuna 
comarca model of government based on a congress of regional caciques. In 
theory, the comarca concept was to provide for continuous access to the resources 
necessary for indigenous peoples social and economic wellbeing. Despite sorne of 
the problems noted below, evidence suggests that recognition of comarca status 
did allow the Kuna to use their indigenous political system to manage their 
internaI affairs (e.g. migration to the banana region) and make important resource 
use decisions (e.g. effectively haIt unwanted road construction and commercial 
tourism development on their lands). The Kuna model is also reported to have 
inspired other indigenous leaders to begin to reshape their own political and ethnie 
organizations. For example: the Embera and Wounan peoples of the Darién and 
even the Guaymi in western Panama had never developed formal regional 
hierarchical social institutions. Comarca status was now beginning to appear as 
the best way to guarantee indigenous land rights, socio-economic development 
and cultural heritage; and for the state, it was increasingly seen as a way to 
stabilize rapidly expanding rural to urban migration patterns (Herlihy 1995). 
During this same period, two well-known and respected social scientists 
(Stanley Heckadon Moreno and Francisco Herrera) joined the government' s 
General Directorate for Community Development creating signiticant public 
pressure in favor of indigenous rights. This helped to draw more attention to 
indigenous issues and prodded the government towards recognizing its 
constitution al obligations to promote cultural continuity among indigenous 
peoples (ibid: 84). Thus Herlihy conc1udes that by peacefully (for the most part) 
and deliberately working within Panama's legal and political institutions, 
indigenous Panamanians have successfully secured state support for their land and 
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resource rights against unauthorized usurpers (Herlihy 1995:91-92). He also 
argues that these comarcas probably represent the best potential for the 
development of indigenous autonomy in all of Central America (ibid: 93). 
Other observers of these developments in indigenous Panamanians' relations 
with the dominant society are less enthusiastic in their assessments of the 
significance of these changes. Much of the lack of optimism regarding indigenous 
comarcas in Panama has focused on the relatively recent comarca experience of 
the Guaymi or Ngobé-Buglé. Young points out that among the provisions of 
Panamanian National Assembly Law 10 of 1997, the govemment reserved for 
itself the right to all natural resources in the Comarca Ngobe-Buglé, with simple 
requirement that the Ngobe be "consulted" if the govemment decides to develop 
or exploit any natural resources within the comarca. Young and many Ngobe 
have interpreted this Law as effectively leaving the Ngobe with no real decision-
making power in the matter.49 
Wickstrom similarly recognizes that indigenous peoples have been "more 
directly engaged in negotiating their control over resource management with the 
state." (p.43) But she is reluctant to grant that the degree of control obtained 
through such negotiations will allow them to adequately address the cmshing 
poverty and mounting ecological problems that she sees as being caused by 
increasing integration into national economic and political systems (Wickstrom 
2003). Wickstrom attributes the relative success of the Kuna in protecting their 
land rights and cultural autonomy to competent leadership and a remarkable 
ability to mobilize in defense of their collective interests. Following Howe (1986), 
she explains these achievements by the enduring strengths of Kuna political 
culture grounded in a tradition of frequent communal gatherings, mIes and 
obligations enforced by police, and diverse cooperative productive activities 
(2003:47). Even so, Wickstrom wonders if in the future the Kuna's capacity to 
49 Phil Young, personal communication received via e-mail on 19/03/2004. See also: Gjording 
(1991) and Young and Bort (1999). 
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exert autonomous control over their territorial resources will be enough to ensure 
their ability to manage these resources sustainably (ibid: 62). 
2.4 Neo-liberal globalization 
Since the 1980s, neo-liberalism has emerged in Central America as part of a 
broad post cold-war shift from macro-economic stabilization to addressing the 
more structural issues thought to undermine sustainable long-term economic 
development. In terms of agricultural and rural development policies, these 
changes have shifted the emphasis from agrarian reform to land policy -with 
issues like privatization, property rights, land taxation and titling coming to the 
fore. This new orientation has also been accompanied by the phasing-out of many 
of the previous generation of state-sponsored supports for small-scale agriculture, 
with the predictable impact of further increasing heterogeneity among producers. 
Mexico is a particularly good example of such reforms, especially the changes to 
Article 27 of the Constitution allowing for the privatization of usufruct rights 
within land grant communities (ejidos) (Moguel, Botey, and Hemandez 1992, 
Stanford 2000). 50 The new economic and socio-political contexts created through 
these measures have provided additional impetus to capitalist farming, while 
serving to further marginalize subsistence producers and/or harvesters. 1 will 
retum to this point about the socio-economic implications of these development 
choices in the final section of this thesis. For now 1 simply want to emphasize that 
while most Latin American peasants and indigenous peoples are equally 
concemed about the nature of these changes, these trends have also reinforced the 
shift among indigenous peoples to base their land claims on ethnic and cultural 
features instead of social class and economic ones (Gutierrez 2002). 
Additional impetus for indigenous peoples to seek to tie ongoing negotiations 
over land and political autonomy to ethnic and cultural criteria has come from a 
resurgence of academic and policy interests in communal land and resource tenure 
50 Costa Rica adopted similar measures inc1uding privatizing much of its agro-industrial sector and 
lowering trade barriers and subsidies (Edelman 1999). 
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systems.51 These studies recognized the multiple functions that communal tenure 
systems generally perform (i.e. ensuring equitable distribution of access rights, 
reducing vulnerability to economic or environmental shocks, etc.) and have led to 
a reassessment of their virtues, including their capacity to evolve and respond to 
changes. Contrary to the 'tragedy of the commons' scenario of de gradation 
frequently assumed to characterize group owned or managed natural resources, 
much of this experience has shown that indigenous tenure systems contain 
significant normative and institutional assets for local people to manage common 
resources in an effective and sustainable manner. 
In keeping with these regional policy shifts, Panama is consistently rated as 
one of the most advanced countries in the region in terms of constitutionallaw 
and regulations recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples (Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo 2003). Panama recently adopted a comprehensive 
approach to consolidating indigenous territories. In addition to delimitation and 
demarcation, the World Bank funded Panama - Land Administration Project 
includes a series of complementary activities required to fully regularize 
indigenous territories and to ensure that indigenous communities achieve 
territorial control. These additional measures include: (i) assessing potentialland 
and resource use conflicts or overlaps with non-indigenous peoples, protected 
areas or other entities; (ii) satisfactory resolution of these conflicts; (iii) 
complementary studies on such matters as tenure or land use patterns; (iv) 
assistance in the drafting of the le gal and regulatory frameworks to establish 
indigenous Reserves (comarcas); and (v) strengthening of indigenous 
organizations with respect to land regularization and consolidation (The World 
Bank 2000). 
These measures have clearl y increased the political visibility of Panama' s 
indigenous minorities, for example several indigenous legislators have even won 
seats in the country's National Assembly. However significant these political 
SIOn Indigenous and other communal resource tenure systems see especiaIly: (Assies 2000, Bromley 
1989, Davis and Wali 1994, Forster 2000, Ostrom 1990, Richards 1997, Wali and Davis 1992). 
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gains for indigenous peoples appear to be, as in other countries throughout Latin 
America, they have not generally translated into sorely needed social and 
economic benefits for the vast majority who continue to struggle against 
widespread poverty, illiteracy, disease and discrimination (Hall and Patrinos 
2006). Interestingly though, 'geography' seems to be a more significant 
determinant of poverty in Panama than 'ethnicity' - with higher incidence of 
poverty being reported among ethnie indigenous people living within indigenous 
areas than those living outside these areas (Lindert 2000:X). 
This is not the place to review aIl the social and environmental changes that 
have occurred in the Naso region over the past three decades. Suffice it to say here 
that just as Panama' s ministers and engineers were discovering the hydroelectric 
potential of the Naso region, they were also becoming increasingly sensitized to 
the high rates of deforestation that could threaten the quantity of water available 
to power the proposed electrical facilities. Thus in 1983 the govemment of 
Panama created the 244,000 hectare Palo Seco Protected Forest (BPPS) in an area 
of Bocas deI Toro where more than 5420 people currently reside. The majority of 
these residents within the BPPS protected area are Ngobe indigenous people, and 
close to 800 or so are Naso (Fuenmayor and Muschett 2004:55-57). 
According to Panama's national forestry law adopted in 1994, protected 
forests are: 
Forested areas considered of national or regional interest for the regulation of 
hydrological regimes; for the protection of river basins, dams, settlements, 
crops, wildlife or civil works; for the prevention and control of erosion and the 
negative effects of the wind; or to contribute to national security (Direcci6n 
Nacional de Patrimonio Natural 2000) (my translation). 
Thus far from being an obstacle to the construction of a hydroelectric dam on 
the Bonyie River, the legal status of the targeted region as a Protected Forest has 
actually served to justify the national govemment's control over the area's natural 
resources. AdditionaIly, this same forestry law absolves the private company that 
obtained a concession to produce energy from the waters of the Bonyic River (i.e. 
Hidro Ecol6gieo deI Teribe) of the need to obtain any supplementary forestry 
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concessions. If the Bonyic region was not already a Protected Forest, then the 
hydro developers would have needed to obtain special forestry concessions in 
order to protect the surrounding watershed area that guarantees the long-term 
viability of the multi-million dollar investments planned for the region.52 
This chapter has reviewed the resource-use options and the social 
consequences resulting from thousands of years of human adaptations to the 
physical environments and poli tic al economies of the Caribbean coast of lower 
Central America. The arguments and the evidence assessed suggest that the 
indigenous peoples throughout the region possess varying capacities to draw on 
their own tradition al modes of organization in order to adapt to changing social, 
economic and ecological contexts. The cases of the Kuna people in Panama and 
the Miskito in Nicaragua are probably the best demonstrations of the importance 
of cultural as sets in collective mobilizations in defense of resource rights and 
political autonomy. Secondly, this historical review makes clear the centrality of 
the multiple roles of the state and the specific nature of the policies pursued vis-à-
vis indigenous peoples and their concerns. Through a combination of resistance, 
compromise and manipulation indigenous peoples have sometimes been able to 
influence the direction of these state policies in favor of their own more desirable 
outcomes. 
These conclusions suggest that researchers, practitioners and policy-makers 
need to know more about how changes in external incentives influence the 
internaI dynamics of households where many decisions about resources are made, 
and how both affect the local and increasingly international institutions which 
govern resource usage. For example, what effect will strengthening traditional 
resource management institutions have on household land management practices? 
How can resource tenure issues be effectively combined within a comprehensive 
framework for indigenous development (including such aspects as non-indigenous 
partnerships, markets and globalization)? My own sense is that the answers to 
52 In 2006, the private utility company Hidro Ecol6gico deI Teribe (RET S.A.) opened a website to 
publicize its proposed hydroelectric project on the Bonyic river < 
http://www.hidroecologica.comlsitel>. 
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these research questions are beginning to emerge through a series of systematic 
attempts like my own that seek to understand the cultural and ecological dynamics 
of local political movements seeking to preserve or alter the prevailing patterns of 
resource tenure. 53 
53 See for example: (Dove 2006, Horton 2006, Spaeder and Feit 2005). 
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Chapter III: Resonrce Management "from below" 
As stated in the Introduction, this Chapter looks at the local socio-economic 
and cultural determinants of Naso land use and natural resource management 
practices. 1 contend that it is through the interactions of such factors within the 
broader political and ecological contexts described in Chapters II and IV that 
individual and collective decisions about resource use must be understood. Thus it 
is necessary to develop a relatively accurate understanding of local socio-
demographics, political organizations, land tenure and land-use dynamics against 
which to assess the appropriateness and the adequacy of the assumptions and 
predictions underlying external policy and pro gram interventions in the Naso 
region. This chapter analyses household survey data and relevant secondary 
sources to paint such a detailed and nuanced portrait of contemporary Naso 
livelihood strategies and community dynamics. 
3.1 Socio demographics 
According to the latest available statistics from Panama's 2000 National 
Population and Household Census there are 285,231 indigenous people in the 
country. For the most part, these people identify with one of the eight principle 
indigenous groups present in the country (see Table 1 below). In the Province of 
Bocas deI Toro, indigenous peoples make up over 55% of the total population, 
with the Ngobe people constituting the single largest ethnic group in the province 
(i.e. accounting for more population than aIl other non-indigenous groups 
combined, ex: European, African, Chinese, Middle-Eastern, etc.). Table 1 is also 
interesting because it shows that 721 Naso Teribe people, or 22% oftheir total 
population, currently reside outside of their home province of Bocas deI Toro. 
Most of these Naso are living in the neighbouring province of Chiriqui, and to a 
lesser extent in and around Panama's capital city. 
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Table 1: Indigenous Population in Panama and the Province of Bocas deI Toro. 
Panama Bocas dei Toro 
Indigenous Affiliation Total Indigenous Affiliation Total Population Population 
1: None 2,553,946 1: Ngobe 41,714 
2: Ngobe 169,130 2: None 39,975 
3: Kuna 61,707 3: Bugle 3,068 
4: Embera 22,485 4: Naso / Teribe 2,584 
5: Bugle 17,731 5:Wounaan 877 
6:Wounaan 6,882 6: Kuna 598 
7: Naso / Teribe 3,305 7: Bri Bri 275 
8: Bri Bri 2,521 8: Bokota 91 
9: Bokota 993 9: Embera 87 
10: Un-dec1ared 477 10: Un-dec1ared 0 
Totallndigenous 285,231 Totallndigenous 49,294 
Total Panama 2,839,177 Total Bocas dei Toro 89,269 
% Indigenous 10 % Indigenous 55 
Source: (Contraloria General: Direcciôn de Estadfstica y Censo 2000). 
These National Census figures for the year 2000 differ considerably from an 
independent survey of the N aso population conducted that same year by the 
Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala. Dobbo Yala puts the total Naso population resident 
within the Province of Bocas deI Toro at 3,340 people - 756 more than the 
provincial total reported in the national census. Dobbo Yala also found 2,343 
people living in the 12 core Naso communities situated along the Teribe and San 
San Rivers and the remaining 997 scattered throughout the Bocas deI Toro banana 
belt that stretches from Guabito on the border with Costa-Rica to the port city of 
Almirante in the east (see Table 2 below). The Dobbo Yala census did not attempt 
to count the Naso living in Panama's other provinces or even intemationally. 
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Table 2: Naso population by community of residence. 
Total Total Numberof 
Community Population Numberof Households 
Households Interviewed* 
1. Siekin 366 61 16 
2. Sieyic 402 77 15 
3. Solon 208 28 9 
Shupsco (sector of Solon) 19 4 3 
4. Druy 411 71 11 
5. Sodi 88 11 6 
6. San San Tigra 82 14 3 
7. Santa Rosa 212 36 2 
8. Bonyic 236 31 5 
9. Kuikin 91 14 1 
10. Yorkin 53 8 0 
11. San San 125 24 3 
12. Loma Bandera 50 8 2 
Total Naso region 2343 387 76 
Banana region 997 N.A. 7 
Total Bocas dei Toro 3340 N.A. 83 
* The number of households mterviewed corresponds to the commumty of 
residence of the 29 interview and 54 household survey participants 1 spoke to 
between August 2004 and June 2005. Source: adapted from Fundaci6n Dobbo 
Yala (2002:23-24). 
Given the remoteness of many Naso households and the logistical difficulties 
involved in reaching them, it is entirely likely that the National Census figures 
significantl y undercounted the N aso population resident in the Province of Bocas 
deI Toro in 2000. There is also sorne chance that the Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala could 
have deliberately over counted the local Naso population in a bid to strengthen the 
Naso bid for their own comarca. Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala is a Panama City based 
Kuna indigenous peoples' organization dedicated to conserving the cultures and 
traditions of the indigenous people of Panama, as weIl as the environments that 
they see as intimately linked to the survival of these distinctive cultures and 
74 
traditions. 54 Nevertheless, the extent of tbis discrepancy between the two counts -
i.e. 756 people or almost one in every four Naso residents potentially missed by 
the official statistics - is worrisome since many decisions about govemment 
spending on health and education are based on the population estimates contained 
in the census data. More specifically, the relative demographic insignificance of 
the Naso and other indigenous peoples as a proportion of the total population of 
the country has been successfully exploited by political opponents of indigenous 
rights in the National Assembly. These critics question the equity of allocating 
extensive semi-autonomous territorial jurisdictions to small groups of indigenous 
peoples. 
As of November 2006, Panama had already designated five indigenous 
Comarcas (Ngobe-Buglé, Embera-Wounann, Kuna Yala, Madugandf and 
Wargandf) which account for 21.9% of the country's total surface area. The Naso 
proposal would add another 160 Km2 to that total (Asamblea Legislativa de 
Panama 2004). The amount of land designated as comarcas is becoming 
controversial as increasing numbers of indigenous Panamanians have migrated to 
urban and peri-urban areas. The 2000 National Census reports that only 53% of 
Panama's indigenous people actually live in one of the five legally recognized 
comarcas. The argument against recognizing exclusive indigenous jurisdictions 
over land that they do not permanently inhabit was used against the Naso when it 
tumed out that a large number of the squatters who had illegally occupied land in 
the town of El Silencio were Naso. According to national media reports, the 
majority of the 174 families who illegally occupied four hectares of land on the 
outskirts of the community of El Silencio were indeed previously residents of the 
Naso region (Pimentel 2005). The presence among the squatters of politically 
influential Naso leaders, including El Teribe' elected Representative Constantino 
Aguilar and Naso king Tito Santana, eventually insured that Panama's ruling PRD 
govemment bought out the private land owner who had sought to have the 
squatters evicted (Arrocha 2005). Nevertheless, in an extraordinary session of 
54 http://www.dobboyala.org.pa/accessed November 21,2006. 
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Panama's national Legislative Assembly that took place on June 22nd, 2004 Law 
No. 50 that was created to recognize the Naso people's land rights and political 
autonomy failed to gather enough votes to be adopted (Ruiz 2004). 1 will retum to 
the topic of the Naso Comarca in the next chapter. For the moment, 1 wish to stay 
with the view from within the Naso communities. 
Table 2 above also gives a pretty good sense of just how small most Naso 
villages are. Even the larger and more populated among them - such as Sieyic, 
Santa Rosa and Druy - can best be described as collections of dispersed 
households that share sorne form of public infrastructure (i.e. elementary school 
or health clinic) and a variety oflocal organizations (for example: religious, 
productive or political). Each village generally has a soccer field, a church 
(usually Adventist although sorne Catholic as well), and a communal structure for 
meetings and special events. As mentioned earlier, there are currently no roads in 
the Naso region. The Sieyic - Siekin region is accessible only by dugout canoe or 
on foot. Communities in the San San region have a much easier time traveling by 
four-wheel drive taxi from Guabito along a cattle road to within 4krn of their 
homes. The villages of Sori and Santa Rosa are located about an hour' s walk from 
the ethnically mixed community of El Silencio, itself only a 30 minute bus ride 
from the center of the city of Changuinola (see Map 4 below). 
Figure 5: Images of the Naso region. From left to right: Naso girls in traditional dress 
during National Independence Day (November 3) celebrations in Solon. A view of a 
hamlet in the village of Siekin (slight clearing on the hillside visible in the center of the 
photo), and a typical house with a palm roof in the village of San San. 
The Naso build their hou ses out of local materials, although many now 
substitute corrugated iron sheets for their tradition al palm leaf roofs, and a few 
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now have cement floors. None of the Naso villages has electricity, although a very 
limited few have diesel-fired electrical generators which they use infrequently. 
Everyone uses kerosene lamps and candIes or battery powered flashlights after 
dark. Several Naso communities have installed - with the help of the government, 
churches and/or international donors - gravity-fed piped water networks to bring 
water from nearby streams into their houses. Water quality is reported to be 
decent, although coverage does not reach many of the more remote households. 
Periodic floods and frequent leaks in the largely above ground PVC piping also 
means that water delivery can be quite unreliable. 
Map 4: Three geographic sub-regions within the Nasa area. 1) San San - Guabito, 2) 
Sieyic - Siekin, and 3) Santa Rosa - Solon. Neighboring villages within each of these 
sub-regions are typically linked by kinship, social and productive and commercial 
relations. Small squares (i.e. CA22 - CA97) show proposed boundaries of the Naso 
Comarca under Law No. 19 of 2005. Represa indicates location of the proposed 
77 
Bonyic dam, approximately six kilometers upstream from the nearest Naso 
settlement. 
Health care services are especially deficient in the Naso region. There are no 
doctors or nurses, and the local medical clinics are staffed by government 
contracted heath 'promoters'. In the case of Sieyic, the local health promoter was 
a Naso man in his late 30's who had completed a grade nine secondaryeducation 
and received sorne basic training in first aid. These village clinics are generally 
equipped with solar panels that provide enough electricity to power a few lights 
and a refrigerator. Several Naso interviewed reported that when their ancestors 
used to get sick, they made an arduous journey of more the five hours up the 
Teribe River towards the headwaters where the sacred rock of the grandmother 
"Ter" is said to be located. During the six months that 1 spent in the Naso area 1 
did not learn of anyone attempting this journey. 1 did, on the other hand, witness 
several N aso turning to their local health clinics and even traveling down river to 
receive modern medical attention at the hospital in Changuinola. 
The issue of ethnicity and parental origins is quite significant throughout the 
Naso region and even within Panama as a whole. Naso or non-Naso identity can 
even become quite divisive, as when sorne "pureblood" Naso suspect the loyalties 
of their mixed-blood brethren whom they sometimes see as culturally inferior and 
a threat to their ambitions of recognition as a distinct people with their own 
political authorities and territory. For many years intermarriages with the much 
more numerous Ngobe people and their territorial expansion into areas previously 
considered within the exclusive domain of the Naso villages have served to 
heighten the Naso sense of cultural distinctiveness. The Naso are especially prone 
to criticÏze the Ngobe as ecologically destructive. The Ngobe, for their part, 
complain that the Naso are lazy and don't like to work the lands that they claim to 
occupy. The Naso are justifiably concerned about maintaining their distinct 
identity and territory as separate from the Ngobe, particularly as sorne provincial 
Ngobe politicians would have preferred to annex the Naso territory to their own 
Comarca Ngobe-Buglé that was created in 1997. 
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Already 25 years ago the Naso could hardI y be described as ethnically, 
linguistically and/or socio-economically homogeneous. In a 1981 surveyof 1027 
Naso people, Von Chong and Ortiz found that only 56% of respondents 
considered themselves to be pure-blooded Naso, 2% exclusively Ngobe, 2% 
Latino, 1 % Talamancan and 39% report mixed racial origins (mestizo). According 
to the same survey, 5% of residents (51 people) had moved to the Naso region 
from outside the immediate district of Changuinola. 19 of these new arri vals were 
women (37%), and 32 were men (63%). Most of the se immigrants to the Naso 
region are descendents of Ngobes, Latinos and Talamancans who married a Naso 
spou se and chose to settle especially in the Santa Rosa, Bonyic and Solon regions 
(Von Chong Sand Ortiz 1982:57-85). 
25 years later, my own survey data and interviews with local residents confirm 
the mixed ancestry of a significant segment of the Naso population. Of 54 
households surveyed 16 (30%) reported having at least one non-Naso parent. 
After N aso, the most pro minent ethnicity claimed was N gobe, followed by Latino, 
Bri Bri (also known as Talamancan) and Bokota. A large segment of this 
immigrant population was also male and had also chosen to settle in the Sodi / 
Solon region (see Table 3 below). The more populated villages of Sieyic and 
Siekin have also drawn their share of migrants. During follow-up interviews 
several of these immigrants reported having come to the Changuinola region to 
work in the banana plantations during their youth. Most found plantation work 
difficult and underpaid. They thus opted instead for the self-employed lifestyle of 
the small peasant farmer amid the relative abundance of land then available in the 
Naso region. 
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Table 3: Ethnie ancestry of N aso households by community of residence. 
Community Bokota Bri Bri Latino Naso Ngëbe Total 
Druy 7 7 
La Tigra 1 1 2 
Santa Rosa 2 2 
Shupsco 3 3 
Siekin 8 4 12 
Sieyic 1 1 10 1 13 
Sodi 2 4 6 
Solon 7 2 9 
Total 1 1 3 38 11 54 
Note: In those households listed here as Naso (N=38) both spouses reported 
having only Naso ancestors. For the others, a single non-Naso ancestor among the 
different household members was grounds for classification under the other 
categories included in this table. Source: Household survey, 2004-2005. 
This ethnie diversity of Naso households is also reflected in their linguistic 
diversity. AlI but the very elderly speak Spanish, and 7 households reported 
speaking little or no Naso at all. Among the unilingual Spanish speakers were 2 
families that daim Latino ancestry, 3 Ngobe and 2 who reported having only 
Naso ancestors. Both of the latter respondents likely assimilated their non-Naso 
ancestors in order to emphasize their local heritage. As is so often the case 
whenever the parents are native speakers of different languages (for instance Naso 
and Ngobe or Danish and Albanian, etc.) they chose to communicate with their 
children in a common language such as Spanish or English and their children end 
up being un able to speak either of their parents' native languages. 
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Table 4: Language spoken among surveyed households by community of 
residence. 
Spanish 1 Spanish Spanish 1 
Community Naso only Naso l Other 
Druy 6 1 
La Tigra 1 1 
Santa Rosa 2 
Shupsco 3 
Siekin 11 1 
Sieyic 11 1 1 
Sodi 1 4 1 
Solon 8 1 
Total 43 7 4 
Source: Household survey, 2004-2005. 
The first public schools were built in the Naso region during the 1970s. Even 
so, many ofthose who are currently in their 50's and 60's claim to have 
completed severaI years of formai primary education (see Figure 6). In the year 
2000, there were 485 elementary school students enrolled in multi-grade classes 
given by 17 teachers (Planeta Panama Consultores 2005). The curriculum taught 
in the Naso elementary schools is the same Ministry of Education pro gram taught 
throughout the country. The majority of the local teachers are non-indigenous and 
therefore do not speak Naso. Although several teachers integrate weIl into their 
host communities and play an active roll in organizing parent-teacher committees 
and student activities, severaI others have made it known that they are simply 
waiting to be reassigned to another less remote school in the following year. 
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Figure 6: Years of formaI schooling by age-group and gender. 
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Note: The shade of the fill pattern described in the legend at the bottom of Figure 
6 corresponds to the age cohorts of the household members surveyed. For 
instance, among male respondents with six years of education, the figure allows 
us to see that three of these men were between 15-25 years of age; six were 
between 25-35; four between 35-45 and so on and so forth. Source: household 
survey 2004-2005. 
Boys appear to stay in school somewhat longer than girls. Whereas both 
respondents who reported having completed 12 years of formal education were 
male, two female respondents and only one male reported having received sorne 
secondary level education. A grade 12 education is required to work as a teacher 
in Panama's public school system, and grade 9 is the requirement for local health 
assistants. A few of the more educated individuals have also worked sporadically 
for one of the many international and national NGOs active in the Naso region.55 
AlI other occupations reported by Naso survey respondents required only grade 
55 The NGOs that have invested considerable economic resources in the Naso region inc1ude: 
Conservation International (CI), New Tribes Mission, The Nature Conservancy, The World 
Conservation Union (IUCN), the Catholic Church, Center for Popular Legal Assistance (CEALP), 
Panamanian Center for Study and Social Action (CEASPA) and the Alliance for Conservation and 
Development (ACD). 
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six or less (see Figure 7 below). Those with more years of education were also 
somewhat more likely to be engaged in more than one occupation - for instance 
boat-building and craft sales as weIl as agriculture - while those with less 
education were more likely to work in agriculture alone. The absence of 
secondary schools within the Naso region means that after completing grade six 
Naso families have to send their high school aged children to live with relatives in 
the Changuinola or Guabito areas. 1 did meet a few young people from the Sori 
and Santa Rosa are as who walked between one and two hours in each direction in 
order to attend secondary school. Many Naso without these options have chosen 
to become squatters for the very same reason of being able to send their children 
to secondary school. Education, especially secondary education, remains an 
expensive proposition either way. 
Figure 7: Primary and secondary occupations among the Naso. 
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Source: household survey 2004-2005. 
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Those with more years of formaI education also tend to be more active in a 
range of local organizations including traditional authorities, national political 
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parties, producer organizations, and socio-cultural and religious groups. 
Interestingly, sorne of the most active participants in each of these types of local 
organizations also had at least one non-Naso parent. One respondent with Latino 
ancestry even plays a pro minent role within the group dedicated to traditional 
Naso culture inc1uding ritual ceremonies, dance and various arts. Other residents 
with both Latino and Ngobe ancestry have occupied the traditional authority 
position of community Regidor. These latter types of organizations also tend to be 
older and more stable in their memberships than the more commercially oriented 
and sporadic producer organizations that are frequently formed and dissolved in 
accordance with the benefits available to participants. 1 will return to this point 
below in the section of this chapter that deals with land use patterns. For now 1 
simply wish to point out that discrimination based on ethnicity does not seem to 
be particularly prevalent within Naso community organizations. 
3.2 Political organizations 
The Naso political system is a hybrid regime that combines traditional 
elements of a hereditary monarchy (i.e. a king and his appointed councilors), and 
locally-elected community representatives responsible for the administration of 
justice and the maintenance of public order (see Figure Il below). Over the years 
the Naso King has bec orne an elected figure with the stipulation that he or she be 
descended from the Santana family. The Naso are proud to be among the last 
peoples in the Americas stillied by a monarch. The Naso monarchy is believed to 
have derived from the period between 1780 and 1850 during which the Miskito 
people - who were themselves ruled by a king - exacted tribute from the Naso 
and their hostile Bri Bri neighbours. It appears that the title of "King" was first 
applied to the highest chief of the N aso warriors.56 
56 Francisco Herrera, personal communication received via e-mail on 30/0912005. 
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Figure 8: Public transit fit for a King. A local bus company in Changuinola has 
appropriated the symbolism of the Nasa king "El Rey Nasa" for one of its 
vehicles. 
The current Naso king's role is to represent the Naso people in relations with 
surrounding communities and govemments, and to attempt to resolve those 
problems which the elected community officiaIs are unable to solve. The king's 
palace in Sieyic is a rather austere looking cinderblock house (see Figure 9 
below). The palace is the symbolic and administrative headquarters of the Naso 
territorial jurisdiction, and most of the important meetings affecting the N aso 
people as a whole are held there. Several Naso spoke of plans to replace the 
current non-descript structure with a newer building that would be deemed more 
culturally and aesthetically appropriate. The Bonyic hydroelectric project benefits 
and compensation agreement signed in 2004 by Naso king Tito Santana and the 
power company RET S.A. actually specifies the allocation ofU$21,000 towards 
construction of a new 70m2 administrative building for the Naso (Planeta Panama 
Consul tores 2005). 
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Figure 9: The Naso Palace in Sieyic: symbolic center of traditional authority. Two 
former Naso Kings (Lazaro Santana and his son Simeon Santana) are buried next to 
the Palace. Their graves are marked with simple cement crosses. 
The Naso Council of Leaders is composed ofthe King's 12 appointed 
community Representatives and each of the Naso communities' elected 
Regidores. In theory, the Council of Leaders elects an Executive Committee from 
among its members to administer the day-to-day needs of region. In practice 
though, several members of the Executive Council were appointed to their 
leadership positions by the King without having previously been appointed or 
elected to the Council of Leaders. The General Assembly is made up of all 
members of the Naso people and the representatives of their various local and 
regional commissions and associations. The Naso have different interpretations 
and consequently differing expectations as to the legitimate roles and 
responsibilities of their traditional authorities. The Naso will eventually have to 
sort out these differences of opinion if and when their Comarca status is ever 
approved, as second law establishing the new jurisdiction's internaI administrative 
regulations - called a "Carta Organica" in Panama - would then have to be 
adopted. The remaining paragraphs of this section analyse the strengths and 
weaknesses of these traditional organizations as they become increasingly 
engaged in the political, technological and environmental changes currently 
sweeping through the region. 
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In 1998 most of the Naso region became officially designated as 
Corregimiento deI Teribe, a nationally created political subdivision of the 
municipal district of Changuinola. This Corregimiento status was initially fiercely 
denounced by the tradition al Naso authorities who saw it as a betrayal of the 
historic objective of their Comarca project. Again, 1 will discuss the broader 
political context and significance of these events in Chapter IV, but for now 1 
want to mention that this change in political status also meant the addition of two 
more govemment officiaIs into the local political mix: the Corregidor and the 
Representante de Corregimiento. The Corregidor is a municipal authority 
appointed by and responsible directly to the District Mayor; in the Teribe case this 
means to the Mayor of Changuinola. The Corregimiento currently operates a 
small office equipped with a desk, typewriter and a few supplies in Siekin. 
Figure 10: Corregidurfa deI Teribe. Office of the Mayor of Changuinola's 
appointed municipal official in Siekin, Bocas deI Toro. Seated at the typewriter 
before several neat piles of case folders organized by year is the office's part-time 
unpaid secretary. 
The office of the Corregimiento is housed in the building of a now defunct 
cooperative store that once sold basic household goods to its members. A 
Corregidor's mandate is not fixed, and can be revoked at will by the Mayor. 
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Excluding salaries, the operating budget in 2005 for the Corregimiento deI Teribe 
was $12000, not a very significant amount given the high travel costs required just 
to reach the more than fifteen or so scattered communities located within its 
jurisdiction. Generally, the Corregidor does exactly whatever a Regidor can be 
called upon to do, but the inverse is not true. The other official at the 
Corregimiento level is the 'Representante' or Representative. This figure is 
elected for a five year term which generally corresponds to voting cycles across 
the country. The Representante work's closely with municipal and provincial 
officials to ensure that public investments in the region respond to local priorities. 
The local village Regidor is generally the first authority contacted by Naso 
villagers when problems occur; particularly for problems that Regidores have had 
sorne success at resolving in the past (i.e. petty theft, assault, land disputes, etc.) 
There is inevitably a strong element of pers on al friendship and trust in the 
operations of local justice, such that certain individuals prefer to by-pass their 
local Regidor in order to take their case directly to the Corregidor. These same 
categories of problems, plus disputes over child custody and support payments 
make up the bulk of the cases brought before the Corregidor in El Teribe. 
Panama's National Administrative Code that regulates the attributes and powers 
ofthe country's various public authorities prohibits Regidores from applying 
monetary sanctions. And yet the Corregidor of El Teribe in 2005, a Naso from the 
village of Druy by the name of Jorge Gamara, explained that sorne leeway is 
normally granted in indigenous areas where Regidores have traditionally had this 
power to levy fines. This also apparently leads to sorne interesting cases of 
"sanction shopping" where people will chose to file a complaint with either the 
Regidor or the Corregidor based on the severity of their respective sanctions. 
Ideally, the two officials coordinate their actions for greater efficiency and 
effectiveness. But such cooperation has become less common in the current 
context of political conflict and factionalism surrounding the hydroelectric project 
that has served to exacerbate personal rivalries and to erode the perceived 
legitimacy of many local authorities. 
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Figure 11: Proposed institutional re-organization of natural resource management for the Comarca Naso Tjër Di. 58 
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58 Naso institutional organization as reflected in draft legislation (Law No.19 of 2005) that would recognize Naso serni-autonomous jurisdiction in the 
form of a Comarca. 
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3.3 Land tenure 
The Naso consider the lands within their as yet unofficially designated 
tradition al territory to be a collective good intended for the exclusive use of the 
Naso people. The Comarca Naso Tjër Di legislation that is currently delayed in 
Panama's National Assembly would accord the Naso jurisdiction over 160,616 
hectares ofland -125,141 ha. of which were previously designated part of the La 
Amistad Intemation Park (PILA), and 21,722 ha. of which will continue to belong 
to the Palo Seco Protected Forest (BPPS) -leaving 13,753 ha. under the quasi-
exclusive intemal jurisdiction of the Naso people (Comisi6n Permanente de 
Asuntos Indigenas 2005). 1 will retum to the subject of proposed changes to the 
legal status of N aso territorial resources in Chapter IV. For the moment 1 wish to 
focus instead on how the Naso regulate access to land and associated resources 
through a system of usufruct rights. 
Figure 12: The relative importance of the three common means to obtain land use 
rights in the Naso region. 
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Source: Household survey 2004-2005. 
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Lands situated within the boundaries of the proposed Naso territory cannot be 
mortgaged for credit or privatized, and neither can they be subject to alienation by 
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any means inc1uding prescriptive acquisition, adjudication or embargo. Land use 
rights are obtained and held by individuals through one of three channels: 1) by 
possession of previously unoccupied lands (this is sometimes accompli shed by 
requesting the permission of traditional authorities); 2) by inheritance through 
which both sons and daughters can obtain land and other goods from either or 
both of their parents; and 3) by purchase and sale between Naso community 
members. Figure 12 above provides a breakdown of the relative importance of 
each means of acquiring land among my household survey participants. 
44 of the 54 households surveyed reported owning between two and four 
parce1s of land (81 %). The general pattern is for a household to own a relatively 
small property (0-2 ha.) on which their hou se is located and which is situated in 
the vicinity of the local school and/or health c1inic. These household plots situated 
nearest to community infrastructure were frequently acquired through inheritance 
and to a lesser extent through purchase, whereas the more distant agricultural 
parce1s were more often acquired through possession. Their other larger properties 
are generally located anywhere from 15 minutes to three hours walking distance 
from their hou ses and are used for seasonal and perennial crops. A more detailed 
analysis of the specific uses of these various household parce1s is provided in the 
following section on land use practices. 
>20 ha. 
35% 
Land Holdings by Size 
>100 ha. 0 ha. 
9% 2% 
30% 
Figure 13: Graphie depiction of the proportional distribution of landholder 
categories in the household survey sample. Source: Household survey 2004-2005. 
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Figure 13 above reveals a fairly dear distribution of household land holdings. 
The majority of surveyed households (35 of 54 or 65%) reported controlling 
between 5 and 25 hectares of land. With the exception of five households that 
daim to possess more than 100 hectares of land, and the one single respondent 
with no daims to any property of their own, the remaining households break 
down fairly evenly into three groups with respectively less than 10 hectares, 
between 10 and 20 hectares, and between 20 and 100 hectares. Figure 14 below 
shows the extent of the inequality between the Naso when it cornes to access to 
household land. 50% of households account for less than 20% of the total area 
daimed, whereas Il households (i.e. 20%) account for more than half of the total 
land area daimed by aH survey participants combined. 
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Figure 14: Concentration of land ownership in the Naso region, 2004-2005 
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Note: The diagonalline represents perfect equality; i.e. where 25% of households 
own 25% of the land, 50% account for haIf, etc. The curved line depicts Naso land 
ownership. Source: Househoid survey 2004-2005. 
Younger Naso households generally had less land than their more elderly 
neighbors. Young people are also less likely to have acquired property by 
possession of previously unoccupied lands. It seems that from the late 1980' s 
onward, most of the available land within 2 hours walking distance from the core 
villages had been c1aimed. Younger people are thus increasingly dependent on 
inheritance and purchasing for access to house plots and agriculturalland. This 
perceived shortage of reserve lands also helps to explain why so many Naso are 
reluctant to sell even a fraction of what often amounts to the only inheritance they 
can offer to their children. Only one household in my survey reported owning no 
land at aIl. This was a patrilocal nuc1ear family headed by a man in his early 
thirties. This man sold his labor as a farm worker to support his Latina wife and 
their only young child. They built a house on his father' s land, and the father 
allowed him to use parts of his fields at different times of the year and to gather 
subsistence materials such as firewood and palms for roofing. 
Table 5: Distribution of Household Lands by Community. 
Total Area Claimed (Ha.) 
Community 0 1-10 11-20 21-100 >100 
Druy 1 3 2 2 
La Tigra 1 1 
Santa Rosa 1 1 
Shupsco 1 1 1 
Siekin 5 1 5 1 
Sieyic 6 5 1 
Sodi 1 1 1 3 
Solon 4 2 2 1 
Total 1 13 16 19 5 
Source: Household survey 2004-2005. 
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In the past, the Naso claim to have had no use for land titles. Naso villages are 
still relatively small places where everybody is related to each other or at least 
knows everyone else's business pretty weIl. In such circumstances, family 
members and close neighbors agreed to designate natural features of the landscape 
such as creeks and tree groves as boundary markers separating their respective 
properties. As an added precaution many N aso plant the colourful Red Ti plant 
(Cordyline Terminalis) - know as "nana" in Naso and referred to simply as ''flor'' 
in Spanish or 'flower' - as a visual sign of their territorial claims. Increasingly 
though, the Naso are beginning to use written documents to validate aIl types of 
transactions involving land. Several parents reported having drafted written 
agreements stipulating the inheritance rights of each of their respective children. 
This was seen as a means to avoid boundary disputes between heirs, and also as a 
way to explicitly prohibit the sale of inherited lands to third parties. Property 
documents have also become more popular in cases of land purchases and sales 
agreements. Local authorities have even sought to base their cont1ict resolution 
decisions on the existence of such documentary evidence. 
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Figure 15: Registered land transactions as a percentage of all transactions 
reported by surveyed households. 
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Source: Household survey 2004-2005. 
The Naso ca1culate the exchange value of a particular parcel of land based 
predominantly on the current value of the agricultural production available from 
the parcel. For example, how many orange or cocoa trees does it have, how many 
lumber trees, etc. Distance relative to house plots and river access for 
transportation, slope and soil quality are also factors that the Naso take into 
consideration when negotiating land transactions. Sorne land sales also act as a 
redistributive mechanism whereby those with more cash income will purchase a 
small parcel of land from a relative who requires addition al cash, say to pay for a 
child's school or a medical procedure, etc. Figure 15 describes how only 8 of the 
20 cases of land transactions (purchases, sales and trades recorded between the 
1940 and 2004) recorded in my household survey produced documentary 
evidence testifying to the nature of the transaction. These documents are hand 
written notes signed by both parties involved and occasionally by a witness. 
Witnesses can be local authorities, but the signature of a neighbor is also 
considered sufficient. The documents generally state the date, place and additional 
relevant details such as boundaries, neighbors, price, etc. The buyer generally 
retains the only copy of these transaction agreements. 
Figure 16: Size ofparcels (in hectares) involved in 19 reported land transactions. 
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Source: Household survey 2004-2005. 
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Figure 16 above describes the amount of land transferred in each of these 
cases (except for the one case involving a registered land trade reported above). 
13 out of the 19 land sales or purchases invol ved properties of less than 2 hectares 
in size. Larger size transactions were not more likely to be registered. Registration 
alone is no guarantee that a transacted parcel will not eventually become subject 
to tenure disputes. Similarly, tenure conflicts do not appear more likely to occur in 
the absence of any written document defining the precise nature of the land 
transaction. However, in cases where properties bought or sold were subsequently 
involved in boundary disputes, registered transactions do appear somewhat more 
likely to be resolved in favor of the rights holder registered with the transaction. 
Table 6: Sample of land purchases reported in household survey. 
è 
Total 
°a Area Relation Registered Size Distance Year Land Use CUITent ::l Claimed Transaction from Neighbors Land E to Seller (Ha.) Acquired at Purchase E by Buyer (yes/no) Home Use 
0 (Ha.) U 
Health 
Druy >20 Brother - Yes 0.5 2min Clinic- 2004 House Plot House in -Law Ganadera Plot 
Bocas 
Fruit 
Solon >100 Cousin Yes 10 20min Brother 2000 Forest trees -
Lumber 
Ganadera Cocoa -
Druy >100 Cousin No 1 45 min Bocas- 1984 Forest Fruit Santana trees -
family Lumber 
Latino - Cocoa - Fruit Siekin <10 Aunt No 1 5min Uncle 1984 Lumber trees -Bananas 
Source: Household survey 2004-2005. 
Land tenure conflicts between neighbors are the most common category of 
land disputes occurring in the Naso region (see Figure 17 below). These kinds of 
conflicts generally involve contested boundaries between agricultural fields 
belonging to members of the same or neighboring communities who do not 
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generally associate with each other. They are frequently caused by differing 
interpretations of the factors that legitimize continued land ownership. Principle 
among these is the respect for work invested. Thus many Naso still do not 
recognize individual property rights to unmodified forest lands. In other cases 
individuals may deliberately disregard a mutually recognize property boundary 
for the simple convenience of maximizing their own area under crops. In most 
cases, if the owner actually contests such an unauthorized incursion the sanctions 
amount to little more than a share of the eventual harvest. In sorne such cases 
though, the local authorities have seen little alternative than to redraw the 
boundary between claimants such that ownership of a section of the disputed land 
is attributed to each. 
Figure 17: Land tenure conflicts among survey respondents by community of 
residence and relationship between plaintiffs. 
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Three examples drawn from the files kept at the office of the Corregidor in 
Seikin will help to illustrate the nature of the land related disputes that occur in 
the Naso region and the principles and procedures the y use to attempt to resolve 
them. The names of the plaintiffs and the accused have been replaced with 
pseudonyms. 
1. Mr. Campos (senior) vs. Mr. Campos (junior). April 13th, 2004. La Tigra, 
Bocas deI Toro. 
On this day Mr. Campos Jr. appeared before the Corregidor to lodge a formaI 
complaint against his father, Mr. Campos Sr., whom he accused of working a 5 
hectare property that Mr. Campos Sr. had previously given to Mr. Campos Jr. The 
son reported having taken his complaint to the Regidor of La Tigra who 
apparently ordered the father to stay out the property in question, but to no avail. 
Mr. Campos Jr. related the story of how his father purchased the parcel in 
question for $100 from the now defunct Mr. Sanchez. In 1977, Mr. Sanchez was 
among the beneficiaries of a successfulland daim settlement involving the 
residents of La Tigra against the local cattle ranching operation known as 
Ganadera Bocas. A witness testified to the effect that Mr. Campos Sr. had in fact 
negotiated a deaI to purchase Mr. Sanchez's property, and that an initial down 
payment of $10 had been made. The witness was unable to confirm if the 
outstanding amount was ever paid in full. 
Mr. Campos Jr. said that in 1994 his father became embroiled in a dispute 
over the property in question with a neighbour. Campos Jr. daims that his father 
promised him ownership of this parcel of land in retum for his assistance to sort 
out the conflict with the neighbour. The son daims to have kept up his end of the 
bargain by favourably resolving the case with the Corregidor of the day. 
Unfortunately, Campos Jr. also daims to have lost the document confirming this 
decision. The son went on to explain how he had been living and working on this 
parcel for the last 10 years without his father' sever having tried to redaim this 
land. The son also buttressed his daim to the lands in question by describing how 
he had planted various perennial crops induding orange trees, coco a, lime, and 
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timber trees on the property. Naso landowners are usuaIly careful to prohibit 
lenders and sharecroppers from planting trees and perenniaI crops (three 
households in my survey reported having entered into sharecropping agreements 
whereby haIf of the harvest is retained by the owner of the land) as these confer an 
enduring property daim to the person who plants them. 
After recording Mr. Campos Jr.'s testimony, the Corregidor issued a 
summons instructing Mr. Campos Sr. to present himself on the scene of the 
disputed property on May lQth at 8:00am. Campos Sr. was then able to give his 
version of events. The father recognized having had a tenure conflict with a 
neighbour in 1994, but he denied ever having requested his son's assistance with 
the case, much less having promised to give him the land. Mr. Campos Sr. 
explained that the only help that he had asked of his son was for making the 
payments on the land, help that in any event he never received. 
Resolution: Due to each party' s inability to produce written documents to 
support their respective positions, the Corregidor ordered the father and son to 
split the contested property in half. Interestingly though, the officiai document 
that testifies to this resolution was signed by Campos Jr. but not by his father. 
2. Mrs. Leticia vs. Mr. Quiroz. March 4th, 2004. Loma Bandera / La Mona, 
Bocas deI Toro. 
Mrs. Leticia filed a complaint with the Corregidor aIleging that Mr. Quiroz 
was working on lands that she inherited from her stepfather without her 
permission. In his defence Mr. Quiroz (a N gobe from the neighbouring 
community of La Mona) daimed that no one was using the 1.5 hectares of forest 
in question before he began to work on it. Mr. Quiroz also mentioned that his wife 
inherited the property from her father which also gave him the right to use it. 
Resolution: Mr. Quiroz refused to accept either of two proposaIs to partition the 
property such that he would retain ownership of one section of the land that he 
had cultivated, or to be compensated for his labour invested and then for the 
property to revert fully to Mrs. Leticia. The Corregidor ordered Mr. Quiroz to 
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withdraw from his recently cultivated lands, and to stick to that section which he 
had first occupied. A future date would have to be set to resolve the dispute with 
the participation of the N aso King, authorities of the Comarca N gobe-Bugle and 
of the Corregimiento deI Teribe. 
3. Mr. Salomon vs. Mr. Gabriel. March 2od, 2001. Bondi (sector of Bonyic), 
Bocas deI Toro. 
Mr. Salomon filed a complaint with the Corregidor alleging that Mr. Gabriel 
was working on lands that belonged to him since his childhood. Mr. Salomon 
explained how he spent time in prison during the 1970' s and that upon his return 
to his native village he discovered that Mr. Gabriel had planted crops on his land 
without his consent. As if to strengthen his case, Mr. Salomon accused Mr. 
Gabriel of being ignorant of local boundaries between the parcel in question and 
those of his neighbours, and secondly of having cut and sold aIl the valuable 
lumber previously found on the parcel. For his part Mr. Gabriel maintained that 
the property in question had belonged to him for many years. He added that Mr. 
Teofilio could testify to that effect as he had previously been employed by Mr. 
Gabriel to work on the property in question. 
Resolution: Both sides agreed to fix a new boundary along a creek separating 
their respective properties. Mr. Gabriel will be permitted to harvest the crops he 
planted on sections of the parcel that will hence forth be recognized as the 
legitimate property of Mr. Salomon. Once the harvest is complete a date will be 
set in order to plant a new living boundary using the Red Ti plant (Cordyline 
Terminalis). 
One of the most significant details visible in Table 7 below is the fact that the 
Corregidor was cited most frequently - a total of nine times - as the authority 
consulted in cases of boundary disputes over land. 1 believe that this is particularly 
important since the post was only created in 1998, and it was initially resisted by 
the Naso who viewed it as an imposition of the National government intended to 
further marginalize their traditional authorities and to hasten their assimilation 
into the social and cultural mainstream. Another interesting trend depicted in 
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Table 7 refers to the Naso propensity to seek solutions to their tenure conflicts 
within the irnrnediate vicinity of their village of residence. This preference is 
attested to by the fact that six conflicts were resolved directly among neighbors, 
local cornrnunity Regidores were involved in an equal number of cases, and both 
the Corregidor and the Naso king intervened most frequently within their 
respective geographic bases of Siekin and Sieyic. 
Table 7: Location of reported boundary disputes and nature of the actors 
involved in resolution of the tenure conflict. 
Reforma 
Community Personal* Regidor Corregidor King Agraria** None Total 
Druy - 1 1 - - 1 3 
La Tigra 1 - - - - - 1 
Santa Rosa - - 1 - - - 1 
Shupsco - - 1 - - - 1 
Siekin 2 1 4 - - 1 8 
Sieyic 2 4 1 3 1 - 11 
Sadi - - - 2 2 - 4 
Solon 1 - 1 1 - - 3 
Grand Total 6 6 9 6 3 2 32 
Note: * 'Personal' means that the farnily members or neighbors mvolved resolved the 
problem between themselves, whereas many more cases required the intervention of 
local authorities. ** Reforma Agraria is a govemment agency that registers the 
private property rights of non-Naso settlers in the region. Only two conflicts reported 
had yet to be resolved. Source: Household survey 2004-2005. 
3.4 Land use 
Present day Naso settlements are concentrated in the relatively few low-Iying 
areas situated along the Teribe and San San River valleys. The Naso get better 
agricultural yields from the alluvial soils in these regions than from the rather thin 
mix of clay and rock that covers the steep hills that rise directly from the water's 
edge (slopes vary between 45 and 100%). The gallery forests that generally 
occupy these narrow strips of fertile and accessible land along the rivers' edges 
are therefore among the most intervened micro habitats in the Naso region (see 
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Map 5 below). Ruman impacts on the landscape are most pronounced in the Santa 
Rosa, Sori and San San regions, whereas further upriver in the Bonyic-Solon and 
Sieyic-Siekin regions more remnants of primary forests and re-growth vegetation 
are interspersed among the cultivated plots and those used for pasture (Fundaciôn 
Dobbo Yala 2002:91-92). 
Cuh~o 61$ &Q:b'"ll,»te-nl;HliI 
U$O p"'t':\fllUa 
R~-Mt'°fO~ 
Bo~qu. na-tura! pnrTUtrm 
Eh»$qv,," nKthJ .... 1 "'H!r.t41 
I ... I$Q ~coh . .u~!!ltrc:,() 
Map 5: CUITent land use practices in the Bonyic-Solon region of Bocas deI Toro. 
This map shows the prevalence of cultivated areas (CS) and agricultural fallows (Ro) 
along the Teribe and Bonyic Rivers, as weIl as relatively large area for cattle pasture (UP) 
just south of the village of Solon. Darker sections at the bottom of the map correspond to 
primary forest (BNP), which blends into a mixed area of re-growth and primary 
vegetation (BNM) as you move doser to the river' s edge. Source: (Planeta Panama 
Consultores 2005: Uso Actual de Suelos). 
Agro-forestry is probably still the most prominent land use practice 
throughout the Naso region, complemented to varying degrees by slash and bum 
agriculture, animal husbandry, and to a lesser extent fishing, hunting, gathering 
and lumber sales. A typical Naso field will produce cocoa and/or oranges which 
are both important cash crops, pixbae or peach palm fruit (Bactris gasipaes),for 
consumption and sale, as weIl as lumber trees, plantains, other fruit trees and 
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vegetable crops such as yucca (see Figure 18). Rice, beans and corn are their 
staple annual crops, very little of which are sold. These are grown in small 
separate fields (usually less than O.5ha.) that in the past were bumed before being 
planted but on which increasingly the cut vegetation is now simply being allowed 
to rot around the planted crop. Only the Corregidor is authorized to grant permits 
to bum cut vegetation, although in practice no one in the Naso region is actually 
required to possess such a permit before buming their fields. Traditionally the 
Naso did not use any natural or chemical fertilizers, nor did they control for 
insects or disease. However, two households in my survey reported using sorne 
chemical inputs on their commercial plantain crops, and four others said they 
continued to make and use their own compost after participating in a training 
course on the subject offered by the govemment-run Biological Corridor project 
(CBMAP). 
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Figure 18: Principle agricultural commodities sold by Naso farmers. 
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Note: Nampi and iiame are starchy tubers, whereas uyama is a tropical squash and 
ajî is a type of chili pepper. The 'other' category includes everything from 
avocadoes to cilantro and beans to pineapples. Source: Household survey 2004-
2005. 
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Cocoa became an especially significant cash crop for the Naso during the 
1970' s and 1980' s. At the time, the state-run agricultural development bank 
(BDA) provided local farmers with thousands of dollars in credit to plant cocoa 
trees. No collateral was demanded from participating Naso farmers which was 
fortunate since a subsequent outbreak of monilliasis destroyed most of the cocoa 
crop and forced the government to write off these investments as bad debts. 59 
Coco a is still a significant crop for the N aso in terms of the number of local 
producers, but the annual amounts sold almost exclusively to the Almirante-based 
cooperative (Cocabo) in 2004 varied between 25 and 1000 pounds and averaged 
only about 300lbs per producer. AIl producers surveyed reported that these levels 
were considerably lower than what they had sold during previous years. In 2004 
Cocabo paid its growers U$0.50 per pound which was also down from U$0.80 
paid in 2003. Only one survey respondent reported having participated in a similar 
credit pro gram that allowed him to use his privately owned property rights as 
collateral towards the pure hase of several head of cattle. Two other survey 
respondents received sorne income from members of the local Arab community in 
Changuinola for allowing their goats to browse on Naso lands. Only four other 
survey respondents reported having ever obtained commercialloans. These were 
teachers and other public service employees who paid off their cash advances plus 
8% interest through automatic deductions from their bi-weekly paychecks. 
Around their homes the Naso also plant fruit trees, coconuts, and occasionally 
herb gardens and ornamental flowers. Their household plots are inevitably used to 
raise a variety of domestic animals as weIl. Almost every household surveyed 
raised at least a few chickens for consumption, and more than half actually sold a 
portion of their animal production (see Table 8). Chickens, turkeys and ducks are 
allowed to roam freely to scavenge for food; their diets are also supplemented 
with rice or corn. Severallarge-scale chicken and egg production experiments 
have been attempted in the region, always with external funding, but none of these 
59 Monilliasis is a disease produced by a fungus (Moniliph-thora roreri) that attacks the fruit of the 
cocoa tree. 
104 
was operational in 2005. A small number of families have also dug fish ponds and 
are beginning to raise tilapia for both consumption and sale. Larger animaIs such 
as pigs, goats, horses and cows - especially when the owner has more than a 
couple at the same time - require their own fenced off pastures or pens. 
Small animals like chickens and fish are often sold in the same communities 
where they are raised; essentially to the local teachers and medical assistants, but 
increasingly also to those who sell crafts and boats or fix c1othes. Goats and cows 
are almost inevitably shipped live by dugout canoe to slaughter in Changuinola or 
walked out to Guabito. Astate issued permit is officially required to slaughter 
cows and pigs, but this is rarely complied with except in cases where large 
commercial buyers demand it. Slightly less than half of aIl households surveyed 
also reported having gained sorne income from timber sales in the previous two 
years. The Naso use the cash obtained through these sales to buy basic necessities 
such as salt, sugar, cooking oil, kerosene, medicine, c1othing, boots, machetes, 
and school supplies. 
Table 8: The relative mix of commercial and subsistence production for three 
key land use activities in the Naso region. 
Crop Sales Animal Sales Lumber Sales 
Community (2003-04) (2003-04) (2003-04) 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Druy 0 8 6 2 5 3 
La Tigra 1 1 1 1 2 0 
Santa Rosa 0 2 2 0 1 1 
Shupsco 1 2 0 3 1 2 
Siekin 0 12 1 11 6 6 
Sieyic 0 12 5 7 7 5 
Sodi 2 4 2 4 2 4 
Solon 3 6 6 3 5 4 
Total 7 47 23 31 29 25 
Note: The 7 respondents who reported no crop sales were either principally 
engaged in sorne other form of incorne generating activities (i.e. animal sales, 
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craft sales or salaried work) or else quite elderly. Source: Household survey 
2004-2005. 
My household survey did not attempt to measure monetary income. 1 preferred 
to use occupational data, commodity sales and ownership of land and material 
as sets as proxies for socio-economic class and poverty levels (see Table 9). The 
Fundaciôn Dobbo Yala did however conduct a survey of income levels among the 
Naso in 2000. They estimated the average per capita annual income to vary 
between U$32.00 in Loma Bandera and U$397.00 in Sodi, which means that that 
the vast majority of the Naso are extremely po or (Fundaciôn Dobbo Yala 
2002:42). This internal variance can be explained by the closer proximity of Sodi 
residents to wage earning opportunities in the commercial sectors of the 
Changuinola banana zone. Sodi's flat clay soils are poorly drained and frequently 
prone to flooding, making them unsuited to many crops. Many of its residents 
have therefore adapted their livelihood strategies to the comparative advantage of 
being within one hour's walking distance from the town of El Silencio. 
Table 9: Relative prevalence of selected tools and commercial enterprises. 
Gas 
Community Store Motor Stove Rifle Chainsaw 
Druy - - - 2 2 
La Tigra - - - - -
Santa Rosa - - 1 - -
Shupsco - 1 - 1 -
Siekin 2 2 4 5 4 
Sieyic - 4 7 4 3 
Sodi - - 2 1 2 
Solon 1 2 1 3 1 
Total 3 9 15 16 12 
Table 9 gives sorne sense of the relative prominence of key manufactured goods 
in the various N aso communities. Outboard motors require the largest cash 
investment among the items listed in the table, although because of the shallow 
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water levels of the San San River the se are not generally owned in the Druy and 
La Tigra areas. The high transportation costs and relative lack of income among 
Naso villagers cuts into profit margins of store operators. Many of the hunting 
rifles reported were over 50 years old, and many of those who owned agas 
cooking stove said that they had been encouraged to buy them in order to reduce 
smoke inhalation from cooking over an open fire. Still, half of the households 
with gas stoves did not have the propane with which to use them during my visit. 
Chainsaws are an interesting item that requires a series of permits both local and 
national that 1 return to latter on in this section. 
Table 10: The prevalence of other land use practices. 
Community Pasture Hunter Fisher Use of peons Reforestation 
No Yes No Yes No Rarely Yes No Yes No Yes 
Druy 8 0 7 1 2 6 0 5 3 3 5 
La Tigra 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 
Santa Rosa 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 
Shupsco 2 1 2 1 0 2 1 3 0 0 3 
Siekin 8 4 7 5 2 6 4 8 4 3 9 
Sieyic 10 2 11 1 4 5 3 4 8 1 11 
Sodi 4 2 6 0 2 4 0 3 3 3 3 
Solon 9 0 5 4 1 5 3 4 5 3 6 
Total 44 10 41 13 12 29 13 29 25 15 39 
Source: Household survey 2004-2005. 
As was the case with land tenure, the family is again the basic organizational 
unit of Naso productive activities. Labour exchanges between neighbours, caIled 
'juntas' , are also quite common, especially during the short dry season from 
January to April when the Naso c1ear their fields for planting. Juntas are also used 
to assemble a work party to transport lumber and tree trunks for boat building. 
Wage labour is also widespread, with over half of aIl surveyed households 
reporting having employed agricultural workers (peons) in their fields (see Table 
10). These local workers earn U$5.00 a day, or U$4.50 if the employer provides a 
lunch. Peak demand for agricultural workers also coincides with the short dry 
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season. These seasonal spikes in labour demands are part of a broader cyclical 
pattern whereby the N aso key commercial crops ripen simultaneously causing a 
temporary glut in the market which serves to drive down priees. As mentioned 
previously above, Naso socio-economic and productive organizations tend to be 
rather short-lived. As a result, Naso producers have few dedicated marketing 
channels and end up competing against each other for sales. 
Table lOis also interesting for the relatively large proportion of respondents 
that reported planting trees on their property (39 of 54 or 72%). Those survey 
respondents who were old enough to remember described how during the 1960s 
and the 1970s many Naso engaged in indiscriminate logging activities. Several 
could still point to their now rusted two pers on band saws that were the 
technology most widely used at the time. They also spoke woefully of how easily 
the previous generation was persuaded to cut down aIl the best and most 
accessible trees for a pittance compared to what those trees would be worth today. 
The most common tree species being planted today are the same commercially 
valuable species that have become scaree (ex: cedrela odorata) and a few other 
species commonly used for building houses (ex: cordia alliodora). 
In response to such growing commercial pressures on their resouree base the 
Naso adopted a series of internal regulations in 1973: the "Legal code of the 
Teribe Indians". These 49 articles and amendments coyer a range of topics 
including everything from a1cohol to zoning rules, many of which are no longer 
applied. For example: one article required the Naso to obtain the permission of 
their local authorities before leaving their area, and another banned Naso women 
from working for wages or marrying non-Naso. In terms of land use regulations, 
the code explicitly addressed forestry, fishing and the use and sale of the species 
of palm leaf know locally as pallanquillas (Geonoma congesta) traditionally used 
as a roofing material for Naso houses. 
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Figure 19: Sign posted in Naso village of Druy and directed at visitors. 
English translation: "Attention members of the public. We wish to inform those 
who are not native Naso (ex: tourists and visitors that from time to time come 
here to hunt or eut trees and have come for legitimate business! From now on 
respected visitors when you pass through you must identify yourselves as it does 
you no harm to cooperate with internaI and national regulations. If not, we will 
not be sorry. Thank you." Signed the Naso people, and certified in bottom right 
corner with the logo of the Naso Kings. 
On the subject of forestry, article 42 of these rules stipulates that the local 
community Regidores are in charge of issuing permits to those who wish to cut 
trees for personal or commercial purposes (Teribefios 1973). In 1998, the national 
environmental authorities (ANAM) reached an agreement with the Naso 
authorities whereby all Naso who wished to selllumber need only show up at the 
ANAM office in Changuinola with a permit from their local Regidor testifying to 
the fact that the pers on requesting the permit from ANAM has already paid the 
1 % local surtax on commerciallumber sales to the Naso authorities. The tax is 
based on the estimated commercial value of the wood that the petitioner seeks to 
sell. The Naso Regidores are supposed to collect and forward this money to the 
Naso Council of Leaders, but several Naso admitted to not paying this surcharge 
because they say they don't know how the collected money is spent. Several 
Regidores apparently collect the 1 % logging tax but then refused to send it on to 
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the Council of Leaders because they say that none of this money is ever reinvested 
in their communities. 
Once such a locallogging permit has been issued by the Naso Regidor, 
ANAM imposes its own 4% surcharge. This government tax on commercial 
lumber is apparently intended in part to coyer the costs of field inspections 
required before the final permits are issued and the trees can be cut. At least this is 
how the system is supposed to work. In fact, 1 did not hear of many ANAM 
officials actually making the trip to pre-inspect the trees scheduled to be cut in this 
manner. However, 1 did leam that ANAM once set up a night watch to catch 
clandestine loggers who floated timber down the Teribe River to the town of El 
Silencio where it was loaded onto vehicles for transportation to any number of 
national and probably even international destinations.60 ANAM officiaIs also 
confiscate unregistered chainsaws and hunting rifles until the owner pays the fines 
and agrees to register their property. In 2005 it co st U$1O.00 to register a new 
chainsaw, and U$5.00 for the annual permit required to use the saw each 
subsequent year. 
Figure 20: Naso small-scale lumber operations. 
One local official at the ANAM office in Changuinola confided ta me that this 
'co-management' system had broken down somewhat of late as a result of the 
conflicts between the Naso leadership that 1 discuss in the following chapter. This 
60 The proximity of the highly porous international border with Costa Rica makes smuggling of aIl types 
of contraband (drugs, guns, manufactured goods, etc.) and migrants a significant economic activity for 
the province of Bocas deI Toro (Pérez 2005). 
110 
official reported having approved severallogging permits for Naso residents who 
arrived at his office without having paid the 1 % local tax to the Naso authorities. 
The ANAM official said that these Naso petitioners claimed to have been unfairly 
denied a local permit on the grounds that they did not support the right local 
authority in the internal dispute. In such cases the ANAM official reported having 
little choice but to issue the requested logging permits.61 In any event, for the time 
being the economic disincentives for engaging in logging seem to be outweighing 
the administrative ones - at least for the average Naso household. 
The internal priee for wood sold among Naso villagers varies from U$0.10 to 
U$0.22 per board foot, whereas sales to local wood sellers and carpentry shops 
can eam up to U$0.35 per foot. Those who hired loggers to eut and sell wood 
from trees standing on their property eamed between U$0.05 to U$O.lO a foot. At 
these prices the Naso report that after paying for the permits, transportation, 
labour, tools, gas and oil there remains very litde profit to be made from logging. 
But while this situation may be discouraging the small-scale low volume 
producers from entering the market, it is likewise encouraging a few relatively 
large volume producers to specialize in commerciallogging activities. One survey 
respondent reported supplying an average ofbetween 2000 to 6000 board feet per 
month to lumber shops located as far away as the province of Herrera. 
On the subject of fishing, the InternaI Regulations require the Naso to store 
their diving masks and spear-fishing gear with the Regidores until the blanket ban 
on fishing is officially lifted from Friday to Sunday (Teribefios 1973: Article 
No.41). Today, the Naso keep their gear at home and are more likely to fish after 
a dry spell when the sediment load carried by the river is at its lowest and thus it is 
easier to see the fish. A permit is not required to fish with a line and ho ok, but the 
written permission of a Regidor does appear to be necessary to spear fish with a 
mask. 1 was not able to find out from anyone how much a spear fishing permit 
61 This same official promised to allow me to access ANAM's forestry database in order to leam the 
quantity of permits issued to Naso residents and the amount of wood authorized for commercial sale. 
The problem was that each time 1 went to the ANAM office in Changuinola 1 was told that the 
computer system was temporarily unavailable. 
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costs though, nor did 1 learn how rigorously this requirement is enforced. 1 did on 
the other hand hear several comments about how unregulated over-fishing is 
depleting local fish stocks. 
Local hunting permits can be issued for U$5.00 by either the Regidor or the 
Corregidor. But as seen in Table 10 above, only 13 of 54 households reported 
hunting, even including those who hunt as little as once a year. 1 was told that the 
reason why most households do not hunt was that very few game animaIs remain 
within a two hour walk from the Naso villages and agricultural plots. For the most 
part, those who did still hunt organized bi-annual expeditions to the remote 
mountainous regions where game animals are still relatively abundant. On one 
overnight expedition to the Cerro Sepuchingo region located west of Siekin 1 
spotted white-throated Capuchins (Cebus capucinus), crested guans (Penelope 
purpurrascens), toucans (Ramphastos sulfuratus), fer-de-Iance (Bothrops asper), 
and poison dart frogs (Dendrobates punilio and auratus). On the same trip 1 heard 
howler monkeys (Alouatta palliata), an owl (probably Pulsatrix perspicillata), 
and a species of dove. 1 also saw scratch marks left by a large cat that my Naso 
guide identified as a jaguar (Panthera onca), and foot prints left by what 1 was 
told were an ocelot (Leopardus pardalis), white-tailed deer (Odocoileus 
virginianus), paca (Agouti paca) and raccoon (Procyon lotor). 
Finally, despite the explicit prohibition on cutting palm leaves (Geonoma 
congesta) for commercial purposes mandated in Article 43 of the Internal 
Regulations, one respondent reported having sold 80 bundles of the leaves at 
U$5.00 a bundle to the ODES EN ecotourism group who recently added two dorm 
style sleeping rooms to accommodate more tourists and larger groups on 
overnight stays at Wekso. One other respondent reported having sold just three 
bundles to a neighbour in Siekin for the internaI Naso priee of U$3.50 a bundle. 
Four additional respondents reported having purchased palanquillas leaves in the 
prevlous year. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
Making a living from the land, especially where - as in the Naso case - people 
are heavily dependent on their natural resources for income purposes, requires 
access to markets, appropriate infrastructure (transportation, communications, 
etc.) and services (health, education, agricultural extension) (North 2003:p.17). In 
Chapter II, 1 attempted to show how the state and various global interests have 
combined to shape these crucial components of sustainable livelihoods in ways 
that rarel y took into account the priorities of the N aso people. The goal of this 
chapter has been to sketch a broad portrait of contemporary Naso community-
level institutions and cultural land use practices against which to evaluate the 
design and implementation of the ongoing conservation and development policies 
and projects described in the next chapter. 
The survey data and other observations brought to bear on these subjects 
suggest that Naso resource management institutions and practices are the 
outcomes of complex and dynamic experimental processes occurring 
simultaneously within the realms of their ecological and technological knowledge, 
social and ethical priorities and govemance structures. According to most 
statistical indexes that attempt to measure these outcomes in terms of 
demographic, heath, education and economic indicators, the province of Bocas dei 
Toro - and especially the indigenous areas of the province - consistently register 
the lowest levels of human development in Panama (Planeta Panama Consul tores 
2005: V -162). The survey data presented here not only support this regrettable 
macro-assessment, but also specify the nature and variability of the levels of 
economic deprivation, social exclusion, and political marginalization that 
characterize a cross-section of Naso households and communities. 
But despite their monetary poverty and deficient access to public services, the 
majority of the Naso people have retained, at least for the time being, access to 
sufficient land and subsistence resources to ensure the social reproduction of their 
families and communities. This is more than can be said for sorne of the other 
113 
indigenous peoples in Panama. 63 However, many of the same telltale signs of 
population increase, resource shortages and environmental degradation have 
become increasingly prominent among the Naso as weIl. The same pressures of 
increasing integration into regional markets and national society facing other 
indigenous peoples are reshaping N aso culture and land use practices as weIl. 
As described above, the Naso have access to a wide-range of manufactured 
goods, and many of their young people prefer to work for cash or wages in the 
expanding non-agricultural economy (principally crafts, tourism, and 
construction). Others raise cattle and sorne sell significant quantities of lumber. 
An important cultural impact that can be attributed to this transition from a 
subsistence economy to a more commercially oriented one is the weakening of the 
social unit y and traditional political institutions that were so forcefully symbolized 
in the 1973 "Legal code of the Teribe Indians". This trend is explored further in 
the next chapter which details how commercial interests in Naso territorial 
resources have galvanized factional in-fighting and are even serving to formalize 
contested new notions of the roles and responsibilities of the various traditional 
Naso political organizations. 
Policies and interventions designed to overcome these multiple and severe 
social, economic and environmental challenges will have to build on local 
strengths in a culturally appropriate manner if they are to succeed. Among such 
strengths discussed in this chapter 1 would emphasize the ethnie, linguistic, 
geographic and socioeconomic diversity of the Naso region as part of the reason 
for its residents' often demonstrated willingness to innovate, and their resilience 
and ability to adapt in the face of sweeping changes. This can be seen in the 
variety and the combinations of livelihood strategies that they employ, and in their 
highly pragmatic and transfiguring approaches to regulating human behaviour in a 
manner that is consistent with the desired outcomes of these lifestyle choices. The 
next chapter explores sorne of the pitfalls of misunderstanding these community-
63 See for example (Wickstrom 2003) and (Young and Bort 1999) on the severity of the socio-economic 
and environmental challenges currently facing the Ng6be and Kuna indigenous peoples. 
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level politics and land use practices within the context of a series of legal and 
administrative changes affecting Naso access to and use of local natural resources. 
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Chapter IV: Resource management "from above" 
This chapter analyses the guidelines and criteria invoked by the various actors 
currently seeking to modify Naso resource tenure and management practices 
'from above'. As such it highlights ongoing conflicts associated with the various 
social, cultural and environmental representations invoked to support the 
construction of the Bonyic hydroelectric dam and associated national and 
international development projects on Naso territory. This ethnographic focus on 
the contests over legitimacy and control of local resources initiated through these 
projects provides an essential complementary framework for understanding the 
prevailing symbolic, poli tic al and economic systems that link together the various 
actors through different networks and sc ales of dependency and obligation. In 
light of the trends shaping the local socio-economic and institutional diversity 
described in the previous chapter, Naso experiences with the Bonyic hydropower 
project in particular argue in favor of greater skepticism and sophistication when 
assessing the objectives and justifications provided by the academics, 
practitioners, government agencies, local authorities and private companies 
involved in the conservation and development of indigenous peoples' territorial 
resources. 
4.1 Hidro Ecologica deI Teribe (HET S.A.) 
By the year 1998 Panama had completed a series of energy sector reforms and 
privatized its national energy company, the Instituto de Recursos Hidnlulicos y 
Electrificacion (IRHE). This opened the way for a number of private companies -
most of them foreign including among others Hydro Québec, AES Corporation 
(USA) and ENDESA (Spain) - to invest in the country's existing dams and 
distribution networks or else to seek to develop their own new projects (L'Institut 
de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF) 2003:18). Hidro 
Ecologica deI Teribe (HET S.A.) emerged at the beginning of this process as a 
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partnership between the Bocas Fruit Company (BFC), a local subsidiary of USA-
based United Fruit Company (Chiquita Brands) and several private investors.64 
As the only large sc ale economic actor in a province with no road or rail links 
to the rest of Panama, the United Fruit Company signed a special agreement with 
the Government of Panama under which the Company agreed to sell part of its 
excess energy production to the expanding commercial and residential sectors of 
the province (Ente Regulador de los Servicios P6blicos 2001).65 To this day the 
Bocas Fruit Company's 40+ year old diesel-fired thermo electrical generating 
plant provides all the energy available to the almost 50,000 residents of the district 
of Changuinola. Blackouts are a frequent fact of life in the city, so businesses and 
essential services have their own backup generators. The air and noise pollution 
generated by the Company' s diesel plant are also quite severe. At a cost of U$0.15 
per kilowatt hour or nearly U$0.03 more than in the rest of the country almost no 
one, including even the Company for that mater, is satisfied with the existing 
service. 66 
By the mid 1990's even the Bocas Fruit Company had begun to prefer to 
concentrate on its core business activity of marketing fruit and thus to spin off 
many support services like security and maintenance operations to trusted sub-
contractors. Casting around for energy alternatives, the Company chose to contact 
a local associate by the name of Cesar Romero who - with the help of a lawyer 
and two environmental engineers - dusted off the old hydrological potential 
studies the IRHE had conducted on the Teribe river during the 1970s and set 
about obtaining the newly required concessions and licences to build and operate 
a privately owned hydroelectric facility in the Province of Bocas deI Toro. The 
company created for this explicit purpose was called Hidro Ecol6gico deI Teribe 
(HET S.A.). 
64 American anthropologist Philip Bourgois (1989) wrote a fascinating ethnography about the socio-
cultural and econornic history of the United Fruit Company in Panama and Costa Rica. 
65 In 2006, banana production still accounts for sorne 65% of the econornic activity in the province of 
Bocas deI Toro (Alvarez 2006). 
66 Panama ranks 7th overall among the countries in Latin American with the highest residential energy 
rates. In 2004 the average residential rate was U$0.121 per kWh in Panama, while the regional average 
was only U$0.098 per kWh (Ente Regulador de los Servicios PUblicos 2004) . 
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The year 1998 was also significant from the standpoint of the govemment of 
Panama's adoption of a new General Environment Law (No.41). This law seeks to 
regulate environmental management practices and establishes various 
requirements for access to and the use of the country' s natural resources. Article 
103 of the General Environment Law is especially significant to the N aso people 
because it states that: 
In the case of activities, civil works or projects to be developed on the 
territories of indigenous communities, consultation procedures will seek to 
negotiate agreements with community representatives conceming their rights 
and customs, as well as compensation for the use of their resources, 
knowledge or lands (my translation). (Asamblea Legislativa 1998) 
Two months later Panama's National Environmental Authority (ANAM) 
issued resolution no. IA-150-98 approving the Environmental Impact Assessment 
submitted by HET S.A. for the Bonyic project. But due to problems and delays 
obtaining investment capital and additional govemment authorizations, 
construction of the Bonyic dam would have to wait until 2005. This time frame 
seemed reasonable back in 2003 when the new investment partner, Empresas 
Pliblicas de Medellin (EPM), bought out the Bocas Fruit Company in order to 
acquire a 75% controlling share in Ridro Ecol6gico deI Teribe (RET S.A.). 
4.2 The Bonyic hydroelectric project 
Empresas Pliblicas de Medellin (EPM) is a public utility company owned 
entirely by the municipal govemment of Medellin, Colombia. For EPM, the 
Bonyic dam represents the first step in the process of selling their energy 
production services intemationally. They saw Bonyic as a 'pilot' project that 
would allow them to assess the potential of energy markets in Central America, to 
identify the kinds of business strategies required to operate successfully in joint 
venture partnerships with local associates, and to protect their revenue streams 
against the risk of currency devaluation as Panama uses the US dollar (Gaviria G. 
2005). The project design calls for the construction of a 30 megawatt 
hydroelectric generating station and includes access roads, bridges and a 
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transmission line between Bonyic and Changuinola (See Appendix II: illB Project 
Abstract for addition al project details). 
By the standards of most large dams, Bonyic seems almost cherubic! (See 
Table Il for detailed comparison). Key indicators that suggest the modest nature 
of the Bonyic dam's likely social and environmental impacts include its relatively 
small reservoir surface area (17 hectares), low hectares flooded per megawatt 
generated ratio, short stretch of river impounded, many downriver tributaries, no 
people displaced and limited loss of culturally significant sites. On the other hand, 
local communities and environmental NGOs are justifiably concemed about 
critical natural habitats affected, fish species diversity, and the risks of induced 
deforestation and vector-bome diseases (Ledec 2003). 
The following quote from the Bonyic hydroelectric project' s Environmental 
Impact Assessment (ElA) illustrates how pervasive and influential the notions of 
traditional indigenous ecological culture discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis have 
become. On page VI-5 of the report the authors contend that construction of the 
dam in the Naso region will have the following profound effect: 
" ... the connection between society and nature, maintained in harmony by 
traditional cultural values, will be thoroughly transformed by a new 
technological order, product of a new socioeconomic system that will come to 
dominate this connection, thereby critically degrading the sustainability of the 
natural system." (my translation) (Planeta Panama Consultores 2005:VI-5). 
This conceptual framework for understanding social change leads the 
environmental consultants responsible for this ElA to highlight what they see as 
two of the most significant impacts of the environmental and social changes 
introduced by the Bonyic project: 1) challenges to the authority and integrity of 
the tradition al Naso political institutions, and 2) changes to Naso customs and 
traditions. The ElA thus explicitly recognizes that the long term environmental 
viability of the project will depend enormously on the promoters' and local 
authorities' capacity to jointly resolve a series of essentially non-ecological 
problems that the dam's construction is expected to provoke. 
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Table 11. Land area flooded and people displaced in large hydropower projects. 
Area Area People Capacity People flooded Project (country) (MW) flooded displaced (Ha.) 1 displaced (hectares) MW IMW 
Kompienga (Burkina Faso) 14 20,000 1,842 1,426 132 
Kedung Ombo (Indonesia) 29 4,600 29,000 159 1,000 
Bonyic (Panama) 30 17 0 <1 
Bayano (Panama) 30 35,000 4,400 1,167 
Brokopondo (Suriname) 30 160,000 n.a. 5,333 
Pak Mun (Thailand) 34 6,000 4,945 176 
Arenal (Costa Rica) 157 7,000 2,500 45 
Nam Theun-Hinboun (Laos) 210 630 0 3 
Salvajina (Colombia) 270 2,030 3,272 8 
Fortuna (Panama) 300 1,050 446 4 
El Cajon (Honduras) 300 11,200 4,000 37 
Urra 1 (Colombia) 340 7,400 6,200 22 
Pan gue (Chile) 450 500 50 1 
Narmada Sagar (India) 1,000 90,820 80,500 91 
Aswan High (Egypt) 2,100 400,000 100,000 191 
Churchill Falls (Canada) 5,225 665,000 0 127 
Grand Coulee (United States) 6,494 33,306 10,000 5 
Three Gorges (China) 18,200 110,000 >1,300,000 6 
Source: Adapted from (Ledec 2003: 12). The author adds that thlS table should not be 
interpreted as an endorsement per se of those projects with favourable ratios of hectares 
fIooded or people displaced per megawatt. Sorne of the projects with favourable ratios 
have other unfavourable characteristics. For instance, they may be weIl sited, but 
implementation of environmental or social mitigation measures may be inadequate. 
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0 
147 
n.a. 
145 
16 
0 
12 
1 
13 
18 
<1 
81 
48 
0 
2 
>71 
To support their case the authors of the Environmental hnpact Assessment 
report argue that the construction of access roads, the establishment of temporary 
work camps and the movement of people and equipment into and out of the region 
will unleash a series of new social and environmental problems that the Naso are 
relatively ill prepared to contend with. For ex ample the project is expected to 
increase settlement pressures in the immediate vicinity of the access road 
projected to pass through the villages of Solon and Bonyic (see Map 5 above). 
The influx of migrants willlikely include both Naso people from more remote 
villages and many non-Naso from the surrounding districts that would be attracted 
to the area by the prospects of temporary construction work or the newly provided 
access to the officially 'public' lands and resources situated in the Palo Seco 
Protected Forest (BPPS) and La Amistad International Park (PILA). Intra and 
interethnic conflicts can also be expected to increase as the project construction 
phase initiates a boom cycle of investment and employment opportunities that 
generate additional stresses on the already inadequate public services available in 
the region. 
These changes will increase local property values and encourage a shift 
towards more intensive and diverse economic activities that will provoke further 
changes in traditional Naso productive relationships (Planeta Panama Consultores 
2005:VIII-34-37). Naso institutions and their formaI organizations involved in 
resource management issues are not accustomed to operating in an environment 
characterized by this degree of socio-economic complexity. Only recently have 
they begun to formalize the kinds of institutional capacity and dedicate the 
additional human and financial resources required to solve these contemporary 
problems. These changes willlikely serve to further consolidate the Naso turn 
away from the authority of their traditional king and regidores and towards the 
national government figure of the Corregidor discussed in the previous chapter. 
This is highly probable since the se socio-economic changes will be experienced 
most directly the villages of Bonyic and Solon which are already two of the most 
ethnically mixed Naso communities. 
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Added to such extemal pressures, the increased exposure to wage labour and 
the market economy that the hydro project will bring is expected to result in fewer 
Naso choosing to engage primarily in traditionallivelihood activities based on 
agriculture and resource extraction. This trend has already been observed among 
the younger generations, and has accelerated their loss of awareness conceming 
the specificities of their local bio-physical environments. The impacts of sorne of 
these changes became c1ear to me through the spontaneous group discussions that 
followed each time 1 opened my local wildlife guidebook. The eIders commented 
on how several species were no longer seen in the vicinity, and the youth were 
capti vated (see Figure 21) by the images of the animals that they had perhaps 
heard of but never before seen. These images prompted stories and reminiscence 
about traditionallegends and surprise encounters while working in their fields. 
People expressed a sense of pride and attachment to a dimension of the natural 
world that is increasingly removed from their daily lives. 
Figure 21: Young boys enthralled by pictures of local wildlife in a guidebook. 
In its construction phase the Bonyic project is expected to employ around 200 
workers, inc1uding many Naso and non-Naso. As the vast majority of the Naso 
have only six years of primary school education they can aspire to only relatively 
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unskilled jobs as labourers, security guards and cooks with the project. Those who 
do get su ch jobs will also have to forfeit yet an other opportunity to use their 
knowledge of tradition al Naso cultural practices and the distinct ways in which 
these practices are related to their natural environments. The cumulative effects of 
these choices have meant that many Naso now have only limited knowledge of 
local biological diversity or the traditional cultural practices of their ancestors 
who are thought to have kept their society in a more harmonious balance with the 
surrounding natural environment. Once this knowledge of ancestral land use 
practices is lost, the Naso will have few productive alternatives to improve their 
livelihoods except to increase timber sales, cash cropping and cattle ranching 
activities. 
In spite of aIl the talk of fostering and supporting traditional N aso land use 
practices and the cultural values proper to their subsistence economy, the Bonyic 
project designers end up emphasizing the importance" ... of readapting [N aso] 
agricultural practices in order to improve soil management techniques, plant 
nurseries, marketing, etc. and the use of new instruments ... " (my translation) 
(Planeta Panama Consultores 2005:X-262). This is precisely the kind of 
contradictory prescription that 1 believe results from the inadequate 
understandings of culture deployed in the service of the development projects 
currently underway in the Naso region. By depicting traditional indigenous 
culture as sorne form of quasi-mystical homeostasis instead of as a dynamic 
repertoire of categories and practices created to adapt to changing social and 
ecological conditions, resource developers can ostensibly align their projects with 
the politically palatable goals of cultural diversity and ecological conservation. 
The very 'vagueness' of this concept of culture is also perfectly suited to the 
needs of the project designers since it allows for considerable maneuvering in the 
interpretation of traditional customs and practices. 
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4.3 The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor 
Another revealing example of the distorted application of this concept of 
traditional indigenous cultures in the Naso region is the Mesoamerican Biological 
Corridor project or CBMAP by its Spanish acronym. The official mission of 
CBMAP is to promote 
" ... the conservation, use and management of Panama' s biological di versity, 
while taking into account the need to promote and facilitate sustainable 
development and a better quality of life for the country's rural communities." 
(my translation) (Corredor Biol6gico Mesoamericano deI Atlantico Panameno 
2005). 
And yet an official from Panama's Ministry of the Environment recently 
summed up the project's objectives the following way: 
" ... to educate the Ngobe-Buglé, the Kuna, those from the Madungandf 
Comarca and the Naso Teribe people about how to use their hydraulic 
resources, flora and fauna without destroying them." (my translation) (Sween 
11/0912005) 
This quote highlights similar contradictions as seen in the Bonyic hydro project 
between the policy rhetoric deployed in the official project documents and the 
ethnocentric and professional biases guiding operational staff. 
CBMAP officials daim to have supported institutional coordination between 
the tradition al authorities of the Naso people and the Ministry of Environment 
(ANAM). The stated objectives of these efforts were to jointly design and 
implement a management plan for the protection of biodiversity and the 
traditionallivelihoods of the Naso people in the vast areas of overlap between 
their ancestral territory and the State's protected areas (i.e. Palo Seco National 
Forest (BPPS) and La Amistad International Park (PILA)) (Autoridad Nacional 
deI Ambiente 2004).67 The environmental consultants associated with this 
initiative identified three positive factors in favour of an expanded role for the 
Naso people in the design of the guidelines and strategies required to reconcile the 
projects twin conservation and development objectives in the region: 
67 In 1988 the governments of Panama and Costa Rica combined efforts to create the 2,007,000 
hectare La Amistad International Park (PILA). The area eventually became part of the core 
conservation zone for a 655,558 hectare UNESCO designated biosphere reserve. 
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1. The leadership capacity of the N aso authorities, 
2. The supposed positive attitude of the Naso towards the existence of the 
protected areas in their territory (BPPS and PILA), 
3. The Naso's previous experience with conservation and development projects 
supported by international organizations (ex: Conservation International, etc.). 
In spite of such favourable conditions, the extent of Naso participation in this 
resource management planning process appears to have been limited to that of 
simply being consulted. The proof that the Naso played only a marginal role in 
this process is reflected in the La Amistad International Park management plan 
sponsored by CBMAP. This plan emphasizes the immediate need for the creation 
of institutional mechanisms for coordinating the effective co-management of the 
park with the Naso people. Its authors allege that since the co-management 
framework is still a relatively new and unproven administrative model, the State 
authorities should seek to gradually increase local participation, " ... such that 
ANAM makes all initial decisions which are then submitted for adoption by 
consensus." (my translation) (Asociaci6n Nacional para la Conservaci6n de la 
Naturaleza y Consultores Ecol6gicos Panamefios 2004:85). 
AImost half of the Naso households with whom 1 spoke had received sorne 
form of benefits through an agro-forestry component of the CBMAP project. This 
particular component has had sorne success diversifying the many hectares of 
monilliasis-plagued underproductive cocoa fields with plantains and economically 
important tree species such as tropical cedar (Cedrela odorata) and laurél (Cordia 
alliodora). In order to be eligible to receive the tools, seeds and training offered 
by the project promoters, the Naso had to affiliate themselves as community-
based producer organizations with a legally constituted NGO. The Naso eco-
tourism organization ODES EN played this role in Siekin, while the CBMAP 
group in Sori fulfilled this obligation by contracting with a nearby Ngobe 
agricultural producers' association. These initiatives have helped to build local 
organizational capacities and to provide economically viable income generating 
options that also permit the rehabilitation of local ecosystems. And yet in spite of 
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sorne such promising experiences, 1 received many comments from Naso villagers 
about the lack of cooperation and the inequality of benefits that continue to plague 
many such donor and govemment-sponsored investment initiatives in the region. 
These latter problems, together with several acts of vandalism and physical 
intimidation, also seem to be related to broader cultural issues of poli tic al 
patronage and the socio-economic pressures of increasing integration into regional 
markets and the national society.68 
In 2006 alone Panama's National Environmental Authority (ANAM) 
approved 18 environmental impact assessments for hydroelectric projects which 
are proposing to invest over U$1000 million in order to add another 751.8 
megawatts to Panama's CUITent electrical generation capacity of 1300 MW 
(Munoz 2006). In a personal communication a local officer of the National 
Environmental Authority (AN AM) in Changuinola assured me that in the next ten 
years the forests and rivers of Bocas deI Toro will be transformed by a series of 
dams, artificiallakes, access roads and transmission lines. Three of these projects 
are being built on the Changuinola River which runs through a section of the Palo 
Seco Protected Forest (BPPS) on the neighbouring Ngobe indigenous people's 
territory. These are the El Gavilân (Chan-75), Cauchero II (Chan-140) and 
Cauchero III (Chan-220) dams expected to flood more than 2240 hectares and to 
displace over 1000 people.69 
Given the economic and environmental importance of these hydroelectric 
investments, the Pll...A management plan recommends that Govemment 
authorities investigate the interest and capacity of the se energy project promoters 
to support management operations within the protected areas. The plan's authors 
suggest that an innovative mechanism to foster private sector contributions to 
protected area management programs would be to modify the concession 
68 On June 20th 2006, Felix Sanchez, an anti-hydro Naso activist filed a charge of harassment against the 
National Police in Changuinola, Bocas deI Toro with Panama's human rights ombudsman (Defensor deI 
Pueblo). Sanchez claims that the Police intended to disrupt a peaceful protest action organized in a 
N gobe community affected by the construction of the AES Corporation dam on the Changuinola River. 
( www.defensoriadelpueblo.gob.pa ). 
69 In January of 2006 Arlington, VA. based global energy giant AES Corporation (www.aes.com) 
bought the rights to develop the 150 MW El Gavilân project from the local promoter Hydro Teribe S.A. 
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agreements authorized by Panama' s Public Services Regulatory Commission (el 
Ente) so as to charge the companies fees for the environmental services that they 
receive access to (Asociaci6n Nacional para la Conservaci6n de la Naturaleza y 
Consultores Ecol6gicos Panamenos 2004:71). The Ente Regulador de los Services 
Publicos (Ente) is an autonomous entity of the Panamanian State that regulates the 
country's telecommunications, electricity, water and sanitation and radio and 
television systems. 
In the case of Bonyic, despite the rhetorical importance that Ridro Ecol6gico 
deI Teribe (RET S.A.) accorded to the role of social and cultural factors in 
determining the long-term environmental viability of their project, RET did not 
contemplate having to pay any additional su ms for the right to exploit the 
environmental services that it obtained through its state-granted concession (Ente 
Regulador de los Servicios Ptiblicos 1999).71 Quite the contrary, the company 
expects to make additional profits through the sale of greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction certificates. RET officials estimate that they will be able to market 
somewhere in the vicinity of 50,000 tonnes of CO2 annually at a price of between 
U$3.00-U$5.00 per tonne (Ridro Ecol6gica Del Teribe S.A. 2004).72 
The La Amistad management plan specifies that one of the main reasons for 
the creation of the park back in 1988 was to "Protect the upper reaches of the 
Teribe and Changuinola rivers' hydrological basins in order to ensure an adequate 
quantity and quality of water for the production of electricity." (my translation). 
The other major objective of the PILA is said to be to "Protect a significant 
sample of the biodiversity of an area of the Republic of Panama that is rich in 
plant and animallife and relatively unaltered." (my translation) (Asociaci6n 
Nacional para la Conservaci6n de la Naturaleza y Consultores Ecol6gicos 
Panamenos 2004:2). While in theory these two objectives may be complementary, 
in practice it is hard to understand how both the authors of the PILA management 
plan and the ANAM officials who recently approved the Environmental Impact 
71 Public Services Regulatory Commission (Ente) Resolution No. JD-1497 of August 12,1999. 
72 For an overview of greenhouse gas markets and global emissions offsets see (C02e.com 2002). 
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Assessments for four dams on rivers that flow out of PUA, failed to be concerned 
about the prospect that these dams will cut off various species of migratory fish 
and shrimp from one sector of the park. This particular risk was brought to the 
government's attention by ANAl during a public forum held in June of 2005 in 
Changuinola to listen to concerns about the Bonyic project (McLarney 2005). 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (ElA) for the Bonyic hydroelectric 
project includes an "Environmental Management Plan" which is composed of a 
series of measures designed to prevent, mitigate, compensate or otherwise monitor 
the project' s expected impacts. According to the ElA "The plan is designed to 
achieve an adequate and sustainable management of the Palo Seco National Forest 
and the indigenous communities that will be affected by the project' s 
construction ... " (my translation) (Planeta Panamâ Consultores 2005:X-99). The 
ElA purports to achieve these objectives through a " ... special and rigorous 
control of the territory ... " administered directly by the energy company Ridro 
Ecol6gico deI Teribe (RET S.A.). To establish the legal framework that would 
permit such an exclusive and thorough control over the region, the ElA 
recommends 'evaluating the feasibility' of creating a new category of protected 
forest in the area immediately surrounding the dam. The purpose being to 
designate this area as raw material for the exclusive use of power generation 
(Planeta Panamâ Consultores: X-lOI). Once again the Naso people are expected 
to sacrifice their access to and use of the local natural resources coveted by the 
State and project developers. 1 therefore sincerely doubt that either of the resource 
management plans proposed for the PILA or the Bonyic dam are even compatible 
with the effective participation of the Naso people in the management their 
territorial resources. 
4.4 The Comarca Naso Tjër Di 
Since 2003, Panama has made sorne progress towards the legal recognition of 
the Naso's rights to possess, use, and manage their territorial resources according 
to their customs and traditions (Comisi6n Permanente de Asuntos Indigenas 
2003). Since the previous setback over the rejection of Law No. 50 in June of 
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2004, the Naso Comarca bill was renamed Law No. 19 and was just recently sent 
back to a special committee of Panama's National Assembly for additional 
revisions (Aparicio 2006). This legislation would grant the Naso jurisdiction over 
160,616 hectares of land, of which 125,141 hectares were previously designated 
part of the La Amistad International Park, and 21,722 ha. ofwhich will continue 
to belong to the Palo Seco Protected Forest. This willleave 13,753 ha. (or 8.6%) 
under the serni-autonomous jurisdiction of the Naso People (Cornisi6n 
Permanente de Asuntos Indfgenas 2005). The Naso have preferred to designate 
this remaining portion of their tradition al territory as collective property intended 
for the exclusive use of the Naso people. Lands situated within the boundaries of 
the Comarca cannot be mortgaged for credit or privatized, and neither will they be 
subject to alienation by any means including prescriptive acquisition, adjudication 
or embargo. 
The Naso generally anticipate that the comarca legislation will help to 
improve their land tenure security and thus contribute towards ensuring the 
continuity of their language, culture and traditionallivelihoods. Francisco Herrera, 
an anthropologist familiar with indigenous rights issues in Panama has suggested 
that the government's apparent willingness to recognize a Naso comarca is 
characteristically tied to the construction of the Bonyic hydroelectric project on 
lands claimed by the Naso. An important aspect of this legislation is that it will 
empower the tradition al Naso authorities to enter into legally binding agreements 
with third parties interested in developing the commercial potential of the N aso' s 
territorial resources. Without the adoption of such a law recognizing Naso 
jurisdiction and the legal authority of their traditionalleaders, the legitimacy of 
any deals signed in the name of the N aso people could be challenged in court. In 
Herrera's view, were it not for this factor, the Naso comarca legislation would 
likely have continued to languish as it has for the past 30 years (Herrera 2003). 
Later sections of this chapter describe in greater detail the complicit role that 
officiaIs ofPanama's government have played in assuring construction of the 
Bonyic dam on Naso territory. As of August 2006, officiaIs from Panama's office 
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of Indigenous Affaires and the National Land Administration Program 
(PRONAT) were still trying to sort out two significant boundary conflicts 
between the areas proposed for the N aso comarca and the 57 private landholders 
whose properties will border on the new jurisdiction. These conflicts involve on 
the one hand a long-simmering dispute with the owners of the Ganadera Bocas 
cattle ranch located in the Druy - San San Tigra region, and, on the other, a long 
since abandoned - but clearly not forgotten - conflict with the neighbouring Bri 
Bri people who are claiming part of the Naso territory for their own comarca. 
While these two boundary disputes are being worked out, no one seems to be 
concemed about the potential for administrative and normative conflicts between 
the proposed Naso comarca and pre-existing environmentallegislation regulating 
the BPPS and Pll...A protected areas. 
Figure 22: Sign posted in Sieyic that proc1aims: "La Amistad International Park 
Boundary. No cutting of trees, No hunting, No agricultural activities." Signed by 
"Local Authorities" and the National Association for the Conservation of Nature 
(ANCON), a Panamanian NGO that works c10sely with ANAM. 
The preamble for the Naso comarca law states that with the adoption of these 
measures the Naso people will obtain the benefits of " ... full rights over their 
lands and resources, in order to consolidate the wellbeing of their inhabitants in a 
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manner that is consistent with their customs and traditions." (my translation) 
(Comisi6n Permanente de Asuntos Indfgenas 2005). It is quite revealing to 
compare the 'development with identity' tone of this officiallegal discourse with 
several of the specific articles contemplated in Law No. 19. For instance, on the 
subject of natural resources Article No. 24 of the Comarca legislation confirms 
that the 145,000 hectares of protected area lands (BPPS and PILA) that will 
become part of the Comarca N aso Tjër Di " ... will be protected and conserved 
according to the present law and applicable environmentallegislation." (my 
translation) 
In order to harmonize the se two positions - i.e. where: 1) the Naso hold 
complete rights to all territorial resources within the entire 160,616 ha. 
jurisdiction of their comarca, while 2) existing national protected area legislation 
is recognized and enforced over the 91 % of this same territory that correspond to 
the Palo Seco and La Amistad sectors - we have to imagine that traditional Naso 
subsistence activities such as collecting plant materials and hunting, agriculture 
and forestry, etc. (all actions that are now explicitly forbidden within the 
boundaries of PILA) are somehow incompatible with Naso customs and 
traditions! Notwithstanding the absurdity of this claim, the respective interests of 
the diverse actors involved (i.e. governments, indigenous peoples, ecological 
NGOs, etc.) have combined to maintain the fiction that " ... the ecological culture 
of the indigenous peoples is compatible with the goal of environ mental 
preservation, ... " (my translation) (De1ca Consultores 2000:72). Not surprisingly, 
in Panama and a number of other countries with similarly contradictory legal 
arrangements, conflicts are pitting the rights of indigenous peoples to autonomy in 
the management of their ancestral territories against the environmental rights 
regimes represented by protected area officiais and their management plans.73 
73 For additional exarnples of sorne of the se contradictions and conflicts between indigenous rights and 
environrnental regirnes in other countries see: (Anderson and Berglund 2003, Lu 2001, Nygren 2004, 
Redford and Mansour 1996, Stevens and De Lacy 1997). 
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4.5 Revolution and the Naso monarchy 
Controversy over land tenure and hydroelectric dams is nothing new to the 
Naso region. Neither have the Naso been immune from the kinds of conflicts that 
such land use changes almost inevitably inspire. Since 1988 Naso involvement 
with a series of political and economic projects that targeted their region has 
played a significant role in the downfall of three successive Kings or Queens. First 
there was Rufina Santana, daughter of the previous King Simeon Santana, who 
was forced to resign from her post in 1988 because of her close association with 
the military dictatorship of General Manuel Noriega. 
Table 12: Recent chronology ofthe Naso monarchy (1970-2006). 
King/Queen Relation to Predecessor Years 
Lazaro Santana Unknown ?-1973 
Simeon Santana Lazaro Santana's son 1973-1979 
Manuel Aguilar Simeon Santana' s advisor and 1979-1982 
legal representative 
Rufina Santana Simeon Santana' s daughter 1982-1988 
César Santana Rufina Santana' s uncle 1988-1998 
Tito Santana César Santana's nephew 1998-Present (2004) 
Valentfn Santana Tito Santana's uncle (2004-Present) 
Rufina's resignation preceded the 1989 United States of America military 
invasion dubbed "Operation Just Cause" that captured General Noriega to face 
drug trafficking charges in the US. Naso relationships with the Noriega regime 
became increasingly significant after a deal was reached in 1977 whereby in 
exchange for a promise to recognize and delimit Naso land rights, the 
Govemment built a 120 hectare jungle warfare training facility called Panajungla 
75 William Friar, author of Moon Handbooks Panama, (2006) includes Wekso in his Iist of "Must-See" 
Panama destinations: "A visit to Wekso is one of the most memorable experiences Bocas dei Toro has 
to offer," For additionai information see: http://www.odesen.org/index.htmi 
132 
on the site known to the Naso as Wekso. Ironically as one of the members of the 
Naso Organization for the Sustainable Development of Ecotourism (ODESEN by 
its Spanish acronym) once told me, Noriega did them something of a favour as the 
group has since been able to convert the facility's surviving infrastructure - under 
concession from ANAM which now officially owns the property - into a 
f 1 . . 75 success u eco-tounsm operatIOn. 
Figure 23: Sign we1comes visitors to ODESEN's Wekso ecotourism facility on the 
grounds of the converted "Panajungla" jungle warfare training center. 
Discontent with Rufina's rule prompted the Naso to select César Santana, the 
ex-queen's uncle to be their new King. César's leadership lasted for ten years until 
in 1998 rus own nephew, Tito Santana, began to campaign for César's removal on 
the grounds that his uncle was misusing government funds allocated to the Naso 
people. The project that did the most to discredit César Santana's reputation was 
the 1998 decision by Panama's National Assembly to create a new Corregimiento 
or sub-municipal district of El Teribe for the Naso region. The bill was presented 
by a Ngobe legislator from the province of Bocas deI Toro and was seen by the 
Naso as an act of treason against their historie aspirations to be recognize as a 
comarca. Tito Santana and his followers argued that with the new law local 
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authority would pass from the tradition al Naso regidores to the newly elected 
Representante and Corregidor bound to uphold the le gal and administrative codes 
of the State just like in any other jurisdiction of the country. Tito Santana 
maintained that such changes would have disastrous implications for the area' s 
natural resources and the Naso culture in general (Machuca 1999). 
Tito Santana capitalized on popular resentment provoked by the 
Corregimiento to orchestrate César's removal and his own election as Naso king. 
After the bill' s official adoption in 1998 Tito Santana organized several 
assemblies to mobilize support against his uncle César and in favour of his own 
candidacy for king. Within months Tito and César Santana had agreed to form an 
electoral commission composed of equal numbers of each of their representatives. 
The Commission went on to negotiate a series of 31 ground mIes concerning who 
could vote and how many votes would be required for a Naso king's election to be 
considered valid. These mIes established a precedent that has since been invoked 
by another of Tito Santana' s uncles, Valentln Santana, as the only culturally 
legitimate way to resolve the Naso leadership crisis of 2004-2005. 
Tito Santana eventually won the 1998 election with 530 votes against the 479 
obtained by his uncle César. The total number of ballots cast was therefore greater 
than the 801 previously agreed to by both sides as the minimum benchmark for 
the election to be considered valid (i.e. 50% + 1 of the 1600 registered N aso 
voters). After the results of the vote were known César Santana acknowledged 
defeat and stepped aside, but not before accusing the new king and his supporters 
of being motivated more by personal ambitions than by the good of the N aso 
people as a whole. The deposed king Cesar was referring to his rivals' interests in 
securing for themselves a larger portion the growing international investments 
being made in the Naso region. A similar view was publicly voiced by Father 
Roberto Cirauqui, a Catholic priest based in Changuinola and long-standing ally 
of the Naso people (Cirauqui 2004). In addition to the mode st economic resources 
and political opportunities introduced through the Corregimiento, the Biological 
Corridor (CBMAP) and the hydroelectric projects already discussed, a National 
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Land Administration project (PRONAT) supported by the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank had also identified the Naso region as a 
priority for land tenure regularization and the consolidation of protected areas 
(The World Bank 2000). 
After a great deal of virulence and conflict surrounding the creation of the 
Corregimiento deI Teribe, several of its most outspoken critics went on to present 
themselves as official candidates for the position of Representante de 
Corregimiento on behalf of the various political parties that contested the 1999 
national election in Panama. The crowded field seeking the nomination as the 
official candidate for Representante on behalf of the Partido Revolucionario 
Democratico (PRD) - the party affiliated with Rufina Santana, Manuel Noriega 
and his much revered predecessor General Omar Torrijos (father of current 
Republic of Panama President Martin Torrijos) - allowed César Santana to win 
the PRD nomination only a matter of months after having been driven from office 
in the Naso Palace. César then became the first elected Representante for the new 
Corregimiento of El Teribe (1999-2004). As 1 show in the next section, the 
political fortunes of Naso leaders continue to be vulnerable to local perceptions of 
their skill and altruism in the management of external relations with govemments 
and investors. 
4.6 Bonyic: the Naso factor 
Once Empresas Public as de Medellfn (EPM) had bought out the Bocas Fruit 
Company's control of Ridro Ecol6gico deI Teribe (RET S.A.) in 2003, they 
immediately set about negotiating with the Naso leadership in order to obtain their 
consent for a series of additional geological studies that they wished to conduct in 
order to update the original Environmental Impact Assessment approved by 
Panama's environmental authorities (ANAM) five years earlier (Cirauqui 2004). 
Negotiations between RET and the Naso led to the signing of an "Agreement on 
Principles" in the presence of Padre Cirauqui in Changuinola on November 1 st 
2003. The agreement recognized the jurisdiction of the Naso people over the 
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territory where the dam was to be built, and reserved a role for the Naso 
tradition al authorities in the contracting of Naso laborers. 
Despite growing concerns among the Naso population over the potential risks 
and the limited benefits the project represented for them, and despite then 
President ofthe Naso Council of Leaders Adolfo Villagra's refusal to sign the 
Agreement on Principles, King Tito Santana signed the agreement along with 
seven of his Councilors and supporters. RET' s next move in December of 2003 
was to begin work upgrading an existing road link between Changuinola and the 
village of Charagre on the Teribe River. Charagre is the mixed Naso-Latino 
community from where the new access road would have to be built to the dam site 
on the Bonyic River. This decision to send in the tractors and heavy equipment 
seems to have catalyzed Naso fears about the project and intensified divisions 
within their leadership. Naso opponents of the dam demanded that the road work 
be suspended until the N aso people had given their formal consent to the overall 
project. At which point the dam's promoters (i.e. RET working with Tito 
Santana's supporters) agreed to step back and began to improvise a process of 
community consultations that would consider the project' s impacts and 
alternatives before calling on the Naso to approve or reject the dam in an eventual 
referendum. 
The Naso people were becoming increasingly polarized over the prospects of 
the hydro project. Those leaning against the Bonyic dam were generally not 
opposed to all forms of hydro development on their territory. A distinct majority 
of this group simply felt that any major project of this nature should only be 
considered after the comarca legislation recognizing their land rights and 
jurisdiction had been approved. The fact that Tito Santana was willing to 
negotiate a deal with the hydro company in the absence of any guarantee that the 
National Assembly would eventually pass the Naso Comarca law only served to 
strengthen the resolve of his detractors to remove him. Naso opponents of the 
Bonyic dam also conditioned their eventual support for any such project on three 
key provisions: 
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1) the Naso should be made partners in the planning and management of the 
project; 
2) the Naso should be given preference in project-related employment; 
3) the project's promoters should also support a range of sustainable 
development projects that would help to maintain Naso access to local resources. 
These people resented the fact that their King had not made more of an effort 
to inform them about the details of the negotiations that he was involved in with 
the hydro company on their behaIf. This lack of communication encouraged 
speculation as to the inequity of the distribution of the benefits that RET S.A. was 
willing to offer the N aso in exchange for their consent to the dam. Allegations of 
fraud and corruption continued to plague the negotiations between King Tito 
Santana and the power company, which further exacerbated internaI divisions 
among the Naso. 
For his part, Tito Santana continued to draw support for the hydro project 
from close allies of his administration based in the Naso capital of Sieyic, and 
from among the families settled mainly in the eastern lowlands (i.e. Santa Rosa, 
Sori, Bonyic) and the nearby squatter settlements in and around Changuinola. In 
2005 Tito Santana was himself engaged in an illegaIland invasion in the nearby 
town of El Silencio. The Naso king's presence among these squatters motivated 
lawyers for the affected land owner to publicly accuse the Mayor of the district of 
Changuinola of having succumbed to politicaI pressure in favor of allowing the 
squatters to remain (Arrocha 2005). It is in these latter are as where the population 
is more ethnically mixed and integrated into the wage economy that the benefits 
of the Bonyic dam seem most appeaIing. In these areas it is not hard to find 
people who whole heartedly we1come the job opportunities and better road links 
to nearby towns that the project will provide. 
Finally there is aIso a third group among the Naso whose numbers are more 
difficult to measure. Many in this group report not having been given adequate 
time or information upon which to make up their minds about the Bonyic hydro 
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project. This last group includes a number of people who - even though they 
recognize many of the significant threats and opportunities that the dam represents 
- are not yet prepared to commit their own futures and especiaIly those of their 
children to one particular outcome or the other. Many in this undecided group aIso 
say that they do not particularly trust their own politicalleaders on either side of 
this issue. 
In March of 2004, Hidro Ecol6gico deI Teribe attempted to counter the 
deepening divisions that the Bonyic dam was provoking among the Naso by 
signing an agreement for an ad hoc Coordinating Commission charged with 
organizing a series of community consultations and negotiating the details of the 
compensation and benefits package. As part of this agreement RET contracted the 
Fundaci6n Dobbo YaIa to facilitate both the consultative and deliberative phases 
of this process. The Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala proposaI caIled for a four-month 
process of community consultations in anticipation of a collective decision by the 
Naso people on the Bonyic dam and associated compensation and benefits 
agreements. The total amount budgeted for this activity was U$36,718.00. While 
these measures appear to have been well intentioned and designed to address 
legitimate Naso concerns over the Bonyic project, the events that would soon 
follow suggest - as many of the project's opponents had aIready concluded - that 
they simply amounted to "too little ... too late". 
Tensions between the project's Naso supporters and opponents reached a new 
threshold during a Council of Leaders meeting held one month latter on April 
19th, 2004, when a motion was passed by the pro-hydro faction stripping then 
Council President Adolfo Villagra of his position. The Naso leaders who 
supported the motion argued that by refusing to participate in the negotiation 
process underway with HET, Mf. Villagra had failed to live up to his 
responsibilities as Council President. He and severaI members of the ad hoc 
Coordinating Commission who were likewise se en to be obstructing the 
agreements were officially replaced by a new slate of 'leaders' who would prove 
to be more amenable to the Bonyic dam proposaI. The new Council of Leaders 
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proceeded to grant RET permission to conduct additional studies in the region, 
and announced that construction work on the dam and access road would not 
begin until after the community consultations and the Naso's formal acceptance of 
the project. 
Meanwhile, the ex-President of the Naso Council of Leaders, Adolfo Villagra, 
started planning a General Assembly of the Naso people to mobilize opponents of 
King Tito Santana' s handling of the Bonyic negotiations. In May of 2004 Villagra 
and his allies traveled to Panama City to seek the support and advice of contacts 
within three national NGOs: Alianza para la Conservaci6n y el Desarrollo (ACD), 
Centro de Asistencia Legal Popular (CEALP), and Centro de Estudios y Acci6n 
Social Panameno (CEASPA). Then on May 30th, 2004 Mr. Villagra and his allies 
brought together 512 supporters for an extraordinary session of the Naso General 
Assembly in Sieyic. These members of the General Assembly declared 
themselves to be the maximum decision-making body of the Naso govemment 
and then adopted the following three resolutions: 
1. To remove Tito Santana from office for abuse of power and his 
replacement by Valentin Santana (Tito's uncle) as Naso King. 
2. To demand approval of the Naso Comarca legislation before 
considering any other projects in the region. 
3. To reject the Bonyic hydroelectric project on the grounds that it would 
essentially benefit the promoters while the interests and the heritage of 
the Naso people would be negatively affected. 
For his part Tito Santana defended his rightful position as Naso King claiming 
that the decision to convoke an Assembly of the Naso people must be officially 
endorsed by the Council of Leaders. According to him, since the May 30th 
Assembly was never approved by the Council, its decisions cannot be considered 
legitimate expressions of the will of the Naso people. RET did not appear to be 
overly concemed by these events which, if nothing else, called into question the 
legitimacy of Tito Santana' s claim to be negotiating on behalf of all the Naso 
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people. The company thus chose to ignore recommendations contained in the 
Bonyic Environmental Impact Assessment (ElA) report that it had commissioned 
and which underscored the" ... the dangers of continuing with the project without 
first having established an excellent understanding with the Naso people and the 
traditionalleaders who would emerge legitimated from the process in which they 
are currently involved." (my translation) (Planeta Panama Consultores 2005: p.V-
171). 
ln defence of this decision to continue negotiating with Tito Santana in spite 
of the contested nature of his leadership, RET officiaIs pointed to the official 
recognition that Tito Santana recently received from the National Directorate of 
Indigenous Affairs (Direcci6n Nacional de PoHtica Indigenista). Four days after 
the May 30th Naso General Assembly that revoked Tito Santana's mandate as 
King, Dorian Rios, then Panama's National Director of Indigenous Affairs, issued 
a public statement confirming "King Tito Santana as the highest authority of the 
Naso Teribe region and his new Council of Leaders, ... appointed on the 19th of 
April, 2004." (my translation) (Rios 2004). 
Emboldened by this official support, Tito Santana accused the organizers of 
the May 30th Assembly ofplotting a 'coup d'état' to overthrow him. In a 
subsequent interview with a reporter for the national daily newspaper La Prensa 
Santana qualified his poli tic al opponents as a miniscule band of rebels who do not 
even respect their own cultural traditions (PimenteI2004). This latter charge of 
violating Naso traditions refers to the questionable position adopted by Tito 
Santana that aIl General Assemblies of the Naso People must, by tradition, be 
previously approved by the Naso Council of Leaders. 1 mentioned previously that 
during the 1970's the Naso and other indigenous peoples in Panama were 
encouraged to write down their traditions as part of the process of cultural and 
territorial affirmation supported by the government of General Omar Torrijos. In 
the Naso case this led them to adopt the 'Internal Regulations of the Teribe 
Indians' described in the previous chapter. Despite the un official status accorded 
to this document as the 'legal code' of the Naso people, it makes no mention in 
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any of its 49 articles and amendments of any obligation that a GeneraI Assembly 
be previously authorized by the Council of Leaders. 
No one, except Tito Santana's supporters, could tell me where this formaI 
obligation came from. Those who defended the existence of such a mIe aIluded to 
an unspecified precedent adopted at a Council of Leaders meeting and then 
generally added that in the past the word of a Naso king or regidor was the 
undisputed law of the land. On the other hand, most of the Naso whom 1 met were 
under the impression that a simple majority of the Naso people was aIl that was 
required to make decisions that affected themall as a people. It was this latter 
. interpretation that inspired the drafters of the Law No. 50 of 2003 version of the 
Comarca Naso Tjër Di legislation. Article no.8 of this bill in fact states that 
"The Assembly of the Naso People is the maximum decision-making authority 
of the Comarca and is composed of aIl members of the N aso people." 
(Comisi6n de Asuntos Indfgenas 2003) (my translation). 
Article no.9 of the same bill is even more to the point: 
"The Assembly of the Naso People will convene annually and exceptionally 
when caIled for by the Council of Leaders, the King or Queen, or by a 
majority of the members of the Assembly of the Naso People." (my translation 
and emphasis) (Comisi6n de Asuntos Indigenas 2003). 
It is interesting to compare this wording to the revised version of the Naso 
comarca bill that has been awaiting a second reading in Panama's National 
Assembly since the month of May 2005. 77 Re-numbered as Law No. 19, gone is 
any reference to the "maximum decision-making authority" of the Assembly of 
the Naso People. In its place Article no. 8 of Law No.19 now states that: 
"The King or Queen is the maximum traditional authority and LegaI 
Representative of the Comarca N aso Tjer Di, and the spokesperson of the 
Comarca before the National Govemment and both public and private entities, 
and will be elected in accordance with the Carta Organica and Naso customs 
77 In an extraordinary session of the national Legislative Assembly that took place on June 22nd, Law 
No. 50 of 2003 that was created to recognize the Naso people's land rights and political autonomy failed 
to gather enough votes and was therefore defeated (Ruiz 2004). 
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and traditions." (my translation) (Comisi6n Permanente de Asuntos Indfgenas 
2005:p.7). 
The revised Articles no. 10 and Il are even more explicit: the Assembly of the 
Naso People is now simply to be recognized as " ... a decision-making body of 
the Comarca ... " (emphasis in original text), which meets once a year and 
" ... extraordinarily when convened by the Council of Leaders, in coordination 
with the King or Queen." (ibid: p.7). 
Thus the latest version of the Naso comarca law (i.e. No. 19 of 2005) 
conveniently strips the majority of the Naso people of the right to convene a 
General Assembly without the consent of their tradition al leaders. No longer will 
it matter how many people show up to express their opinion on significant topies 
of concern to the collectivity. Without the prior approval of the Council and the 
King extraordinary Assemblies like the one that took place on May 30th 2004 will 
henceforth be treated as public disturbances or ev en riots! 
The nature and timing of these modifications to the Naso comarca legislation 
suggest a c1ear pattern of collusion between government officials, a foreign utility 
company and that segment of the Naso leadership in favour of hydro development 
to legally disqualify any challenge to the legitimacy of their conduct. Such a 
disreputable course of action must have seemed necessary to the project's 
proponents at the time because in RET' s words, if Tito Santana were to lose his 
position as Naso king " ... the [hydro] project would be completely paralyzed." 
(Planeta Panama Consul tores 2005:Anexo 1,p.12). 
Confronted in this way by the government's refusaI to acknowledge their 
grievances, Tito Santana' s political opponents rallied around the second king 
Valentfn Santana and continued to press for internaI elections. As a result of these 
pressures Tito Santana eventually signed an agreement with his unc1e Valentin 
calling for an election to be held on September 19th 2004. Rowever, shortly after 
signing this agreement the Naso Council of Leaders adopted Tito Santana's 
proposal to cancel the voting in favor of holding an extraordinary session of the 
Assembly of the Naso People to approve the Bonyie hydroelectric project. Tito 
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Santana's 'authorized' Assembly was also scheduled for September 19th and 
would be held in the village of Bonyic. The question of the necessity of an 
election to validate his authority as N aso king would likewise be submitted to the 
September 19th Assembly. 
Figure 24 : Police Major Olmedo Moreno seated next to Tito Santana at an 
opposition prote st raIl y in Sieyic, Bocas deI Toro, while Council of Leaders President 
Ricardo Pitterson (standing behind head table) justifies the Council's decision to 
cancel voting on September 19th in favor of holding a General Assembly to approve 
the Bonyic Hydroelectric project. 
Incensed by the Naso King and Council's maneuvers to thwart the election 
agreement, supporters of Valentin Santana staged a three day protest at the Palace 
in Sieyic. During previous gatherings tensions between both factions had led to a 
growing number of incidents of physical intimidation and threats of political 
violence. Perhaps in recognition of the volatility of the situation the Govemor of 
the province of Bocas deI Toro dispatched Police Major Olmedo Moreno to 
mediate the conflict brewing in Sieyic. Major Moreno successfully negotiated a 
temporary solution to the crisis by inviting both kings to meet with municipal and 
national authorities ta find a way out of the impasse. With only one week left 
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before the Assembly in Bonyic, supporters of Valentin Santana demanded that the 
issue of elections be withdrawn from the agenda of the event and that preparations 
begin immediately for a legitimate election on October 31 st. Valentin's supporters 
argued that the best solution to the leadership crisis was a voting process similar 
to that which took place in 1998 when Tito Santana successfully challenged his 
unc1e César Santana for the Naso throne. Tito Santana's camp refused to 
cooperate, maintaining that the Assembly in Bonyic would determine if there was 
indeed the need for such elections or not. 
4.7 "Naso Hydro Project Approved!" 78 
Ridro Ecol6gico deI Teribe officiaIs must have been following these 
negotiations quite c1osely, as they c1early wished to avoid any further costly 
delays in their construction schedule. Imagine their relief when on September 1 i\ 
only two days before the Assembly convened by Tito Santana to approve the 
Bonyic project, the newly appointed National Director of Indigenous Affaires, 
Ignacio Rodriguez, issued an official statement confirming that according to his 
office " ... Tito Santana is the highest authority of the Naso Teribe region." (my 
translation) (Rodriguez 2004)?9 Without further ado on September 19th around 
1000 'Naso' supporters of the hydro project descended upon the village of Bonyic 
for a day of socializing and speeches, and most importantly to sign the attendance 
lists required to legitimize the approval of the project by the majority of the Naso 
people. RET had advertised the event on local radio weIl in advance of September 
19th, and for the day of the Assembly the y contracted ten motor boat operators to 
ferry the hundreds of participants arriving from the banana zone up river ta the 
village of Bonyic. 
78 Title of an article that appeared in the El Panama América newspaper shortly after the Bonyic 
Assembly on September 19th, 2004 (Guardia 2004). 
79 On September Ist 2004 Martin Torrijos became President of Panama for a five year term. Mr. 
Torrijos was elected as candidate for the Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD). In Panama' s 
republican system of govemment the executive administration makes a series of political appointments 
throughout the country's public agencies. These nominations start with National Directors and cabinet 
ministers but extend right down to night watchmen, cooks and gardeners at the local health clinics. 
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In the presence of local invited govemment officiaIs, union and media 
representatives, etc. the Executive Director of the Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala, Eligio 
Alvarado, congratulated the Naso people and their 'legitimate traditional political 
authorities' for the momentous decision that they had come to make for the 
benefit of their own and future generations. Mr. Alvarado was in fact very weIl 
positioned to comment on the adequacy of the Naso decision. Not only had Dobbo 
Yala been hired by RET to carry out the Bonyic project community consultations 
and to advise the Naso authorities in negotiations with the hydro company over 
the benefits and compensation agreements, but Mr. Alvarado had also recently 
been appointed to the office of the Under Secretary for Indigenous Affaires of the 
newly elected Partido Revolucionario Democnltico (PRD) of President Martin 
Torrijos. 
A short time after the Bonyic Assembly, RET issued a report claiming to have 
received a mandate from the 1042 members of the Naso Assembly who 
unanimously approved of the hydro project-related negotiations underway with 
Tito Santana. This report specified that the 1042legitimate 'Members' of the 
Naso Assembly present in Bonyic on September 19th were all: 
" ... Naso, mestizos (sons and daughters of Naso with non-indigenous), people 
who had lived in the Naso region for more than five years and have been 
recognized as such by the King, and people who are not Naso but their spou se 
is or is at least mestizo." (my translation) (Planeta Panama Consultores 
2005:Anexo 1 - p.ll). 
It is noteworthy that these criteria used by RET to define membership in the 
Naso Assembly are much broader than those determined by the Naso themselves 
for the purpose of voting in the Naso election that brought Tito Santana to power 
in 1998. For instance, Article 23 of the elections agreement signed in 1998 states 
that "Non-Teribe spouses of both sexes who have been married for 5 years cannot 
vote unless they possess documents from the King recognizing their residency 
within the territory." (my translation). On the voting rights of mestizos, Article 22 
of the same agreement stipulates that: "People with 25% Naso blood [i.e. one 
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Nasa grand-parent] can only vote if they were born in and continue to live in the 
N aso territory." 
According to the dam's Naso supporters it seems the membership regulations 
for voting in a Naso General Assembly need not be identical to those required to 
participate in the election of a Naso King. These rules may have evolved over the 
years to account for the greater social and economic mobility of recent Naso 
generations. But if this were in fact the case, the Council of Leaders who 
convened the September 19th General Assembly or even the ad hoc Coordinating 
Commission responsible for briefing the Council on the results of the community 
consultations should have formally addressed the issue of voting rights in the 
September 19th Naso Assembly. 1 was in Bonyic on that day in 2004 and 1 
witnessed how the 1042 names on the attendance lists were collected. Not once 
did 1 see any of the signatories being asked to furnish proof of family affiliation, 
marital status, age of consent or residency within the territory. This observation 
makes me question, along with the Naso opponents of the hydro project who 
boycotted the Bonyic Assembly altogether, the sincerity ofHET's daim that such 
an important decision for the future of the Naso people and the province of Bocas 
deI Toro was truly adopted by only legitimate members of the Naso Assembly. 
Despite such doubts about the legitimacy of the process used to obtain the 
Naso's consent to the Bonyic project, at the end of September 2004 the stars 
finally appeared to be aligning in such a way as to permit RET to begin selling the 
electricity it wanted to produce at Bonyic by late in the year 2006. People thought 
that the new PRD-dominated National Assembly in Panama City would soon 
approve Law No.19 for the creation of the Naso Comarca. RET was nearing 
completion of the studies it needed to optimize the basic engineering for the 
project's structural components. No one expected that the project's Environmental 
Impact Assessment would have any difficulties obtaining ANAM's approval.80 
The company still needed about U$35 million to coyer the project's estimated 
80 ANAM eventually approved the category three Environmental Impact Assessment (ElA) for the 
Bonyic hydroelectric project in June of 2005. (Direcci6n Nacional de Evaluaci6n y Ordenamiento 
Ambiental 2005). 
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total costs U$50 million. This problem too appeared to be well on its way to being 
resolved since RET had applied for a loan ofthis amount from the Private Sector 
Department of the Inter-American Development Bank (illB) (Private Sector 
Department 2004). 
With the mandate RET believed it now had from the Naso General Assembly 
the company turned its attention to the remaining legal obligation to reach an 
agreement with the Naso on benefits and compensation. Such an agreement was 
signed on December lSth 2004 by RET President Jorge Alberto Garcia and Naso 
representative Tito Santana. The accord announced a series of investments in road 
building, land purchases and renovations to public buildings that RET agreed to 
make in the Naso region. The total value of these direct benefits is estimated to be 
around U$322,000 or 0.6% of the total project costs estimated at U$50 million. 
Ernesto Monter Flores of the Private Sector Department at the Inter-American 
Development Bank characterized this amount as considerably lower than the 
average of 1 % of costs generally allocated in direct benefits to communities in 
project-affected areas (personal communication, 2005). 
According to other experts on benefit sharing from dam projects, it is always 
difficult to determine what constitutes a fair share of the economic benefits of 
dam projects for project-affected populations (Égré, Vincent Roquet, and Carine 
Durocher 2002). These authors suggest that a basic factor to consider when 
assessing the equity of such agreements should be the actual needs of the 
population in the affected area. Accordingly, poor regions like the Naso area with 
few public services and no infrastructure should receive a proportionally higher 
share of dam benefits. Adequate mechanisms that promote efficient and equitable 
sharing of project benefits can provide stable long term revenues that enable local 
and regional entities to set their own priorities and to minimise their dependency 
on developers and the State. Benefit sharing also facilitates planning and adaptive 
management within the context of the social and ecological changes brought 
about by the project. Nowhere is this more important than in remote regions like 
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the Naso territory that have only limited access to public investments in 
infrastructure and services (Égré 2006). 
As a case in point the "Paix des Braves" agreement signed between the 
provincial Government of Québec and the Cree Nation in 2002 has become 
something of an international 'best practice' example of how mutual respect and 
benefit sharing can characterize relations between indigenous peoples, resource 
developers and government authorities (The World Bank 2004). The "Paix des 
Braves" agreement commits the Province of Québec to pay the Cree $50 million a 
year over 50 years in exchange for the rights to develop a series of hydro projects 
expected to cost $4 billion. Perhaps even more importantly for the Cree, the 
agreement also included negotiated settlements applying to land rights, forestry 
and mining (Secrétariat aux affaires autochtones, 2002). Closer to Panama, its 
neighbour Colombia requires that all new hydroelectric power generation plants 
of more than 10 MW installed capacity transfer 3% of project revenues to local 
watershed agencies and concerned municipalities. Another 1.5% of project 
revenues must be transferred to the municipalities bordering on the reservoir and 
1.5% of project revenues must be devolved to the municipalities located in the 
watershed upstream of the dam. Colombian legislation also stipulates that these 
amounts must be used for infrastructure projects that have been identified in 
municipal development plans (Égré, Vincent Roquet, and Carine Durocher 
2002:33). 
Mr. Flores of the !DB agreed that the overall value of the benefits received by 
communities affected by hydro electric projects usually varies according to their 
economic status and financial management skills. In the Bonyic case, RET 
officials justified the rather stingy benefits package on the grounds that the Naso 
people lack the institution al and technical capacity required to participate 
effectively in any kind of revenue or equity sharing arrangements or development 
funds. Another reason 1 was given by RET shareholder Cesar Romero was that 
RET forecasted needing all revenues from the first seven years of energy sales to 
pay off the debt incurred during construction of the dam. By arguing that the Naso 
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had many more pressing needs that could not wait until seven years into the 
future, project promoters were able to convince the Naso negotiators of the 
relative advantages of having one bird in their baskets over two in the bush. 
The presence of a contingent of union 
activists from SUNTRACS - a very active 
and quite radical national organization that 
represents thousands of workers from the 
construction and allied industries - during 
the Naso General Assembly in Bonyic on 
September 19th also deserves a brief 
explanation here (See Figure 25). Earlier in 
September 2004 1 interviewed a 
SUNTRACS member who agreed to tell 
me about the investigative mission that his 
union organized to the temporary work 
camps RET had established along the 
Bonyic River. The camps were established 
to carry out the remaining studies required 
to update the project's Environmental 
Impact Assessment. SUNTRACS' goal 
was to verify whether or not the developer 
was respecting the basic labor laws of the 
Figure 25: Activists with flags of 
the construction workers union 
SUNTRACS make their presence 
known during the Naso Assembly 
to approve the Bonyic 
hydroelectric project on September 
19th 2004. 
country, and to offer the Bonyic project workers the option of becoming 
SUNTRACS union members in which case they could benefit from the collective 
bargaining agreement the union had negotiated with the construction industry 
association CAPAC (Câmara Panamefia de la Construcci6n). 
This union member explained that the SUNTRACS provincial representative 
for Bocas deI Toro, a man named Jaime Caballero, obtained the Naso king Tito 
Santana' s explicit permission to enter the area for two days in September in order 
to talk to sorne of the workers who se names appeared on the record of 
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employment information SUNTRACS obtained from RET. This union member 
mentioned that the daily salary of U$II.55 paid to project workers was indeed 
slightly better than the legal minimum wage, but that workers complained of not 
being paid for overtime or for time spent traveling by foot to reach the isolated 
camps. Other problems that the SUNTRACS delegation detected were that social 
security and education deductions taken from workers paychecks were larger than 
the amount permitted by law, that camp food consisted mainly of plantains from 
one of the sub-contractor' s packaging operations, and finally that safety and first 
aid equipment was generally unavailable. 
1 may have eventually decided against using this information in this thesis 
were it not for the fact that 1 later received a personalletter denying these 
allegations from none other than Jaime Caballero, Sub secretary of SUNTRACS 
responsible, as it tums out, for the Chiriqul - Bocas deI Toro section - i.e. the 
union boss of the unnamed member whom 1 had interviewed in September (See 
Appendix III). It seems that Mr. Caballero had received a forwarded copy of the 
three page summary of my first phase research results that 1 shared with various 
actors whom 1 had interviewed between August and October of 2004 (See 
Appendix IV). Strangely enough though, Mr. Caballero received my document 
from the ab ove mentioned Cesar Romero, the Changuinola based associate of the 
Colombian hydro company and minority shareholder in Ridro Ecol6gico deI 
Teribe (RET S.A.). Although 1 did not meet Mr. Romero personally until the 
middle of December 2004, he had somehow obtained a copy of my phase one 
research results and wanted to set the record straight about sorne of the more 
cri tic al things that 1 had written in this report. 
During an eventual interview at Cesar Romero' s office in Changuinola - and 
in a subsequent email response that he sent me - Mr. Romero took particular issue 
with my comments conceming labor conditions in the work camps. Romero 
apparently requested that Mr. Caballero of SUNTRACS draft the above 
mentioned personally addressed letter that 1 received which formally disavows all 
the irregularities and violations of Panama' s labor standards that had been 
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reported to me by his fellow union member. Mf. Romero also complained about 
being the victim of an unjustified campaign to tarnish the good international 
reputation of Empresas Pliblicas de Medellin (EPM) - and therefore by 
association Ridro Ecolôgico deI Teribe (RET S.A.). Romero stressed the respect 
that RET has demonstrated in its relations with the Naso authorities, and gave 
various socio-economic justifications for why the Bonyic dam is a good project 
for everyone involved. For instance: the Naso are poor and the hydro project will 
give themjobs; an adequate resource management plan will foster the economic 
development necessary for them to maintain their cultural identity; other 
communities also have a right to cheap and reliable energy. 
Furthermore, what gives Mr. Romero's reply aIl the makings of a mini 
corporate manifesto is the fact that he copied his email response to no less than 25 
people! The support networks that Cesar Romero was apparently attempting to 
mobilize behind his particular interpretation of recent events included Panama's 
Minister of Government and Justice Olga Golcher, various officials at the 
Ministry of the Presidency, the Public defender, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the energy transmission company (Empresa de Transmisiôn Eléctrica S.A), 
various employees of EPM and RET, several Naso leaders and more (see 
Appendix V). Judging by these actions, Mr. Romero and Mf. Caballero clearly 
recognized and were attempting to influence the processes of opinion-forming and 
decision-making which, increasingly in the case of large infrastructure projects 
like the Bonyic dam, are deeply embedded in " ... complex and transnational 
settings characterized by shifting alliances"(Mosse 2005b: 18). At the close of 
2004, many similar attempts to legitimize the practices associated with the Bonyic 
dam were still required to produce a 'successful' project. 
4.8 "Teribe king dethroned" 81 
By the time the agreement on compensation and benefits was signed in 
December 2004, more than three months had passed since separate Naso 
81 Title of an article that appeared in the La Prensa newspaper on June 1 st, 2004 (Chery 2004). 
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delegations representing Tito and Valentin Santana had met with government 
officials in Changuinola to discuss new dates for N aso elections. The government 
had simply ignored the October 31 st proposal submitted by Valentin Santana's 
supporters, and Tito Santana appeared more determined then ever to prevent a 
vote for King from taking place. His opponents decided to take the somewhat 
uncharacteristic step of organizing a petition to demand that the Ministry of 
Government and Justice, to which the Bureau of Indigenous Affairs reports, 
honour its commitments to the Naso people and announce the date set for the 
agreed elections (see Appendix VI). The idea of gathering signatures on a petition 
may have been novel to the Naso as it did in fact originate as a suggestion that 1 
made, but the process that resulted in the collection of more than 500 signatures 
was likely as old as the Bocas hills. Critics of Tito Santana' s handling of the 
hydro project took copies of the petition back to their respective villages where 
they discussed Tito Santana' s handling of the hydro project with their families and 
neighbours. 1 was impressed by how quickly those who supported neither Tito nor 
Valentin in the leadership struggle recognized the non-partisan nature of the 
petition and agreed to sign on. "May the best man win!" was how one signatory 
put it. 
For whatever reasons, the government again chose to ignore Valentin 
Santana's supporters' calls for elections. This time, frustrated by the govemment's 
lack of response and impatient about progress being made on the Bonyic hydro 
project, Valentin Santana's supporters decided to take matters into their own 
hands. As of Jan 4th 2005 they occupied the Naso Palace in Sieyic making it 
known that Tito Santana was no longer we1come as King. As these events 
unfolded in the Naso region, 1 was back in Montreal preparing for my third and 
final phase of fieldwork. To my complete surprise on January 28th, 2005, the 
Panama City-based daily La Prensa published an article quoting the recently 
overthrown Naso king Tito Santana in which Santana personally accused me of 
financing the rebels that had seized control of power in the Naso region (see 
Appendix VIT: "King Tito Santana hopes to recover his throne" (Pimentel 2005). 
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There it was in black and white, my name (with a typo nonetheless) duly 
recognized as a Canadian doctoral student accused of financing a palace coup! 
Romantic hyperbole aside, 1 immediately became concemed for my personal 
safety. After all, there were sorne very significant economic interests aligned 
behind the Naso faction represented by the deposed King Tito Santana. 
Two days later on J anuary 30th, 2005 another article was printed in the same 
newspaper denying the by now ex-King Tito Santana's charges of violence and 
foreign intervention involved in rus expulsion (see "Confirmation that the people 
overthrew the teribe king". Redaccion de La Prensa 2005a). 1 followed this up by 
sen ding a letter to the editor of La Prensa clarifying the nature of my mission in 
the country. This letter was published a few days later under the heading of 
"Name correction and election of king Tito" (Paiement 2005).1 then tried to 
evaluate the significance of the se events with three Panamanians who were 
familiar with the Naso situation: 
1. Manolo Zarate, Sr. Environmental Consultant responsible for the 
Environmental Impact Assessment on the Bonyic hydroelectric dam planned 
for the N aso region. 
2. Professor Francisco Herrera, a historian at the Universidad Nacional de 
Panama who has done a lot of research in the area over the past 30+ years and 
continues to follow local events quite closely; and 
3. Osvaldo Jordan (also personally denounced by Tito Santana in La Prensa), a 
Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Florida and member of the Panamanian 
NGO Alianza para la Conservaciôn y el Desarrollo (ACD). ACD had 
previously made public its opposition to the Bonyic hydro project on 
ecological grounds, and Osvaldo had just retumed from the Naso region where 
he had met with the Nasos and various govemment officiaIs about the hydro 
project. 
These three individuals each reassured me that my personal safety would not 
likely be compromised as a result of these events. They based their assessments 
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upon the following criteria: as a legitimate student with an officially recognized 
research project registered with INAC (see Appendix VIII and IX), most people-
including Tito Santana himself, whom 1 personally provided with a one-page 
summary of my research objectives and my survey questionnaire - understood the 
nature and the value of my reasons for being in this region. These contacts agreed 
that Tito Santana' s attempt to lay the blame for his ouster at the feet of 
illegitimate foreign interests was the desperate act of a politician who knew his 
days in power were numbered. Finally, Panama is (thankfully!) no Guatemala or 
even Colombia for that matter where such accusations can never be taken lightly. 
While in the past the level of tension and animosity brought on by the conflict 
over the ex-king's support for the hydro project did result in anonymous 
threatening phone calls against the ex-king's most visible opponents, none of 
these threats were ever carried out. 
1 also tumed to my thesis committee advisors at Mc Gill for advice on these 
matters. They largely agreed with the assessments provided ab ove by my 
Panamanian colleagues, but went perhaps one step further in suggesting that 1 try 
to lay low for a while and wait until the situation cooled off before going back to 
the Naso region. In the words of my supervisor Laurel Bossen: 
"The 1/30 La Prensa article is not quite enough to reassure me, since it is 
simply the opposing side's version of events. If you are not there, your 
signifieance as a scapegoat will probably fade fairly quickly and other 
scapegoats will be sought before the election. You can follow the issues in the 
press and through emails with your contacts, and in the meantime, you can 
continue your work on material already in hand." 
Professor Bossen also reminded me of the importance of appearing neutral in 
these matters. She argued that such a stance was necessary in order to colle et 
reliable data from different sides, itself a precondition for the legitimacy of my 
own account. 1 attempted to maximize the objectivity of my analysis by sharing 
drafts with all my informants. A related issue in this respect has been my 
comparatively limited access within the ex-king's (Tito Santana) circle of 
supporters. Out of necessity, upon arrival in the Naso region 1 depended on the 
Naso ecotourism group ODES EN - among whose members happen to be several 
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of the Tito Santana' s principal political opponents - for boat rides into the region 
and contacts with interview participants. By virtue of this association, Tito 
Santana's supporters quite naturally viewed me with suspicion if not hostility, 
especially given that they had recently been criticized intemationally by a 
Panamanian ecological NGO for their support for the hydro project. 1 attempted to 
balance this likely factional predominance in my opinion sample by approaching 
key members of the ex-king's Council of Leaders with information about my 
research project, preliminary results, sample interview questions and a request to 
be formally introduced at a Council meeting. 1 also interviewed the company 
officials promoting the hydro project (ex: Julio Zuluaga and Marino Gomez of 
Empresas Public as de Medellfn (EPM) and Cesar Romero of Hidro Ecol6gico deI 
Teribe (HET), the ex-king's indigenous advisors (ex: Eligio Alverado of 
Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala) and various Panamanian govemment officials (ex: Jose 
Mosaquites of ANAM) who recommended that the Naso should support Tito 
Santana and the hydro project in spite of its many difficulties and drawbacks 
discussed earlier. 
By the time 1 retumed to the Naso region in March 2005,1 found that the 
rhetoric was still quite heated, but that the atmosphere was surprisingly calm. For 
example, a local radio station had stepped up its on-air attacks against the anti-
dam faction now in power in the Naso region. One local announcer by the name 
of Ramon Staff Morales even used his popular radio talk show on Caribe Stereo 
90.1 FM to suggest that the money 1 spent on travel to and from Canada could be 
better spent helping local people to buy essential goods, and that in any event 
" ... didn't Canada already have enough ofits own problems with hydro dams on 
indigenous land?" 
The relative calm that 1 witnessed at the beginning of 2005 was a pause as 
both factions in the Naso conflict attempted to adjust to the new balance of 
political strength. 1 happened to meet one of Tito Santana' s most vehement 
supporters in El Silencio one day while waiting for a boat to take me to Siekin. 
This impromptu meeting occurred just as the pro-hydro faction was retuming 
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from a meeting with RET officials in Changuinola. It seems that the hydro 
company had wanted to briefTito Santana's supporters about their plans for 
dealing with the Naso leadership crisis. The encounter went surprisingly weIl and 
was in fact quite cordial and factual. Generally the ex-kings supporters preferred 
to maintain more guarded and officious attitudes whereby they stuck c10sely to the 
script and towed the party line about the officially sanctioned structures of 
authority and legitimate procedures for electing local representatives and 
collective decision-making. This resident from the nearby village of Santa Rosa 
agreed that the accusations against me were exaggerated, and that both Naso 
leadership factions should continue to engage in constructive dialogue as the only 
viable solution to resolving the conflict. Thus he appeared to have adopted a more 
conciliatory attitude, much Iike that of the hydro company officiaIs whom Tito 
Santana's supporters were surely taking their cues from. 
After this highly publicised turn of events, Panama's government finally 
decided that it was time to act. Within days the office of indigenous affairs agreed 
to organize a new election to determine who should be the legitimate Naso 
traditional authority. After aIl, they said, wasn't an election exactly what the 
petitioners had wanted? The only problem was that now defacta king Valentin 
Santana' s supporters viewed the government's attempts to organize these elections 
as an affront to their customary rights and as part of a plan to restore the deposed 
Tito Santana. Valentin's supporters argued that the Naso people have their own 
internaI regulations for electing their kings (i.e. the Electoral Agreement signed 
between César and Tito Santana in 1998), and that the role of the national 
government in such matters should be to act as simple observers. 
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Figure 26: Valentin Santana (the man in the center of the picture holding a wooden 
spear to symbolize his authority as Naso King) seen here greeting supporters outside 
the Naso Palace on election day, April3rct , 2005. 
The govemment went ahead anyway and signed an elections agreement with 
Tito Santana, the only candidate who would appear on the ballot (see Appendix X 
and Figure 27). Together they then set about preparing a new list of eligible voters 
who would be authorized to vote in Ministry of Govemment and Justice 
sanctioned Naso election scheduled for April 3rd 2005. The electorallist was 
compiled by a Ministry official who went door to door accompanied by a member 
of Tito Santana's electoral committee. The opposition accused Tito Santana of 
pressuring people to sign the voter registration cards in order to be eligible to 
receive the ex-King's favours once the Bonyic hydro project eventually went 
ahead. With legal assistance from Hector Huertas of Panama City-based NGO 
CEALP, Valentin Santana filed an official complaint with Panama's Electoral 
Tribunal to have these elections stopped. However in Resolution No. 36-2005 -
ADM rendered March 30th 2005 the Tribunal's magistrates rejected the petition 
on the grounds that the April 3rd Naso election was not an official Electoral 
Tribunal organized event. The Tribunal had simply been asked to provide 
technical support to the legitimate organizers - i.e. the Ministry of Govemment 
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and Justice who were therefore responsible for the actual conduct of the exercise 
(Tribunal Electoral 2005). 
ACTA DE MESA 
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Figure 27: Official Naso election transcript from Sieyic poling station. April3fd, 
2005. A total of 63 valid votes were cast for the only candidate (Tito Santana). No 
incidents or additional observations were reported. Authenticity certified by the seal 
of the Electoral Tribunal. 
The voting went ahead as schedule on April 3
rd and without any major 
incidents. The official results, certified by the Electoral Tribunal, declared Tito 
Santana to be the winner with 378 votes of the overall 388 ballots cast (10 voters 
cast blank ballots). Tito Santana's supporters would have preferred a more 
resounding endorsement as in the previous election that brought Tito to power in 
1998, when a voter participation rate of 50% was required for the results to be 
considered valid. But not this time around. See Table 13 below for a regional 
breakdown ofvoting patterns. To almost no one's surprise voter support was 
strongest in the Naso settlements in and around the city of Changuinola. Equally 
predictable was the ex-King's poor showing in the San San, Druy, and La Tigra 
sectors where he managed only 10 votes. 
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Table 13: April 3, 2005 voting results certified by the Electoral Tribunal. 
No. Votes Total Nasa 
COMMUNITY Cast Population 
Santa Rosa 91 212 
Changuinola 74 500 
Sieyic 64 402 
Bonyic 36 236 
Sodi 35 88 
Guabito 34 500 
Siekin 23 366 
Solon 21 208 
Druy 7 411 
San San 3 125 
Tigra 0 82 
Loma Bandera 0 50 
TOTAL 388 3180 
Note: Total Naso population figures include persons less than 18 years of age 
who were ineligible to vote in this election. Population figures are based on the 
2002 household survey conducted by Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala. Naso 
communities of Kuikin and Y orkin did not have poling stations. 
For his part Tito Santana complained that many more of his supporters had 
attempted to vote only to have been prevented from doing so because their full 
names did not match those on the voter list or el se they were told that they could 
only vote in their home communities. Officials from Panama' s human rights 
watchdog (Defensorfa deI Pueblo) were also in Sieyic to observe the voting on 
April 3rd. Hermel Rodriguez of the Defensorfa said candidly that he did not 
believe that the election process organized by the Ministry of Govemment and 
Justice was the right way to resolve the Naso leadership crisis. However the 
Indian Affaires division of the Ministry persisted and declared Tito Santana to be 
the elected king of the N aso people. The following Sunday, April 1 i h was set to 
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be the day when Tito Santana would be formally reinstalled in the Palace at Sieyic 
(Redaccion de La Prensa 2005b). 
Boistered by the meagre tumout, Valentin Santana's supporters reiterated their 
complete rejection of what they characterized as a fundamentally flawed, arbitrary 
and illegal electoral process " ... that violated the human rights of the N aso people 
in order to benefit a foreign company." (Santana 2005). They also made it clear 
that they had no intensions of vacating the Palace so that Tito Santana might 
reclaim that which the govemment alone maintained was rightfully his. 
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Figure 28: Banner placed in front of the Palace of the Naso People to prote st the 
controversial April 3rd 2005 election of the Naso King. "With Valentin until the 
End ... We will put an end to oppression, corruption, discrimination and racism. We 
will never give up the struggle against the invasion of our lands, and against the 
assimilation that sanctions cultural and ecological genocide. United we stand for the 
legalization of the Naso Tjer Di territory." Note the military police entering the 
Palace with the M-16 rifle strung over his back. 
As the 17th of April drew nearer, Valentin's supporters gathered at the Palace 
in Sieyic to show their defiance against the govemment's plan to re-install Tito 
Santana as King (See Figure 28). A detachment of sorne 20 National Police 
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guards equipped with high calibre rifles and teargas grenades also appeared at the 
scene (See Figure 29 below). The police were under the command of Captain 
Ismael Arguello who was dispatched to Sieyic from his usual posting in the 
Darien region along Panama's lawless eastem border with Colombia. Captain 
Arguello explained that his orders from the Ministry of Govemment and Justice 
were to ensure respect for the law and to prevent any acts of violence from being 
committed. 
Figure 29: Sorne of the twenty odd Nation Police guards dispatched to Sieyic to 
rnaintain order during Tito Santana's governrnent sponsored reinstaternent as Naso 
King. April 17ili,2005. 
Valentfn's supporters were visibly intimidated by the police presence as many 
could still remember back to the 1980's during the dictatorship when police 
brutality was commonly used to silence political opponents. But times have 
changed in Panama and Captain Arguello is living proof (See Figure 30). The 
Captain sat down to talk with Valentin Santana' s supporters in order to learn more 
about the reasons behind the conflict between the uncle and his nephew. 
Valentin's supporters produced a series of documents that testified to the multiple 
organizational and legal actions they had taken since the conflict started over a 
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year ago in April 2004. The Captain was visibly impressed by the passion, 
eloquence and the patience of the N aso protesters, and he quickly made it known 
that he would not be the one to impose any solution on their leadership crisis. 
Captain Arguello laid that responsibility squarel y at the feet of the elected 
officials whom he publicly chastised for attempting to use the police to solve a 
political problem. 
Figure 30: National Police Captain Ismael Arguello (seated on left) listens as 
supporters of Valentin Santana explain the reasons for their protest. Sieyic, Bocas deI 
Toro. April 16th, 2005. 
Because of the Captain' s decision to remain neutral, the govemment officiaIs 
who had come to Sieyic to declare Tito Santana King of the Naso people had to 
perform their ceremony in the backyard of a local Council of Leaders member' s 
home - instead of at the Palace which Valentin Santana had declared a restricted 
area until such a time as an impartial mediation of the conflict could take place. 
Fortunately for most (myself included!) as the Captain Arguello observed in 
Panama "the times have changed" in the 15 years since the end of the military 
dictatorship. 
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4.9 Cracks appear in the Bonyic dam 
Word ofthese tensions reached the Inter American Development Bank (illB) 
whom the Colombian promoters of the Bonyic hydro project had approached for 
financing. The illB elected to send a team of independent consultants to the Naso 
region in order to advise them as to the best strategy to evaluate the social and 
environmental "Due Diligence" of the proposed project. Then, shortlyafter 
learning the results of the Naso election Hiroshi Toyoda, Manager of the Private 
Sector Department for the Inter American Development Bank in Panama sent a 
letter to Félix Sanchez - a Naso activist allied with Valentin Santana. The letter 
dated April 21 st 2005 reiterated IDB' s commitment to ensure that their evaluation 
of the merits of the Bonyic hydroelectric project be based on aIl relevant 
environmental, social, health and safety and labour aspects. Mr. Toyoda's letter 
specifically confirmed the following four points: 
1) illB had not yet reached a final decision as to whether or not it would 
participate in financing the Bonyic hydro project. 
2) illB would analyse the Environmental Impact Assessment and the 
recommendations of an independent social consultant they hired to evaluate 
specific social and environmental aspects of the Bonyic project before making 
their decision. 
3) illB considered the elections that took place on April 3rd of 2005 to have been 
"inclusive, transparent and consistent with the traditions of the Naso people." 
4) illB expected that the National Assembly would act quickly to legalize the 
Naso Comarca (Toyoda 2005). 
The N aso did not have to wait long before their hopes of seeing their Comarca 
approved were yet again dashed. During the month of May 2005 Law No.19 did 
in fact receive a second reading in the National Assembly, but it was promptly 
retumed to the Commission on Indigenous Affaires for further modifications. It 
has remained at the Commission stage ever since. Although the legislators' 
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decision clearly represents a setback for the Naso's historical aspirations to be 
recognized as a Comarca, RET was quick to specify that: 
"Although the creation of the comarca was initially believed to be necessary 
before considering or accepting the project, the community consultations 
process revealed that the project and the comarca were not incompatible 
themes." (Planeta Panama Consultores 2005: Anexo I-p.17). 
This perspective, however, clearly contradicts the results of the interviews 
conducted for the social assessment aspects of the Bonyic project' s EIA. For 
instance: "The viability of the Bonyic hydroelectric project cannot be analysed 
independently of the Naso people's struggles for demarcation of a Comarca." 
(Planeta Panama Consultores 2005: p. V -170). On page V -165 of the same EIA we 
can also read that: 
"Their principal need and demand is for approval of the Naso Tjër Di comarca 
... which would allow them to negotiate "between equals, as associates" with 
whichever extemal project cornes to the region." (My translation) (ibid 2005). 
Not surprisingly, RET does not specify what happened during the consultation 
process to account for this shift in priority accorded to the Comarca among the 
Naso. 
In his letter to Félix Sanchez, Mr. Toyoda (Private Sector, !DB) also 
mentioned that the Bank was especially concemed to evaluate whether the 
community consultation process sponsored by RET complied with !DB policies 
conceming access to information. Rere again we see similar contradictions 
between what RET reports and what the Environmental Impact Assessment 
concludes. For instance, in paragraph 8 of the annexed report quoted above, RET 
specifies that: 
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"The information and consultation process facilitated the participation of the 
communities, their representatives and various institutions active in the region, 
... the clear and truthful information presented helped to clarify doubts and 
expectations conceming the project and its impacts, and also to reach 
consensus about their management through measures based on knowledge of 
the social and environmental reality of the indigenous communities." (My 
emphasis and translation) (Planeta Panama Consultores 2005:Annex 1 :p.17) 
Meanwhile, the main report of the ElA cornes to the exact opposite conclusion! 
On page V -177 of the report we read that: 
"In conclusion, we can say without fear of being wrong, that until now the 
information available about the project has been insufficient and unclear. 
There are many distortions concerning the impacts the project will have on the 
environment and natural resources; the restrictions that the project will or will 
not imply; ways and means to protect Naso culture and traditions; the levels of 
participation in decision-making and other advantages that would accompany 
the proposed investments in social services and projects." (my emphasis and 
translation) (ibid:p. V -177). 
One could suggest that the reason for these diametrically opposed assessments 
of the quality and adequacy of the project-related information available to the 
Naso people is that the socioeconomic studies for the ElA were conducted at a 
time before the community consultations process was carried out by the 
Fundaci6n Dobbo Yala in July 2004. But this does not appear to be the case as 
page V -170 the ElA report actually mentions two attempts having been made to 
overthrow King Tito Santana. As reported earlier at least one of these attempts 
took place on May 30th 2004, so it is unlikely that a simple temporal sequence 
would account for the significance of this difference of opinion. 
It appears however that the se guarantees of transparency and accountability 
were not sufficient enough to convince the Inter-American Development Bank of 
the merits of funding the Bonyic project. For shortly after the Government of 
Panama approved the Bonyic project's Environmental Impact Assessment in June 
of 2005, the illB issued a letter citing concerns about the potentially negative 
social and environmental impacts of the project as reason for their decision not to 
provide the requested fun ding (Montgomery 2005). To quote Mr. Montgomery, 
Head of the Environmental and Social Unit within the Private Sector Department 
at illB: 
"We consider the environmental and social related issues presented in your 
letter important, in particular the potential impacts and political issues 
associated with the Naso indigenous group and potential environmental 
impacts especially related to the protected areas in the project area of 
influence." 
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Thus in another somewhat ironie twist to this fairly sordid tale of political 
intrigue and economic speculation the IDB's decision - coming as it does from a 
multilateral investment bank that does not exactly enjoy a reputation for being the 
most ardent defenders of the environment or indigenous rights - appears to justify 
the positions adopted by the dam's opponents. The IDB's decision to drop the 
project is also interesting because the promoters of the Bonyic hydroelectric 
project have a good international reputation, and they had tried very hard to 
present the Bonyic project as one of a new generation of small dams capable of 
adequately mitigating aIl significant negative social and environmental effects. 
But these 'cracks' in the Bonyic dam hardly spell the death of the project. 
Ridro Ecol6gico deI Teribe still has all the necessary concessions, licenses and 
permits to build and operate the project, and is presently looking to the private 
sector for potential investors. In the likely event that RET does obtain private 
funding for its dam building activities, it is unlikely to be subject to the same 
social and environmental criteria as those invoked by the Inter-American 
Development Bank as reason for pulling out of the project. It could also prove 
more difficult for the project' s opponents to negotiate with and obtain concessions 
from a private lender. For contrary to the multi-Iateral development banks whose 
board members represent the interests of their national governments and citizens, 
a private bank is legally accountable to produce profits for its shareholders. Even 
so, the factors responsible for the IDB's negative social and environmental 
evaluation of the Bonyic project mean that there remain significant risks and 
obstacles to the development and operation of a hydroelectric station in the Naso 
territory of Panama. 
By the end of 2006, not much had changed which could affect this rather 
negative outlook. Panama's officiaIs seem to have other bigger fish to fry than the 
Naso conflict: including multi-billion dollar plans to expand the country's aIl 
important inter-oceanic canal, and a new bill encouraging private real estate 
development in the already hot market for tourism and retirement homes that the 
islands of Bocas deI Toro have become. Furthermore, plans are underway to build 
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an electricaI transmission line that would allow neighboring Costa Rica to meet 
sorne of the electricity needs of Panama' s Bocas deI Toro province. Both Kings 
VaIentin Santana and his nephew Tito Santana continue to rule over their 
respective Naso followers. Nonetheless, Tito Santana is still being identified in 
the national press as N aso King. In September of 2006 he remained optimistic that 
the NationaI Assembly would approve the Naso comarca (Redaccion de La 
Prensa 2006). Until such a time, Panama's govemment officiaIs appear content to 
simply maintain their traditional, informaI and partial recognition of sorne Naso 
people. 
Figure 31: Naso King Valentin Santana (wearing a feather headdress and carrying a 
wooden spear) accompanies Panama's President Martin Torrijos (wearing a baseball 
cap) during a stopover in the community of Bonyic on October 2od, 2006. The 
President delivered emergency communications equipment, three portable generators, 
and more money for scholarships and sidewalks. Source: (Redacci6n 2006). 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Development is by its nature social. Its ends embody social values. Its 
means are social processes and institutions. Its benefits and costs are 
distributed across communities, social groups, and organizations. 
(Francis and Jacobs 1999:341) 
5.1 Summary of main findings 
Contemporary approaches to analyzing the relationships between indigenous 
peoples and the environment in Central America have emphasized the conscious 
choices made by people engaged in a series of cultural and political transactions 
shaped by changes in the legal and policy frameworks and by the surrounding 
ideological climate of the times. The anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil Batalla for 
example, has suggested that indigenous responses to increasing socio-economic 
development can best be seen as consisting of three interrelated processes: 
resistance, innovation, and appropriation (1990:206-209; cited in (Young and Bort 
1999). The environmental conflicts and cultural contradictions currently affecting 
the N aso people appear to confirm the constancy of these complex social 
dynamics. 
Naso resource management organizations and the socio-cultural institutions 
from which they derive their legitimacy and effectiveness have provided an 
excellent framework within which to observe the perpetuaI frictions and 
accommodations that these three interrelated processes imply. The divergent roles 
of Naso categories su ch as Regidores and the amorphous nature of their voting 
procedures for electing traditional authorities are reflections ofthe Naso's 
changing cultural uni verse on their formal organizations and informal institutions. 
These cultural categories and practices are inextricable elements within a 
repertoire of shared memories and values that allow the Naso people to 
continuously adapt their individual and collective survival to the constant 
evolution of their social and environmental contexts. 
But instead of recognizing and taking into account the extent of this dynarnic 
complexity and indeterminacy in Naso socio-economic and environmental 
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relations, the architects and administrators of local natural resource management 
policies and programs have preferred to imagine the recovery and projection of a 
mythical harmonious past into the future. Starting from the doubtful premise that 
the tradition al culture and institutions of the Naso indigenous people have 
historically ensured stable and sustainable relations between their society and the 
natural environment, current projects in this region have pledged their 
considerable support to strengthen the neo-traditional Naso monarchy. 
This is precisely the kind of contradictory prescription that 1 believe results 
from the inadequate understandings of culture deployed in service of the 
development projects currently underway in the N aso region. By depicting 
traditional indigenous culture as sorne form of quasi-mystical homeostasis instead 
of as a dynarnic repertoire of categories and practices created to adapt to changing 
social and ecological conditions, resource developers can ostensibly align their 
projects with the politically more palatable goals of cultural diversity and 
ecological conservation. The very 'vagueness' of this concept of culture is also 
perfectly suited to the needs of the project designers since it allows for 
considerable innovation in the interpretation and official sanctioning of tradition al 
customs and practices. 
The fact that a national govemment would be complicit with a foreign 
company that seeks to develop natural resources located on indigenous lands 
against the popular will of a majority of the local indigenous population is not an 
especially novel or astonishing conclusion. However, the importance of my 
account lies in having made explicit how particularly significant interpretations of 
the Comarca and Bonyic projects' activities were established, promoted and 
defended through the social and professionallives of known actors in specifie 
organizations. My detailed account of the interplay between the ideas and 
relationships particular to the Naso case reveals how such alliances and strategies 
are generated, maintained and concealed in the complex social and conceptual 
processes legitimized through ongoing development projects in this region. 
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This analytical approach reveals important compatibilities and contradictions 
between economic development, nature conservation, legislative reforms and 
issues like social justice, indigenous territorial rights, and representations of 
identity, community and culture. For example, my findings suggest that prominent 
interpretations of the functions and capacities of the traditional indigenous 
resource management institutions discussed above may be fundamentally 
misguided. Naso institutions and the practices that maintain them are generally 
more responsive to changes in regional socio-economic and environmental 
circumstances than to any particular set of formal rules and regulations. Practices 
such as the use of fire to c1ear brush from fields and the power of traditional 
authorities to control the migration and employment opportunities of their people 
that were once deemed culturally appropriate have fallen out of favour un der 
current demographic, environmental and social conditions. 
And yet 1 have also attempted to show that it is often too simplistic to ascribe 
the erosion of traditional resource management institutions to commercial and/or 
demographic pressures alone. This analysis of Naso resource management 
institutions and practices suggests that the causes of the socio-economic and 
cultural diversity that characterize the Naso region today should be understood as 
the products of complex interactions between community-Ievel forces acting 
'from below' and national and increasingly international structures acting 'from 
above'. Among the later 1 highlighted the impacts of state policies and legislation 
regulating property rights and access to protected areas, and the transparency and 
accountability of the decision-making processes available to change 
discriminatory laws and policies. 
Traditional indigenous cultural institutions are not the magic solution to 
conservation and development problems that project designers and their 
supporters would so often like us to think they are. And yet these institutions can 
make significant contributions to enhancing the viability of local sustainable 
livelihoods, particularly when approached within broader strategies for 
overcoming the many serious social, economic and environmental constraints 
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with which they are faced. This recognition has found sorne expression in the 
proposed Naso comarca legislation, for example by increasing the local autonomy 
of local authorities and recognizing Naso rights to their territorial resources. But 
because of the many conceptual and jurisdictional contradictions and ambiguities 
contained in these measures, the same legislation has actually been used to 
undermine these very same objectives. 
The concepts of tradition al institutions and cultural land use practices -
similar to those of rights and collective identity - are not natural, unchanging and 
universally accepted; but rather the y are culturally constructed, historically 
shifting ideas, practices and normative visions set in varied and dynamic contexts. 
My account has portrayed these ideas as contemporary expressions of geopolitical 
tensions and ongoing controversies over land, resources, governance, and ethnic 
and cultural identities in XXI century Panama. The evidence considered in the 
Naso case therefore suggests that partnerships between states, companies and 
indigenous peoples based solely on the recognition of rights are likely to falter. 
The key conclusion of this thesis is thus that instead of focusing exclusively on 
rights and obligations, all the actors involved should attempt to foster 
opportunities for more collaborative relationships based on mutual respect and 
dedication to shared objectives. This conclusion also highlights the urgent need to 
begin to look for new opportunities for designing and implementing more creative 
and equitable solutions to the kinds of social and environmental problems 
currently affecting the Naso region. The kinds of opportunities presented in the 
Naso comarca legislation and in negotiations over construction of the Bonyic 
hydroelectric dam which have so far generated mostly bitterness and 
disappointment on all sides. 
It has not been the objective of this thesis to advocate either in favour or 
against the Bonyic hydroelectric project on Naso territory. To do so honestly 
would require a more adequate consideration of the project' s contributions to 
Panama' s increasing demand for electrical energy, and the viability of the various 
alternative solutions to meeting that demand (conservation, wind, solar, improved 
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efficiency, etc.). My only professional commitment in these matters has been to 
assess whether or not the resource conservation and development projects 
affecting the Naso region were being designed and implemented in a manner 
consistent with the highest international standards and principles that 1 believe the 
case deserves. 1 am referring to principles such as those articulated by the World 
Commission on Dams report which - even though they are now widely accepted 
among governments, international agencies, NGOs and the private sector - were 
not generally honoured in the Bonyic case. 
1 described how changes incorporated to the legislation proposing to recognize 
Naso land rights and juri sdiction in the form of a comarca (i.e. Proyecto de Ley 
No. 19 de 2005) suggest a clear collusion between the Government of Panama, 
the utility company promoting the hydro project and the Naso leader supported by 
the faction of his people favourable to the project. This constitutes a clear 
violation of legitimate participatory decision-making processes. 1 also described 
sorne of the problems resulting from the way the benefits and costs of the Bonyic 
project are being shared, for ex ample the inadequacy of the compensation 
agreement. If Hidro Ecologico deI Teribe (HET S.A.) ever does eventually 
succeed in building its hydropower project on the Bonyic river, these detrimental 
outcomes leave very little hope that an adequate solution to the social and 
environmental conflicts affecting the Naso region will ultimately be achieved. 
This state of affairs is particularly unfortunate given that the Bonyic project 
actually presented a number of win-win scenarios for the Naso people, the 
province of Bocas deI Toro and the developer. The Naso quite desperateIy need 
the jobs, infrastructure and public service investments, and institutional capacity 
building opportunities that the project presented. And the rapidly expanding urban 
areas of the province quite desperately need reliable and affordable alternatives to 
imported diesel to meet their energy demands. But by the end of 2006, these 
benefits seemed less likely to materialize than they had only three years earlier. 
This state of affairs leads me to the conclusion that they were forfeited because 
the social impacts associated with the proposed resource management changes 
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were not adequately managed. By social impacts 1 essentially mean the conflicts 
the project provoked among the N aso. These events exposed all parties involved 
to an unnecessarily high level of risk (reputation, financial, political and security). 
A more sustained commitment on behalf of the promoter to ensure equitable 
benefits for the affected communities would likely have significantly reduced 
these risks. This evaluation highlights the fact that sorne of the tensions and 
contradictions between the means and the ends of development projects may be 
fundamentally irreconcilable. Tradeoffs appear unavoidable, making the 
institutional arrangements that shape the incentives and constraints facing 
resource users a crucial sphere for policy and project innovation. 
S.2 Suggestions for further research 
The way ahead will require forging a greater consensus over the criteria 
required ta adequately identify and assess the potential social impacts of natural 
resource development and conservation policies and projects~ For example: what 
constitute adequate policies, guidelines and criteria for addressing the distribution 
of project costs and benefits? The importance of this need for greater consensus 
was demonstrated most forcefully in the Naso case when community leadership 
conflicts were allowed to escalate to the point where the risk of violence continues 
to threaten the viability of the Bonyic hydropower project. Lingering resentment 
and uncertainty on all sides is also believed to be responsible for the govemment' s 
recent unwillingness to approve the Naso comarca legislation. 
One way to get beyond such unsatisfactory outcomes would be to look at the 
different ways these projects describe the nature, sc ale and magnitude of their 
impacts on poor people in particular, and to evaluate the extent to which 
appropriate mitigating measures and levels of compensation are implemented if 
negative outcomes were expected. One potentially promising option in this 
respect would be to adjust Michael Cemea's 'Impoverishment Risks' model as a 
tool for the stakeholder analysis component of the framework for evaluating the 
likelihood of reaching an agreement on benefit-sharing. This model based on eight 
common components of risk associated with development projects (landlessness, 
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joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, illness and disease, 
loss of access to common property resources and services, and loss of social 
capital or community dis articulation) would be a good starting point from which 
to develop indicators for attempting to measure the social impacts that a 
hydropower project or its alternatives could have (Cernea 2000). 
Secondly, more attention should be devoted to identifying the factors that help 
to ensure that appropriate measures to mitigate the adverse impacts of 
development projects are effectively implemented. For example, how weIl do 
CUITent legal and institutional frameworks protect the land and water rights of 
affected people, and how do they ensure effective compliance? In the Naso case, 
environmental and forestry legislation created to regulate access to strategic 
resources of national and international importance for biodiversity conservation 
and energy production are clearly incompatible with a strong interpretation of 
indigenous territorial rights over those same resources. How then can we help to 
ensure that the people affected by such resource conservation and development 
projects receive appropriate information and adequate opportunities to express 
their concerns about these projects? And how should we evaluate if negotiations 
over compensation and benefits packages were suitably transparent, inclusive and 
consistent with the needs and priorities of particular groups of social actors? 
The Environmental Impact Assessment report for the Bonyic hydropower 
project was quite explicit about the prevailing level of uncertainty among the 
Naso over the dam's potential impacts. But not only were key messages about the 
project's design and impacts largely missed, the project's promoters also made 
little effort to build trust, facilitate a dialogue among all stakeholders, or to assess 
the distribution of the costs and benefits associated with the project. One 
suggestion that could help to promote more inclusive and informed decision-
making would be to undertake a comparative study of the legislative and 
regulatory frameworks for designing, negotiating and implementing appropriate 
benefit-sharing mechanisms with the people and communities affected by 
hydropower projects. Such a series of good practice examples of how guidelines 
174 
on bene fit sharing have been adapted by specifie development projects would help 
donors, clients and stakeholders to identify and assess more equitable solutions to 
problems with the distribution of the costs and benefits associated with large 
infrastructure projects. A review of these guidelines would also be consistent with 
a main objective of the second phase of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) Dams and Development Project (2005-2007), namely, the 
production of practical non-prescriptive tools to help decision-makers. These 
results could also help to clarify the integrated and multidisciplinary nature of the 
approaches required to take full advantage of the addition al opportunities for 
poverty reduction that infrastructure investments present. 
A final recommendation that requires more serious and creative consideration 
is the issue of the compatibility of traditional and scientific knowledge. For 
instance, how can we design programs that will foster the social and individual 
capacities required to achieve a more coordinated management of the cultural and 
biological diversity that can still be found in places like the Naso region that are 
so rapidly being integrated into the national and global development mainstream. 
Decentralized institutional arrangements for sharing resource management 
responsibilities between indigenous peoples and the various levels of govemment 
(i.e. co-management agreements) are relatively recent phenomena in most of 
Panama. Better understandings, on all sides, of the historic context of competing 
perceptions and claims over resources could help to reduce social conflicts by 
increasing the influence and thus compliance of local users with the management 
rules affecting the resources upon which they depend (Spaeder 2005a:166). These 
would be just three essential elements towards a more equitable reconciliation of 
the rights and priorities of the different groups of people interested in the 
sustainable production of energy and the living conditions of those most affected 
by its production. 
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Appendix 1: Naso household survey questionnaire. 
Derechos Indfgenas y Manejo de Recursos Naturales en el Distrito de 
Changuinola, Panama. 
Hola, mi nombre es Jason Paiement y estoy haciendo un estudio sobre el manejo 
de recursos naturales en el distrito de Changuinola, Bocas deI Toro. Se trata de un 
proyecto para recibir el grade de doctorado en antropologfa en la Universidad 
McGill de Canada. 
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Numero de entrevista: 
• Fecha: Hora: Lugar: 
• Personas presentes: 
Identificacion deI hogar 
• Nombre deI jefe y comunidad de residencia: 
• Tipo de hogar (ex: familia nuclear, monoparental, viuda, etc): 
Hijos y demas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
miembros 
Relaci6n de 
parienta 
Sexo 
Edad 
Estado civil * 
Grado escolar 
Ocupaci6n 
principal ** 
Ocupaci6n 
secundaria *** 
* 1= soltero, 2 = casado, 3 = divorciado, 4= separado, 5 = viuda, 6 = segundo matrimonio 
** 1= Agricultura, 2= Empleado publico, 3= Empleado privado, 4 = Vendedor ambulante, 5= 
Tienda, 6 = Artesano, especifica 
*** 7= Maderero, 8= Albanil, 9= Carpintero, 10= Pe6n, 11= Turismo, 12= Confecci6n y 
reparaci6n de botes, 13= Transporte, 14= Techo de Palma, otro (especifica) 
Equipo y herramientas (ana adquirida) 
• Caracterfsticas de la vivienda: Piso: _____ Techo: _____ _ 
Paredes: _____ _ 
Radio Estufa Refrigeradora Maquina Motor Bote Rifle Motosierra 
gas de coser flb 
• Otros para: Agricultura - Artesania - Carpinterfa - Mecânica - Pesca. 
Origen socioeconomico 
• Usted naci6 aqui en esa comunidad? 
• Por que viniste tu 0 tus padres a ese lugar? 
• Como cuantos anos tienes de vivir aqui? 
• Que idioma usan para comunicarse entre ustedes mismos: Espafiol- Naso 
- Otro (especifica). 
• Participes 0 en alglin momento has participado usted 0 algun miembro de 
su hogar en alguna organizaci6n formaI 0 asociaci6n voluntario? (ex: 
Consejo de dirigentes Junta local, Padres de familia, iglesia, etc.) 
Percepcion de seguridad de acceso a la tierra 
• Cuantos de sus hijos tienen sus propias parcelas yen donde las tienen? 
• Como adquieran sus parcelas? (herencia, matrimonio, compra, donaci6n, etc.) 
• Cuantos hermanos tienes? (varones) 
• Cuantos de sus hermanos tienen sus propias parcelas y en donde las 
tienen? 
• Como adquieran sus parcelas? (herencia, matrimonio, compra, donaci6n, 
etc.) 
• Cuantas hermanas tienes? 
• Cuantas de sus hermanas tienen sus propias parcelas y en donde las 
tienen? 
• Como adquieran sus parcelas? (herencia, matrimonio, compra, donaci6n, etc.) 
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Caracteristicas de las parcelas dei hogar 
Numero de la parcela 1 2 3 4 
Distancia deI hogar 
Colindantes 
Tamafio (Ha.) 
Grado de pendiente (1 = 
plano,2 = suave,3 = muy 
inclinado) 
Tipo de suelo (1 = arenoso,2 
= arena-arcilla,3 = 
arcilla,4= rocosa,5 = otra) 
Fertilidad deI suelo (1= baja, 
2= moderada,3= buena,4= 
muy buena) 
Manera en que fue adquirido 
(1 = Herencia,2= Compra, 3= 
Posesi6n, etc.) 
Ano en que fue adquirido 
Uso(s) de la parcela a la hora 
que fue adquirido 
Uso(s) actual de la parcela 
Tenencia de la tierra 
(1 = No, 2= Si con notificaci6n y permiso, 3= Si solo con notificaci6n, 4= Si sin notificaci6n 
o permiso) 
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Tenencia de la tierra (derecho 
colectivo, titulo privado, tierras 
nacionales, otro) 
Derecho para vender la parcela 
Derecho para designar la herencia 
de la parcela 
Derecho para regalar la parcela a 
otro 
Derecho para alquilar la parcela 
Derecho para sembrar y cortar 
ârboles maderables 
Derecho para sembrar y cosechar 
productos anuales (malZ, arroz, 
etc.) 
Derecho para sembrar y cosechar 
productos pernéales (cacao, 
frutales, etc.) 
Derecho para pastorear ganado 
• Notas sobre estado de parcelas y tenencia de la tierra. 
Mercado de tierras 
• Has usted 0 algûn miembro de su hogar comprado 0 vendido alguna 
parcela? 
Vendedor Comprador Parcela Tamano Certificado 0 
entera? registrado? 
Division de parcelas 
Ano 
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• Han di vi di do sus parcelas en los 6ltimos 15 anos? 
• En cuantas parcelas fueron divididas? 
• De que tamafio quedaron las parcelas divididas? 
Conflictos territoriales 
• Alguna vez tuviste disputas 0 conflictos sobre una de sus parcelas? (cuando, 
con quien, etc.) 
• Cual fue el resultado? (ex: perdida de derechos, modificaci6n de los limites, 
ganancia de derechos, aun no resolvi6). 
Productividad de la tierra 
Uso de la Arroz Maiz Frijol Qtro Rastrojo Bosque 
tierra cultivos* primaria 
Hectâreas 
* 1= Naranja, 2= Cacao, 3= Platano, 4= Yuca, 5= Nampi, 6= Name, 7= Pifa, 8= Uyama, 9= 
Aji, 10= Pifia, 11= Banano. 
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• Desde que tu adquiriste sus parcelas ha aumentado 0 disrninuido la 
producci6n? 
• Razones posibles por estos cambios? 
Tipo de mejoras 
Numero de la parcela 1 2 3 
Trincheras para drenaje ° terrazas 
Cercas ° otras plantas de linderos 
4 
Siembra de ârboles / agro-
foresteria 
Otras (ex: bodegas, etc.) 
Insumos agricolas 
• Alguna vez has faltado de mana de obra para realizar sus labores 
agrfcolas? 
• Puedes conseguir ayuda adicional cuando 10 necesitas? (ex: familia, vecinos, 
asalariado, etc.) 
Donde Abonos Fertilizantes Pesticidas Herbicidas 
consigues las 
sernillas que 
usas? 
• U sted 0 algûn miembro de su hogar ha beneficiado de algun proyecto 
productivo en los ultimos 5 anos? 
Ano Proyecto Promotor Poblaci6n Tipo de Contraparte 
elegible beneficio 
• U sted 0 algun rniembro de su hogar ha tenido algun crédito de alguna 
fuente en los ultimos 5 anos? 
Ano Uso Cantidad / Tiempo para 
Calidad pagar Tipo de 
collateral 
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Venta de productos agrarios (cielo 2003 - 2004) 
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Producto* Cantidad Precio Comprador 
- -1= NaranJa, 2= Cacao, 3= Plâtano, 4= Yuca, 5= NampI, 6= Name, 7= PIfa, 8= Uyama, 9= AJl, 
10= Pifia, 11= Banano, 12= Aguacate, 13= Mango ... 
Cria de animales 
Especia Cantidad Cantidad Mayor Ano que Adquirido 
presente propla cantidad fue (campra, 
posefdo herencia, 
reproducciôn) 
Venta de productos animales (cielo 2003 - 2004) 
Producto Cantidad Precio Comprador 
Venta de madera (cielo 2003 - 2004) 
Producto* Cantidad Precio Comprador 
• 1= Laurel, 2= Cedro, 3= Bateo, 4= Mayo, 5= Criollo, OtTO. 
Recursos colectivos y de subsistencia 
Recuso Uso Cantidad Precio Comprador 
(2004) 
Caserfa 
Pesca 
Madera (casa, 
botes, artesan{a) 
Lena 
Palmas para techo 
Plantas 
medicinales 
Muchas gracias por sus participaci6n. No se si a usted se le ocurri6 algo mas que 
podrfamos discutir sobre el tema 0 que talvez quisieras que guardo tu informaci6n 
en privado por ejemplo usando un nombre falso para identificarte. Si __ 0 
No __ 
Interviewer's comments on interview: Ce.g. conditions, interruptions, other people 
present who might inhibit or influence opinions. 
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Appendix II: Bonyic Hydroelectric Project Abstract. 
PROJECT ABSTRACT 
This Abstract was last updated on September 30, 2004. 
Project Number: PN-0155 
Project Name: Bonyic Hydroelectric Project 
Country: Panamâ 
Sponsors: Empresas Publicas de Medellfn 
Administradora Serviagro 
Consultores Asociados de Ingenieria, S.A. 
MacEnergy Limited 
Total Project Cost: US$50.0 million 
IDB Participation: IDB A-Loan: US$15.0 million 
IDB B-Loan: US$20.0 million (if applicable) 
Department: Private Sector Department 
Status: Due Diligence 
Project Description 
The project consists of the design, development, construction, operation and 
maintenance of a 30 megawatt ("MW") run-of-the-river hydroelectric power plant 
and a small regulating day reservoir along with transmission facilities, including 
an Il kilometre, 115 kilovolt transmission line and associated substation, to 
interconnect with the national grid (the "Project"). The Project is located on the 
Quebrada Bonyic located in northwestern Panama in the Province of Bocas deI 
Toro. Power will be transmitted via the Project' s transmission line to the city of 
Changuinola and will terminate at a new substation constructed for the Caldera-
Changuinola transmission line that is to be built by the Government of Panama 
("GPN"), which will be the delivery point for the Project's power. 
The Project is being developed by Hidroecol6gica deI Teribe S.A, ("HET") a 
special purpose company owned by Empresas Publicas de Medellin of Colombia, 
Administradora Serviagro and Consultores Asociados de Ingenieria, S.A. of 
Panama and MacEnergy (Cayman) Limited. HET was granted a concession (the 
"Concession") to generate hydroelectric power up to a capacity of 30MW 
for a period of fifty years by the Ente Regulador de los Servicios Public os 
("ERSP") (Resolution N°JD-1497) on August 12, 1999. Water usage rights to 
utilize water from the Rio Bonyic for fifty years for hydroelectric generation has 
also been granted by the ERSP. The Contraloria of Panama approved the 
Concession on June 22, 2001. Total project costs are estimated at US$50.0 million 
and a financial plan comprising US$15 million of equity and US$35 million of 
debt, corresponding to a debt-to-equity ratio of 70/30, has been proposed. Senior 
debt financing from the Bank through an A/B loan structure is being contemplated 
including a US$15 million A-loan and a US$20 million B-loan. 
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Project Benefits 
The Project will have a positive developmental impact particularly in the Province 
of Bocas deI Toro, which is among the poorest regions of the country. The Project 
will generate electricity with more effective generation costs than those prevailing 
in the existing isolated system, which consists of out-dated, expensive, more 
environmentally sensitive diesel generation. In addition, the Project will provide a 
reliable source of electricity in the region. Vpon interconnection with the national 
grid, due to its economic viability (dispatch), the Project should contribute to 
lower energy prices in general while being dispatched. 
IDB Participation 
Consistent with Bank objectives in Panama, the Project will contribute to the 
achievement of objectives set forth in the Panama Country Paper with respect to 
increasing private sector investment, achieving environmentally sustainable 
growth, and making the provision of services, in this case electricity, more 
efficient. In addition, the Project is consistent with the objective of the promotion 
of foreign investment and private sector participation in infrastructure projects. 
The Project is also aligned with the Bank's fostering of sustainable and renewable 
sources of energy as specified in the Energy Sector Strategy as the Project is 
small-scale and utilizes a renewable energy source. 
In Panama, renewable energy has been supported by the GPN. Bank participation 
in the Project is consistent with the priorities of the Panamanian Government and 
furthers support for renewable energy projects. 
201 
Appendix III: Letter from SUNTRACS representative Jaime Caballero. 
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SINDICATO UNICO NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA DE LA 
,.,,:', CONSTRUCCION y SIMILARES (SUNTRACS) 
Por la senda de Victoriano: Trabajadores y Campesinos al Poder 
Telefax: 274-07'27 P8gina Web: www.suntraa.org 
Teléfono: 267-0006 Nuevo Veranillo, Calle L Final, Casa L1843 
Correo Electr6nieo:suntracs@hotmaiLeom 
Chanquinola, 17 de Diciembre de 2004 
Senor: 
JasOn Jacques Paiement 
Antrop6logo 
Sr. Paiement: 
Por medio de la presente le manifestamos nuestra molestia por las declaraciones emitidas por su persona 
toda vez que hernos tenido acceso a un estudio supuestamente rea1izado por su persona en el cual menciona 
a nuestra organizaci6n y aun representante nuestro con aseveraciones que son totaImente falsas. 
En el punto #5 de dicho estudio menciona usted que nuestra organizaci6n, el Sindicato Ûnico Nacional de 
Trabajadores de la Construcci6n y Similares, SUNTRACS, realiz6 una inspecci6n al proyecto Bonyic y que 
en dicha inspecci6n entrevistamos a 23 de 93 trabajadores y que detectamos serias anomalias y violaciones 
a las nonnas de trabajo. 
1. Primeramente debo decirle que nuestra organizaci6n siempre se ha caracterizado por respetar el 
derecho dei pueblo Naso a decidir si dicho proyecto se construye 0 no, ya que esta es una decisi6n 
exclusiva de dicha etnia. 
2. Ante la posibilidad de que pudiera desarrollarse dicho proyecto, es nuestra obligaci6n constatar que 
se cumplan las leyes minimas en el aspecto laboral y ademâs dar a los trabajadores la posibilidad de 
que se rijan por la convenci6n colectiva CAP AC-SUNTRACS. 
3. Dicha visita a los campamentos de Rancho Quemado y de MichiIa la realizamos los dias 1 y 2 de 
septiernbre y no en Agosto como usted afirma. 
4. En dicha inspecci6n pudimos determinar que se cumplian las condiciones minimas establecidas por 
la ley en materia laboral en nuestro pals. Se pagaba Seguro Social, se proporcionaban contratos de 
trabajo, el equipo de seguridad estaba en orden y las condiciones en general eran 6ptimas. 
SUNTRACS, UNO GRANDE, CLASISTA, COMBATIVO y REVOLUCIONARIO 
Appendix IV: Summary ofresearch phase one (August 14th - October 1 st. 2004). 
Ll:~'~m Jacques Paiement Universidad McGill 
Resumen de la primera fase deI estudio (14 de agosto aIl de octubre) 
Objetivos especificos 
La primera de las Ires fases <iel estudio tuvo tres objetivos especificos: 
1. Identificar y contactar a las personas que aceptarian de participar con mi cstudio. 
2. Preguntar a los interesados que me cuentan sobre sus experiencias y opiniones con respecto a los siguintes Ires temas: 
la Comarca Naso Tjër Di, 
el proyecto Hidro Ecologica dei Teribe (HET S.A.) .sobre el rio Bonyic, 
varios proyectos productivos tales como de agroforesteria, artesanîas, piscicultura, etc. que han sido promovidos en el area por el estado, la comunidad internacional y por organizaciones no-gubemamentales. 
3. Investigar la disponibilidad de otrns fuentes de informaci6n sobre los Ires temas mencionados en el punta No. 2. 
Metas alcanzadas 
Durante las aproximadamente siete semanas que permanecî en Panama. hice cinco visita~ de cuatm a siete d.i.as cada uno por el area Naso. Medianl. eso pude entrevistarme con aproximadamente cincuenta personas quienes viven por su mayor parte en las siguiente comunidades: Sadi, Banyic, Solon, Siekin. Sieyic, San San. San San Druy, La TigT'd y Loma Bandera. E~tas visitas fueran coordinadas con la dirigencia de la ong Naso ODESEJ\, por molivo deI cual pagué un total de $325.00, sumo que se cobro para gaslos directos de transporte cn bote y tcrrestre, cuarra noches y comidas en el centro eco turistico de Wekso, y servicios de guias quienes me acompafiaron dUl'3nte las entrevistas. Mis gastos adicionales para el alojamiento y la comida en las comunidades los pague $7.00 par d,a J;~ectamente al.iefe 0 jefa de la casa donde me quedaba. Ademâs,logre entrevistar a varios representantes y profesionales de entidades estatales, de los medios de comunicaci6n y de la sociedad civil basadas en las area, de Changuinola, Guabito y en la ciudad de Panama y quienes han trabajado en la region Naso. Estas entrevistas facilitaron mi acce50 a la infornlacion adicional sobre los tres temas que me interesan y asi contribuyeron a la exitosa realizaci6n de mi tercer objetivo especîfico. 
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Con respecto a mi seglmdo objetivo puedo hacer las siguientes observaciones: 
J. El asonto de la Comarca sigue siendo de grau importancia para el pueblo Naso. La mayor parte de la gente con quien pude hablar la describan como mas que un anhelo hist6rico, ya que 10 vean tarnbién como on derecho colectivo a un reconocimienlo nacional que puede garantizar la seguridad de sus tierras y asi asegurar la 
continuidad de su lengua, cultura y modo de vivir. 
2. Desde el punto de vista de los no-Nasos,la aprobaci6n de una ley por la cual se quiere crear la Comarca Naso Tjër Di solicita opiniones contradictorias. Por ejemplo, algunos ban sugerido que la asamblea legislativa quiere 
aprobar la ley 50 de la Comarca para otorgar un valor juridico a las instituciones y autoridades tradiciones y asi legitimizar su derecho de tomar decisiones en nombre de todo el pueblo Naso. Otros crean sencillamente que todos los panameilos deberian de tener los mismos derechos. 
3. En cuanto al proyecto hidroeléctrico sobre el rio Bonyic, los Nasos son mas divididos. Talvez es por la falta de transparencia en la toma de decisiones con respecto a las negociaciones con la empresa HET que no hay consenso sobre el tema. Aun mas se puede decir que la manera controversial por la cual se ha venido administrando los 
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primeros fases dei proyecto ha contribuido a agravar la crisis de legitimidad de las autoridades tradicionales y hasta poner en peligro la seguridad de algunos de los implicados. 
4. Hay un grupo, Iiderado por el actual Rey Tito Santana y sus seguidores dentro dei Consejo de Dirigentes, que promueve el proyecto. Entre los integrantes de este grupo, talvez no alcanza la mayoria de los que viven propiamente en las once comunidades que confonnaran la futura Comarca. En ese grupo se encuentran también la mayoda de las familias que estan recibiendo un ingreso directo de la empresa HET. 
5. Un representante dei sindicato de trabajadores de la construcci6n (SUNTRACS) hizo una inspecci6n de las condiciones de trabajo en el campamento situado en la media cuenca dei rio Bonyic en agosto dei 2004. El 
representante dice haber entrevistado a 23 de los 93 trabajadores cuyos nombres aparecieron en la lista dei persona!. Asi fue que el pudo constatar una seria de anomalias y violaciones de las normas de trabajo. 
6. La principal oposici6n al proyecto esta constituida por una facci6n bastanle numerosa quienes se que jan mas por la forma en que el proyecto ha sido administrado por sus Iideres que como resultado de un rechazo de antemano de cualquier desarrollo hidroeléctrico en su area. Sin embargo, a menudo que la crisis interna de legitimidad no se resuelve de manera justo y legal, la situacion actual esta sirviendo a radicalizar las posiciones de la oposicion al proyecto. A raiz de este problema se fonno - con la apreciable mediacion de las autoridades nacionales y de la policia - un consenso arnplio sobre la necesidad de elecciones para ubicar ellegitimo representanle dei poder institucional entre los Nasos. 
7. La importancia de estas elecciones se ubica en parte por que el ganador sera autorizado para participar en las negociaciones que ya estan marchando con la intermediacion de Dobbo Yala, entre el Rey Tito Santana y empresa privada para la firma de acuerdos sobre compensacion, indernnizaci6n, beneficios, monitoreo y seguimiento de 10 acordado. 
8. Por fin, existe un tercer grupo de tamailo impreciso quienes ni apoyan ni rechazan el proyecto hidroeléctrico. Los miembros de este grupo dicen no contar con la infonnacion adecuada para decidir si 0 no al proyecto. Talvez hay aqui algunos que aunque si tienen bastante conocimiento de las oportunidades y amenazas que representan el proyecto, solo dificilmente llegan a evaluar su futuro y el de sus hijos con 0 sin la represa. Si nos acordamos de todos los cambios socio-tecnoI6gicos, ambientales, culturales, politicos y incluso demogrâficos que ocasiono la construccion de un canal interoceànico en Panama,podemos imaginar algunos de los efectos - si bien a escala mucho·mas reducida - dei proyecto hidroeléctrico sobre el rio Bonyic .• 
9. Sobre proyectos productivos el panorama esta mas difuso con ciertos avances prometedores y otros fracasos delusorios. Quizâs fue por la importancia excepcional en la actualidad acordada a los temas de la comarca y la hidroeléctrica que no logre aprender mas que una pequeiia parte de las exreriencias y opiniones de los Nasos y los promotores de este clase de proyectos (ex: agroforesteria, piscicultura, plantas medicinales, âreas protegidas, artesanias, ecoturismo, etc.) 
10. Cuando me refiero a proyectos exitosos, vale mencionar el proyecto eco turistico de ODESEN en Wekso. El proyecto - patrocinado por la ong ambientalista Conservation International (CI) - ha permitido que un grupo de j6venes Nasos reciben la capacitaci6n y las herramientas necesarias para operar un negocio econ6micamente viable y que les pennite aprovechar sus talentos y conocimientos variados sobre la historia, ecologia, y tecnologia propia de su ârea. Sin embargo, ODESEN esta experimentando ciertas problemas internas en cuanto al manejo de las ganancias y de los recursos colectivos. En otras ocasiones, por tener otros compromisos, se han descuidado el buen funcionamiento dei proyecto. Quizâs este tipo de problemas son casi inevitables para un grupo recién formado y con poea experiencia anterior en la materia. La verdadera prueba dei éxito de ODESEN vendra probablemente cuando se acaba el financiamiento externo por CI y el grupo deberia sobrevivir de las gananeias generadas por su propia gestion dei turismo. 
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justa la forma en que se esta tratando de desvirtuar 10 actuado. 
En documento titulado, -RESUMEN DE LA PRIMERA FASE DEL ESTUDIO (14 DE 
AGOSTO AL 1 DE OCTUBRE)"' usted informa que se ha relacionado con el grupo 
de dirigentes de la ONG, "ODESEN" quienes fueron los coordinadores de sus giras. 
lNo es este el grupo de dirigentes que dirige la oposicion al Rey Tito Santana? GEs 
esta dirigencia representativa de la cultura Naso? GSe comunican en el dialecto 
Naso? lVlYen en el area tradicional? Si los coordinadores de sus giras dirigen esta 
oposicion: lEsta usted seguro que las personas entrevistadas por usted fueron 
escogidas al azar? Me lIamo la atenci6n que usted no conoda al Rey Tito Santana, 
ni al Presidente dei Consejo Naso, Seiior Ricardo Pitterson hasta el 14 de diciembre 
de 2004 que se encontraron por casualidad en mi oficina. lSu estudio solo necesita 
de la participacion de una faedon? No debe oMdar la responsabilidad moral y ética 
de ser un portavoz imparcial de la herencia y riqueza que la cultura NASO 
representa y significa para nuestro pais, asi como la obligacion de contribuir a 
la solud6n de los problemas originados por la dinamica contemporanea. Sus 
planteamientos deben emanar de un pensamiento cuidadoso, que impida que los 
sentimientos de pertenencia en forma personallzada se transformen en factor de 
oposicion a 10 externo... debemos respetar las identidades culturales pero 
reconociendo que perteneeemos a un solo mundo. 
El numeral 5 que menciona la visita dei Sindicato Unlco Nacional de Trabajadores 
de la Industria de la Construcci6n y Similares (SUNTRACS) a los campamentos de 
Rancho Quemado y Michila en el rio Bonylc en agosto de 2004, representado por 
los Seiiores Jaime Caballero y Balbino Priee me sorprendi6 porque a su 
regreso ellos no plantearon a la empresa 10 que usted informa. por eso solicite a 
esta organizaci6n sindical, dandole una copia de su resumen, una 
explicacion. Adjunto la nota que SUNTRACS le envio y amablernente nos copio por 
ellnterés mostrado en mejorar nuestra relacion obrero-patronal. 
En los numerales 6, 7 Y 8 usted propone el aplazamiento dei proyecto hasta que el 
Pueblo Naso realiee nuevas elecciones, no por oposici6n a un desarrollo 
hidroeléctrico sino, por consideraciones de transparencia. GAcaso los que solicltan 
esta transparencia han sido transparentes con 10 que ellos manejan? En el nurneral 
10 usted 10 afirma y soIicita comprensl6n por ser un grupo recién formado 0 con 
poca experiencia. 
En el resto dei resumen usted individualiza: esperanza 0 futuro en cierto proyecto 0 
actividad con resultados economicos por ver, falta de equidad en la distribucion de 
un beneficio, cultura de "clientelismo politico" dasificaci6n dada por usted a un 
tipo de corrupcion, falta de comunicacion y de soluciones por entidades 
gubernamentales. lVemos arboles 0 el bosque?lNO ES LA FALTA DE UNA 
ECONOMÎA DE SUSTENTO GRAN PARTE DE LOS PROBLEMAS DE LA ETNIA NASO? 
Me decia un viejo Naso que cuando tenia para el café no tenia para azucar; 
que cuando tenia recursos para lIegar al hospital no tenia recursOS para la compra 
de medicinas y que los oponentes al desarrollo tienen de alguna forma su pan 
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asegurado. La mayoria no tiene cobertura dei régimen de seguridad sodal ••• por no 
tener empleo. El que tiene empleo no vive en las comunldades Naso. La agricultura 
es de subsistenda y 10 poco que tratan de vender es sin acceso a un mercado 
confiable. La educadon secundaria es fuera dei area Naso. El costo de movilizadon 
cada dia les es mas difidl por el aumento en el costo dei combustible. La 
convivenda comunitaria NASO transmite su cultura, sus costumbres, su 
dialecto, en fin, su identidad. lNo se estan desintegrando las comunidades en el 
territorio Naso? lCual es el motivo de un precarismo NASO en la comunidad dei 
Silendo ... fuera de su territorio? lNo buscamos sombra cuando calienta el sol? Don 
Jason, no pretendo saber sobre su especialidad y menos refutar sus 
planteamientos de forma dentifica pero si estoy convenddo que el proyecto 
hidroeléctrico traera mas benefidos que perjuicios a la Etnia Naso. La garantia de 
un manejo adecuado de los recursos naturales con el respeto y valoraci6n de las 
diferendas culturales que forman parte fundamental y legitima dei modo de vida 
de la Etnia Naso con el desarrollo de derta infraestructura solidtada 0 aceptada 
por ellos ayudara a inidar el fortalecimiento economico necesario para que las 
comunidades mantengan su identidad. No olvldemos que otras comunidades, que 
pertenecen a este mundo, tienen derecho a una energia, mas barata, mas 
conflable, para fomentar el desarrollo de actividades alternas al mono cultivo 
bananero. El mundo comerdal aunque --GLOBAUZADOH permite a los paises 
desarrollados imponer barreras arancelarias para proteger sus intereses. Mientras 
la OMC discute esto, gran parte de la poblaci6n (80,000) que depende dei 
cultivo bananero quedara sin ingresos salariales 0 tendran que optar por salarios 
de 15 a 25 centésimos de dolar la hora (Nicaragua y Âfrica). 
Un saludo, Feliz Pascua y Aiio 2005. 
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Appendix VI: Petition demanding government support for Naso elections. 
El Pueblo Naso Reclama 
jELECCIONES YA! 
Considerando que: 
1. El dia 9 de septiembre de 2004 moradores y dirigentes de diferentes 
comunidades deI ârea N aso reunidos en la casa comunal de Sieyik con el 
Mayor Olmedo Moreno de la Policfa de Bocas deI Toro acordaron formar una 
comisi6n de ambas partes en el conflicto interno para coordinar la fecha de 
elecciones para designar ellegitimo Rey Naso Tjër Di. 
2. Los dias 13 de septiembre y 19 de octubre los miembros de tal comisi6n se 
reunieron en el distrito de Changuinola con la A1caldesa, Gobernadora y 
representantes deI Ministerio de Gobierno y Justicia para decidir sobre una 
fecha a mediano plazo para la celebraci6n de dicha elecciones. 
3. A mâs de 2 meses después de haberse reunido con las autoridades todavia no 
tenemos ningûn compromiso formaI sobre la fecha prevista para estas 
elecciones tan importantes para nosotros y el futuro de la regi6n. 
Pedimos al Ministerio de Gobierno y Justicia que: 
o Cumpla con los compromisos establecidos con el puebla Naso para anunciar 
la fecha de elecciones sin mâs tardar. 
Firma Comunidad No. de Cedula Fecha 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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Appendix VII: Newspaper article on Naso leadership conflict (January 28th, 
2005). 
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GRUPOS ADVERSOS AL MONARCA ELECTO RETlENEN EL POOER 
Rey Tito Santana espera recuperar su trono 
Los nasos son un puebla pequeno que se mantiene casi puro y es la ûniea 
monarqula que sobrevive en ellstmo. 
ANGEL SANTIAGO PIMENTEL 
ESPECIAL PARA LA PRENSA 
nadonales@prensa_com 
EL SILENCIO, Bocas dei Toro. Han 
pasado 24 dlas desde que la unica 
monarquia que subsiste en la Republica 
de Panama, la de los nasos 0 teribes, 
volvi6 a ser victima de las intrigas y la 
v;oIencia. 
Fue la quinta vez que un grupo de 
indigenas se tom6 el palacio de su rey, 
Tito Santana, y trato de raptar a su 
esposa e hijos, en la comunidad de 
Sieyie, regi6n dei Teribe. 
LA PRENSAIA. SANTIAGO PIMENTEL 
Eneida Gamarra. esp0s8 dei destronado 
rey naso Tito Santana, y sus hijos,luego de 
A pesar de que Santana acudi6 a las escapar dei ceroo de sus enemlgos. 
autoridades dei Ministerio de Gobienno y 
Justieia, sigue destronado, sin palacio y como un paria, ha tenido que pedi~e 
ayuda a una hija en Changuinala. 
Todo indica que tendra que esperar hasta el 3 de abril, cuando se convoque a 
una nueva elecci6n para saber si 10 ratifocan en el trono a el poder cambia de 
soberano. 
No obstante, su tia, Valentin Santana, un anciano de corto hablar, poca 
educacion y carâcter pasivo, dejo muy dara que no quiere eleceiones, mucho 
menos ahora que detenta el poder. 
Los nasos 0 leribes 
El puebla naso es un grupo étnico pequeiio, 2 mil 800 miembros seglin el 
censo de 2000, el eual tiende a desaparecer. Se caracteriza pOl" su 
endogamia (matrimonio sélo entre miembros de una misma comunidad) y con 
ramifleaciones en Costa Rica. Eslà localizado al suroeste de la poblaci6n de 
http://mensual.prensa.comlmensuallcontenidol2oo5/01/28/hoy/nacionalesll1 8728.htrnl 2006-06-19 
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De noche 
Restaurantes 
Recetario 
SEPARATAS 
Pulso de 1. Nad6n 
AYUDA 
Gula ""1 sItIo 
Tarifas 
LQuienes samos" 
VJSITA 
Defensorfil dei 
pueblo 
Changuinola, a una hora en lancha, aguas arriba por los rios Changuinola y 
Teribe. 
La conspiracl6n 
Los hechos se suscitaron el 4 Y 5 de enero pasados. Eneida Gamarra, 
esposa dei monarca, relat6 a La Prensa que a eso de las 3:00 a.m. de ese 
martes 4 hubo mucha conmoci6n. La gente lIegaba mâs y mâs. Trai6 de 
comunicarse con su esposo para informane 10 que sucedla, pero los rebeldes 
se tomaron el teléfono publico. 
Eneida acus6 a Adolfo Raul Viliagra de ser el responsable de la conspiraci6n 
en la tierra naso, y agreg6 que tuvo que salir luego de que el sargento Ciro 
Bonilia le advirti6 que huyera para evitar cualquier riesgo, sobre todo euando 
los insurrectos lograron capturar el bote dei monarca. 
Habla el rey 
Decepcionado, el rey Tito Santana explic6 que euando se suscit6 la revuelta 
el 4 Y 5 de enero, estaba en la ciudad de Panama con funcionarios dei 
Minislerio de Educacién para traiar de implementar un plan bilingüe para los 
pueblos indigenas. En eso recibi6 una liamada de un familiar, que le 
informaba que el grupo encabezado por Adolfo Villagra, Félix Sénchez y su 
tio Valentin Santana se habla tomado el palacio, violentando sus derechos 
reales como autoridad y los de su familia. 
Narr6 que los alzados rompieron candados, sacaron los bienes de sus hijos y 
los personales, entraron al palacio y destruyeron documentos histéricos 
sobre el origen de su pueblo que esta ban archivados en la oficina real. 
"La intencién de elios era secuestrar a mi familia para que yo abandonara el 
poder, porque hasia ahora no han podido justificar ante el pueblo mi 
separacion dei cargo·. comenta. 
Los alzados rechazan al rey electo en 1998, por apoyar el proyecto hldroeJéctrlco Bonylc y una 
ley comarcal. 
Autorldades pasivas 
En Panamâ, Saniana presento su inquietud ante el Ministerio de Gobierno y 
; Justicia, el pasado 21 de enero, y se le convenci6 de que era mejor esperar 
. una nueva elecci6n, la cual se celebrarâ el 3 de abrii. Pero antes de liegar a 
esa fecha, se realizarâ un censo de poblaci6n el 17 Y 18 de febrero proximos. 
Intereses ocultos 
El rey Saniana dijo que Adolfo Villagra y Félix Sanchez estén motivados por 
un Interés muy grande y que su disconformidad radica en que no desean que 
se construya el proyecto hidroeléctrico sobre el rio Bonyic, el que éI, Tito 
Santana, si apoya, asi corna el proyecto de ley que crea la comarca naso. 
Saniana revel6 que el proyecto de la comarca esté caminando; que hace un 
mes se revis6 el documento en su primer borrador, de 10 eual se encarg6 la 
Comisi6n de Asuntos Indlgenistas de la Asamblea Nacional. 
Ademas, denunci6 que los que se oponen a su reinado estén siendo 
financiados por extranjeros. Enfil6 sus acusaciones contra Osvaldo Jordan, 
http://mensual.prensacomlmensual/contenido/2005/0 1 /28/hoy/nacionaleslI18728.html 
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asesor de ODES EN, una organizaciôn no gubemamental que trabaja en el 
ârea, y que apoya a los sublevados. 
"Vo, Tito Santana, responsabilizo a mi tio Valentin, a Adolfo Villagra y a Félix 
Sanchez de todo 10 que le acontezca a mi familia". 
"El Consejo y el pueblo naso no han dado permise al asesor Osvaldo Jordan 
para hablar en nombre de los nasos", dijo. 
Asimismo, denunci6 que el canadiense Jason Piagement, quien realiza un 
estudio sociol6gico de los nasos para obtener un doctorado, esté financiando 
a los sublevados para lograr su derrocamiento. 
Goipistas prohiben aeceso de periodistas al Teribe 
ALlO ayer, el grupo de nasos sublevados mantiene bajo su poder el palacio 
dei rey Tito Santana. Su tlo, Valentin Santana, prohibi6 el acceso de los 
periodistas a Sieyic y orden6 a dos nasos armados vigilar las riberas dei rio 
para someter al monarca si osa acercarse. 
La primera autoridad de Bocas dei Toro, la gobernadora Ester Mena de Chiu, 
esté a la espera de que la Direceién Nacional de Politica Indigenista dei 
Ministerio de Gobiemo y Justicia, se reûna con las partes para bajar las 
tensiones y propiciar la celebraci6n de las eleceiones. 
Los comicios dei 3 de abril seran supervisados par el Tribunal Electoral, el 
; cual adelanta los preparativos que garanticen la pureza y la transparencia dei 
. sufraglo. 
Ademâs en naclonaJes 
• Rey Tito Santana espera recuperar su trono 
• Primer plana: Protestas en proyecto dei MIVl 
• Primer ~ano: ladrones se Ilevan 2 mil dOIares 
• Primer plana: Entregan estudios para mercado 
• Construiran relkmo sanitario en Renacimiento 
• Registran dos nuevos casos de malaria 
• Reclaman mas médicos 
• Productores analizarân el TLC 
• MEDUC distingue a graduandos 
• Homenaje p6stumo al musico Rony Bianco 
• Ordenan restituci6n de funcionario 
• Alemân acepta reunirse con transportistas 
[~ ENVlfIILO fil UN f'IoHIGO 1 
œpliL~i-!ftid;;';"fi 
Corporaci6n La Prensa TEL (507)222-1222 
La Prensa Web TEL 323-7292/ 323-7338 
Apartado 6-4586 Et Dorado Ave. 12 de octubre, Halo Pintade Panamé, Repûblica de 
Panama 
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Appendix VIII: Govemment of Panama research permit NO.04-04. 
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"CreaT, Fomentar y Comunicar Cultura" 
Central Telef6nica 211-4000/4800/4900 
AUTORIZACION PARA INVESTIGACléN ANTROPOLOGICA 
No. 04-05 
El suscrito, Direclor Nacional dei Patrimonio Hist6rico encargado, en uso de sus facultades 
legales, 
Conslderando: 
1. Que el Antrop61ogo Jason Jacques Paiement, de nacionalidad canadiense, de la 
Universidad de McGiII, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, ha soIicitado permise para realizar un 
proyecto de investigaciones antropolélgicas titulado "Derechos Indigenas y Manejo de 
Recursos Naturales en el Distrito de Changuinola" en la provincia de Bocas dei Toro. 
2. Que el Antrop61ogo Jason Jacques Paiement ha presentado una propuesta cientifica de 
trabajo completa indicando que el area de estudio incluira el corregimiento dei Teribe; que 
los trabajos incluiran entrevistas a los campesinos, indigenas y funcionarios dei gobiemo 
panameno que habitan la zona, desde marzo a diciembre de 2005 y que no incluiran 
excavaciones arqueol6gicas ni recoIecci6n de materiales culturales de ninguna Indole. 
3. Que esta propuesta ha sido evaluada par personal especializado de esta Direcci6n, 
encontrandola completa y satisfactoria. 
4. Que se realiz6 una entrevista con el Antrop6logo Jason Jacques Paiement donde se 
discutieron ampfiamente los pormenores dei plan de trabajo y la perspectivas de la 
investigaci6n. 
Resuelve: 
1. Autorizar la investigaci6n antropol6gica titulada "Derechos Indigenas y Manejo de 
Recursos Naturales en el Distrito de Changuinola" en la provincia de Bocas dei Toro por 
el Antrop6logo Jason Jacques Paiement. 
2. Informar al Antrop61ogo Jason Jacques Paiement que debera permitir las inspecciones y 
supervisi6n que estime conveniente esta Direcci6n, de acuerdo a 10 estipulado en la Ley 
14 de 5 de maya de 1982 y modificada por la Ley 58 de 7 de agosto de 2003. 
3. Informar al Antrop61ogo Jason Jacques Paiement que debera presentar un info 
dei proyeclo de investigaci6n en el idioma castellano a esta Direcci6n. 
4. Informar a la Antrop6logo Jason Jacques Paiement que este permiso se 
segun 10 estime conveniente esta Direcciôn, facuHada por la Ley 14 de 5 
Apartado postal No. 0816-07812 Zona 5, Panama 
www: Inac.gob.pa 
Appendix X: Election agreement between the Ministry of Government and 
Justice and Tito Santana. 
ACTA DE ACUERDO 
ELECCIONES NASO TJER DI 
II DE ENERO DE 2005 
En el dia de boy 21 de enero 2005, en reWli6n en el Hotel Gran Changuinola, Provincia de Bociis dei Toro, con la Direcci6n Nacional de Polltica Indigenista. La Alcaldesa de Changuinola, funcionarios dei Tribunal Electoral y la Comisi6n de la regi6n Nasa Tjer Di para fijar la fecha de las elecciones para elegir al 
nuevo Rey Nasa Tjer Di. 
Se Ueg6 al siguiente acuerdo: 
1. Se establece el dfa de las elecciolles para el 3 de abril de 2005, la 
CODVocatOrÎa se harâ .30 dias antes dei proceso electoral y previo a la 
confecci6n dei padr6n electoral. 
2. Las postulaciones se presentanin mediante memorial finnado por el 
aspirante, pccvio cumplimiento de los requisitos y la postulaci6n tendra que hacerse de acuerdo a la costumbre Naso tjer Di. Tendra lUI periodo de postulaci6n de121 de encra ailS de febrero de 2005. 
3. Se utiIizara una boleta de votaci6n con numeraci6n y color asignada de 
acuerdo al orden de postuIaci6n de los candidatos. 
4. Habrân once centras de votaci6n que a continuaci6n se detalla: 
1. Siey-llik 
2. Siey-king 
3. Solong 
4.Bonyuc 
S. Sori 
6. Santa Rosa 
7. Changuinola 
8. Dluy 
9 .. Sansan 
10.La Tigra 
I1.Guabito 
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